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INTRODUCTION
.Among

advanced

.tin..

-topoi

cant philosophical theses
that Descartes

probably none is regarded as
more influential in the
development of Western thought thar.
his views about the nature
tund ana body and the relation
of persons to
,

each.

men, that there

It is sury.r

is so little consensus with
respect to exactly

What tr)0Se views were and more
»
surprising still that there has
been little attention paid by
commentators to Descartes : argume
ior his views.

It is my purpose here to examine
ids arguments

one of those views, Descartes*
claim, that he is not identical
w
h_o bo^.y.
in so doing i shall a3.so have
occasion to discuss

Descartes* arguments for the claim that
Ids essence is tc think
To provide a background for our
investigation, we should

distingu ish among the following claims:
I)

Mind and body are distinct.

2)

Minds are thinking things.

3)

Bodies are extended tilings.

4)

Minds are essentially chinking tilings

5)

Bodies are essentially extended things

6)

Persons think

7)

Persons are essentially thinking things

8)

p e r s ons are not essentially extended things

9)

Persons are not bodies

10)

Persons are minds

„

.

H)
**

^

)

Persons are extended.

Persons have bodies

.

13)

Persons ere the union of a
mind and a body.
Tnere is a divergence of
opinion among philosophical
commentators regarding which of the
above claims Descartes would
embrace and
what he means by them. Generally
it is agreed that he held 1
(
) - ( 9
hut there is disagreement over
his commitment to ( 10 - 13
)
Ke
(
).
could not have held them all.

(

10 ) is

r.ot

;

compatible with (13),

and for Descartes, it is not
compatible with (II).

The commentators on Descartes,
at least the interesting ones,
fall into two groups. One consists
of those who think that

Descartes held

(

10 ) but not (13).

tnrr* he held (13) but not (10).
'"

or °

The other consists of those who

Within these two groups commenta-

the question of Descartes* commitment
to (11) and (11)

Historically, the two groups have been about
equally represented

despite the fact that Descartes is widely reputed
as being philo-

sophy^ most explicit proponent of (13).

That so many have chosen

to disregard his pronouncements in favor of
(13) probably ewes in

large part to the notorious difficulties inherent in
the view and to

Descartes T often apparent disingenuousness in dealing with them.
shall retrain from taking

a

position on Descartes

1

I

commitment to

(10) and (13), since my aim is to focus on (9) and (7).

For that

effort, we need not settle on which of (10) and (13) Descartes

embraced
In what follows, Chapter I is devoted to discussing Descartes*

technical notions and soma difficulties
that arise for his use of
them. Chapters II and III
then examine Descartes'
arguments for the
distinctness of himself and his body.
The last half of Chapter
is taken up by a discussion
of Descartes' arguments for
the claim
that his essence is to think.

m
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CKAPTER I
The primary aim of this
work is to discover and
to examine

Descartes

1

arguments for the claim that he
is not identical with
his bixiy
That effort will involve, inter
alia, a fatrly detalle( j
examination of Descartes' claims
that mind and body are distinct
substances and that he is a substance
whose whole essence is to
think. As groundwork for what
comes later, we should first
investigate those of Descartes'
technical notions that play a primary
role in his pronouncements on
himself end his body.
.

Substance
Problems relating to the concept of
substance were apparently
of no particular interest to Descartes.

In his writings he does

not give attention to such problems for
their own sake.

His concern

is rather to use the concept of
substance in the solution of other

problems and to spend no more time treating the
concept than he
deems necessary for the discussion of other
problems.
t

thing.

or the scholastics

Since Descartes

’

,

a substance was an individual

,

concrete

training was scholastic and since he

adopted the terminology of the scholastics, it is tempting
to assume

that by ’res

5

ita .fortunately,

he too intends an individual, e.g., Socrates or Fido
the

texts do not easily support such an interpretation.

Neither toes it help much when Descartes defines the notion.
Principles

.

he says:

In the

-2 -

^

U S
Ce
GSn unders tand .nothing else
?h-n
a thing *
thoii a
which so exists that it needs
no
other thing in order to exist.i

Elsewhere we find

a

-

similar definition:

Really the notion of substance is
just this Uiat which can exist by itself
without the aid
of tny other substance.
If Descartes means that a substance
is something that needs no

ether substance in order to exist,
as the second definition seems
to
indicate, then his definition is hopelessly
circular. But even if
we ignore the apparent circularity
of the latter definition, it
is still not much help to be told
that substances are things that

can exist by themselves.

To be charitable, we can suppose that

Descartes* intent is to draw the distinction between
substance ana

attributes, the latter being thought to require the
former for their

existence

.

But, for example, suppose we grant that we cannot
conceive

of wisdom existing without its being an attribute of
something, e.g.,

Socrates.

Still it is not clear that we can think of Socrates

stripped of ail his properties.

If Socrates is a substance, iu

seems that substances too cannot exist without attributes.

In

particular, we would expect an essentialist like Descartes to
recognize that every substance is such that there is at least one

property, that which constitutes its essence, that is essential to
it.

To be sure, Descartes might have recognized this fact.

reply to Objections IV, he says:

In

,

But yet substance cannot be
first discovered
f
f Ct that it; is a th ing
-° m
that
exi-t? for Sf
exists,
thac S
xact alone is not observed
ty us. We may, however, easily
discover it
by means of any one of its
attributes because
m 0n ncticn that notMng is
possessed
LS° v
Of *10
no attributes,
of
properties, or qualities.
“° r
1S reason when we
P er "eive any attribute
.
we ._v
therefore conclude that some existing
thing
or substance to which it may be
attributed is
necessarily present.
>

*

’

-5

N0W there are three wa s of reading
V
the principle that nothing is

*

possessed of no attributes.

We can regard it as stating either

necessary or sufficient or necessary and
sufficient conditions for
the existence of an individual substance,

in defending the Cogito

passages and in his Arguments Demonstrating the
Existence of God

Descartes appeals to the principle as providing a
sufficient condition
for the existence of something. 4

But we can allow that in the present

passage it is intended to be read in the stronger fashion.
certainly it is at least to be read as providing a sufficient

condition for the existence of a substance.

And if the principle is

so read, then the passage containing it tends to support a
scholastic
viev;

of individual substance.

Wherever we find

a

property instan-

tiated, there we find also an individual substance that has

property

.

that:

Further support for such a view comes from an alternative

definition of substance given by Descartes in the reply to Obj ections
II.

He-

says there that:

Everything in which there resides immediately
as in a subject, or by means of which there
exists anything that we perceive, i.e., any
property, quality, or attribute, of which we
have a real idea, is called a Substance. 0

-4-

Ag*in it seems that substances are
the ordinary objects of
our
everyday world. However, there
is a grave difficulty in
attributing
this scholastic view to Descartes.
He repeatedly refers, throughout
his philosophical writings
to the claimed fact that there
are just
tnree substances: God, mind,
and body.
Indeed, only God properly
fits the definition according to
which substances have independent
existence. However, Descartes claimed
that substances other than
God, which he termed created substances,
need only the concurrence
of God in order to exist.

£SH2SMe

supports both the view that Descartes
thought

substances to require at least one property and
the view that there
are only two substances.

He says:

But although any one attribute is sufficient
to give us a knowledge of substance, there
is
always one principal property of substance
which constitutes its nature' and essence, and
on which all the others depend. Thus extension
in length, breadth, and depth, constitutes the
nature of corporeal substance; and thought
constitutes the nacure of thinking substance.

Descartes held that there are only two essential properties that
belong to created substance:

thought and extension.

Given that

face there seems to be only two substances, mind and body, since
ever}' created substance has only one essential property and that

property is either thought or extension.
with Descartes
is thought.

1

But that view conflicts

claim that he himself is a substance whose essence

Descartes did not think himself identical with mind,

though possibly he thought he was a mind.
There is an easy resolution to this difficulty, whose acceptance

-

,

I propose, and that is to read
Descartes as equivocating on
substance,

in sene cases when he speaks of
a substance Descartes intends
kind
St3nCS-’ as when he sa V s that there are
two created substances,
one thinking and the other
corporeal. In other cases when
Descartes
speaks Ol' a substance he intends
individual substance as when he
says that he is a substance whose
nature is to think 7
this

—~

,

m

.

case he intends a substance to be
understood as being a single
instance of a kind. When Descartes says,
"Created substances

however, whether corporeal or thinking
.. .need only the concurrence
of God

m

order to exist" we understand him to be
talking about kinds
of substance and to allow that: there
are possibly many different

individual substances, though all are either of

a

kind that think or

a kind that: are extended . 3

There is one small hitch to my interpretation.
Ssays

When Descartes

that there are three substances, God, mind, and body,
if we

unde re hand him as saying that there are tliree kinds of
substance

then we mu s

ci l

low tnat God is a kind of substance, whereas he would

seem to be an individual substance.

allow that God is sui generis

.

But that is no problem if we

He is both a kind of substance, a

kind whose members are characterized by infinite perfection, and the
only individual substance that is a member of that kind 3
.

like

tills

A view

was espoused by St. Thomas with respect: to angels.

held that an angel was both individual and

He

a separate species.

Essence

Just as he did with regard to the notion of substance, Descartes

- 6-

adopts and employs the notions of
essential property and essence
Without bothering to first introduce
the notions to his readers and
to explain the peculiarities of
his use of them. We should
attempt
to fill in the gap Descartes has left
in his discussion, but the task
wj. 11 not be an easy one
and success is far from certain.

Essentialism, broadly speaking, is the view
that there are

individuals and properties that are such that the
individuals have
those properties necessarily,

if an individual has a property

essentially, we say, then that individual could
not exist without
having that property.

In the idiom of modal logic semantics, if an

individual has a property essentially, then that individual
has that

property in every possible world containing that individual.

Some

philosophers, of course, deny that any properties are essential
to
a thing

,

but even they grant this general account of what would be

the case if an object did have a property essentially.

concern will be to assess Descartes

1

Since our

claims about' his own essence,

we will not need to adjudicate the general debate.

It may turn out,

for example, that some form of essentialism can be made defensible,

but that Descartes

1

cannot.

Alternatively, it may turn cut that

Descartes 7 essentialism is acceptable contingent upon the accept-

ability of essentialism in general.
There would seem to be two broad stages to an adequate

evaluation of Descartes 7 arguments for his essence being to think.
First, as groundwork, we ought to tease out a sort of Cartesian
analysis of

’x.

has F essentially 1

.

Then we can evaluate the

analysis and see whether
Descartes' claims about his
own essence
can be established in light
of that analysis. The
first stage

I

shall attempt below; the
second, I save for Chapter
As a seep coward understanding
Descartes' essentialism we
can
examine several varieties that
have appeared in the tradition
to see
how Descartes' compares. Among
those offered we can distinguish
four that are instructive for
our purpose. 10

m.

A

-

teffs
x, there
L

fssena aUsm;

for every individual,

is a description, D, and a
property
U h h t ’ Under D it: is necessarily
’
true
that x i- p

Or, what comes to much the same
thing:

For every individual, x, x has some
properties
and G, such that necessarily, for
everv x
if x has F , then x has G

t

’

5

.

Roderick Chisholm has labeled this variety
of essentialism spurious,
since it tells us not that some individual
has some property
necessarily, but that every individual is such
that there are pairs
of properties such that necessarily if an
individual has one
he has the other,

,

then

if anything, this doctrine concerns a relationship

among properties, rather than a relations Flip between
individuals and
the properties that they possess.

It is surely not Descartes® essentialism, since his concerns,
as we might put it, the manner in which individuals possess
some of

their properti.es

.

Spurious Essentialism, however, does go part of

the v;ay toward capturing one of Descartes® intuitions about the

relationships that obtain among properties.
says:

In Princioj.e

LIU

he

^

,

- 8-

B«t although any one attribute
is sufficient
°
S a knoWied
of substance, there
1
P r ln pal pr °P erty ° f substance
which
ruch constitutes
consul
-i
its
nature and essence and
on which all the others
depend
Thus ex***?'* and depth, constitutes
the nature of corporeal
the'nature
substance: and thought
cons titutes the nature of thinking
substance h*

^

|^"

'

When he says that the modes a
thing has depend upon its
essential attribute, Descartes means
to affirm a principle like:
p *)

(*) (F) (if F is a mode of thinking,
then
necessarily if x has ?, then x thinks)

Here, and in other passages, Descartes
seems to embrace a nomenclature according to which there are
two primary (essential) prope:
ties of created substances, thinking
and extension, and all other

properties that a thing may possess are simply
modes of one of
these two primary properties. Thus he
holds that the various ways
in which one can be said to think, e.g.,
to believe, to hope, to

fear, to wish, etc., are each of them modes
of the more general

property

,

thinking

The same holds with extension and its modes

.

length, breadth, etc.
its essence.

Given any attribute of

a

thing, we can infer

For example, if we are told that a particular substance

has the property of

wishing for rain, we can infer that its essence

is thinking.

We con see, then, the sense in which this part of Descartes
v.iev;

is captured by Spurious Essentialism.

T

Descartes seems to have

held that everything is such that necessarily if it has an attribute

that is a mode of thinking or extension, then it also has the

property of being

a

thinking thing or of being

ar.

extended thing.

.

-9
Descartes' view is in one respect
stronger, and in another more
restricted, than Spurious Essentialism.
The latter holds only
that some properties are such
that necessarily whatever has
the one
h ” S ttle other > 3-- e -! pairs of
properties are such as to be, by

necessity, jointly exemplified.

Descartes' view is more restricted

in that for him the jointly exemplified
pairs are ordered. 13

it-

is not necessarily the case that
whatever thinks also hopes, but it
is necessarily the case that whatever

hopes also thinks.

Descartes'

view is stronger in that it, unlike
Spurious Essentialism, holds
not only that attributes are necessarily
jointly exemplified, but
also that things necessarily have at least
one of the properties
that they have
This is *
a

b °°d
f

place to bring up what might be thought to be

problem for Descartes

property.

1

view that substances have only one essential

It would seem that God, who is an individual substance,

is privileged to possess not just one essential
property, as is the

case with created substances, but rather

a

rich array of them.

Descartes does not speak to the problem, but it is easy to see that
it can be circumvented

.

We simply regard infinite perfection as

being God’s one essential property.

Then infinite perfection, like

the primary attributes of corporeal and mental substances, can be

viewed as supporting all of the other of God’s attributes, which
are its modes.

Being infinitely perfect, then, entails being

necessarily existent, omniscient, omnipotent, etc.

This account

does not achieve exact symmetry with the case of created substances,

- 10 -

sine, God, unlike the latter,
cannot fail to have any of
the modes
Of his essential attribute.
But the account seems close
enough to
enable Descartes to claim
That all substances have one
essential
property on which all their
others depend.
Tnis is also a good point
at which to mention that
most of
Descartes * pronouncements on
substance, essence, and mode
are just
that, pronouncements. There
is very little argumentation
for any of
the claims made with respect
to Descartes » technical notions,
it
is, of course, part of the
nature of one kind of system building
that the foundation is left
unchallenged. There the interesting

question is whether the foundation
supports the superstructure it is
claimed to support. And, to be fair,
Descartes does provide argumentation when he builds on top of his
basic principles. But we
will later have occasion to lament,
as some of his objectors did,
Descar ces' lack of support for his basic
claims. This will be
especially true when we return to Descartes’
discussion of his
essence and the essence of mind and body in
Chapter

m

0

Spurious Sssentialism is perhaps most interesting from
the

point of view of contemporary discussion, because it seems
to be
involved in the notion of essentialism to which Quine so
vigorously
objects.

The now famous passage in which Quine sets out his objec-

tion is from Word and Obj ect, p. 199:

Perhaps I can evoke the appropriate sense of
bewilderment as follows
Mathematicians may
conceivably be said to be necessarily rational
and not necessarily two-legged; and cyclists
necessarily two-legged and not necessarily
.

.

- 11 -

nsl
But what Of an individual
who
rn,m° among his
counts
eccentricities both
mathematics and cycling? is
this concrete
individual, necessarily rational
and contingently two-legged or vice
versa? Just
insofar as we are talking
referentialiy
object, with no special bias
toward
background grouping of mathematicians
as
against cyclists or vice versa,
there is
no semblance of sense in rating
some of
nis attributes as necessary
and others as
contingent. Some of his attributes
count
as important and others as
unimportant,
yes; some as enduring and others
as
fleeting; but none as necessary
or
contingent
*

.

f
..

1)

It seems that Quine here has in mind
the principles:

Necessarily

(

x

)

(if x is a cyclist, x is two-legged)

and
2)

Necessarily (x) (if x is a mathematician,
x is rational)

These principles, it should be noted,
provide an instantiation of
Spurious Essentialism.

cyclis t, and bein£
and

They hold that the properties being a

two-leg ged

,

as well as the properties being a

rationa l, are such that necessarily whatever

has the former also has the latter.

principles.

However, these are innocuous

io experience Quine’s sense of bewilderment

comu.se them with their de

re_

we.

must

counterpart principles:

3)

(x) (if x is a cyclist, x is necessarily tv/o-legged)

4)

(x) (if x is a mathematician

and
,

x is

necessarily rational)

But whereas (1) and (2) have a solid claim to truth, (3) and (4)
are clearly false.

conjunction with:

It is only by employing (3) and (4) in

)

- 12 -

5)

(x) (if X is a cyclist,
x is not necessarily
rational)

6>

<X)

and
(

“o-legged"'

athe!" atiCian> x iS nOC

that Quine’s objection strikes
us as worthy.

^cessarily

But again, if

( 5 ) and
(6) look at all attractive to an
essentialist, it is only because
we confuse them with their
de dicto counterparts that
instantiate

Spurious Essentialism, i.e.:
7)

-

necessarily (x) (if x is a cyclist,
x is rational)

and
8) - necessarily (x) (if x is a
mathematician, x is

two-legged

w hile Spurious Essentialism may serve
the useful purpose of
enabling us to understand Quine's objection
to essentialism and to
avoid his bewilderment, we have seen that
it is not rich enough to

capture Descartes’ essentialist doctrine. 14

We should move on,

then, to our survey of the available varieties.

Next we consider:

-Trivia
Essentialism
For every individual, x
there is some property, F, such that x necessarily
y
has F.
.i-

;

This variety or essentialism is trivial in that there are

certain uninteresting, but universally instantiated, properties
that

everything can be said to have necessarily.

For example, nothing

could lack the property of being self-identical or of being either
red or non-red.

Descartes’ essentialism clearly fits this variety,

though not in virtue of his countenancing such universally instantiated properties as essential to their possessors.

Rather, Descartes

.

,

,

- 13 -

held that all Substances
in fact have one essential
property, but
one such property only.
Thinking belongs to mental
substances,
extension to corporeal substances,
and infinite perfection
to God.
It is perhaps because ne
thought substances to possess
one essential
property only that Descartes
conflates the notions of essence
and
essential property speaking at
times of his essence being
thinking
and at others of thinking being
essential to him. If he had
regarded
universal properties as essential
to their owners, then Descartes
would have been saddled with an
infinite number of essential
properties and a very inflated essence
(if we regard a thing's
essence as’ being the sum of its essential
properties).
,

It might be supposed that Descartes
failed to regard universal

properties as essential, because he failed
to recognize such
properties at all.

But while it isn't clear what Descartes
would

have thought of such putative properties as
being such that 1+1-2
he at least recognized some properties
that all things have and

have necessarily.

Duration is an example.

He says:

Finally the distinction of reason is between
substance and some one or its attributes without
which it is not possible that we should have a
distinct knowledge of it, or between two such
attributes of the same substance. This distinction is made manifest from the fact that we cannot
have a clear and distinct idea of such a substance if we exclude from it such an attribute;
or we cannot have a clear idea of the one of the
two attributes if we separate from it the other.
.For example, because there is no substance which
does not cease to exist when it ceases to endure
duration is only distinct from substance by
thought
„

This suggests that duration is an inseparable property of things.

.

.

.

Ir something ceases to have
it, it ceases to exist.

But Descartes
does not recognize duration
to be an essential property
of things
Elsewhere he treats existence
similarly. It is a property
everything must have if it exists,
but it is not an essential
property
of anything (though necessary
existence is a property of God). 15
So we cannot attribute to Descartes
the principle:
S>

If x has F necessarily, then x
has F essentially

That is, we cannot conclude from a
thing's having a property in
every world in which it exists that
it has it essentially in
Descartes' sense.
10
^

havfngr

But we can attribute to Descartes the
principle:

~ essentiall y

>

then * cannot exist without

That is, if something is essentially F
in Descartes' sense, then
it

.is

necessarily F.

Descartes supports this view in Motes Directed

£agjBSLJ-£6£^n_PxograiiCTe when

he replies to Regius' claim that the

mind may be a mode of corporeal substance.

He says:

This assertion involves a contradiction, no
less than if he had said, The laws of
nature allow that a mountain can exist with
or without a valley.
For a d?Lstinction must
be drawn between things which from their
nature can change, like the facts that I am
at present either writing or not writing, that
one man is prudent, another imprudent; and
things which never change, such as are all the
things that pertain to the essence of anything,
as is generally acknowledged by philosophers
Of course there is no doubt that it can' be
said of contingent things that the laws of
nature permit these things to be either one
way or another--for instance, the fact that
I am at present either writing or not writing
But when the point at issue is the essence of
something, it is manifestly foolish and
f

1

contradictory to say that the laws of nature
a.^low that it may be after any
fashion save
the fashion after which it really
is, 17
Descartes fails to distinguish here between
the properties that
a thing has without which it could not
exist and those that just

happen never to change for as long as the

tiling exists.

At any rate

the passage does support the view that a thing
can’t lose its

essential properties while it continues to exist.

Descartes affirms

(10) explicitly in reply to Arnauld when he says, "For in my
opinion

nothing without which a thing can still exist is comprised
in its
essence

,,ls
.

.

.

Descartes’ essentialism, of course, is less general than

Essentialism.

He holds not only that everything has some

property necessarily, but also that everything is such that there
is some property that it has necessarily and there is something else

that fails to have it.

That is, he holds the principle:

(x) (3P) (x necessarily has p & (By)-(y has P))

11)

Doubtless

,

Descartes thought the world such that the second conjunct

of (11) holds accidentally.

God could have made the world devoid of

bodies, for example, in which case the conjunct would be false.

$o

we should not consider it part of Descartes’ notion of the essence
of a thing that everything is such that its essential property is

lacked by something else.

C.

Arnaul dic Essentialism
For every individual, x,
there is a proper subset, F, of its non-uni versa!
properties which is such that (i) x has F necessarily, and (ii) for every individual, y, y
necessarily has the property of being either non-F
or identical with x.
;

.
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Chisholm has offered a variant
of Arnauldic Essentialism
as being
required for identification of
individuals across possible
worlds.
He offers:

For every entity x, there
are certain
properties N and E such that: x
has N in
some possible worlds and x has
non-N in
others; but x has £ in every
possible
world
which x exists; and moreover
for every entity,
y, if y has E in any
poj^ible world, then y is identical
with
,

m

X

•

Arnauldic Essentialism has coma to
be popular among present-day
essentialists
Something very much akin to it has
been espoused
by Alvin Plantinga.20 The subset
F above (and E in Chisholm’s
version) seems to capture Scotus*
notion of a haecceltas and the
.

.

associated property of having the properties
in F has come to be
called a haecceitous property or individual
essence. 21 it is a
view according to which if two things share
the same essence, then
they are identical.
The distinguishing feature of Arnauldic
Essentialism is that it

enables us to individuate things uniquely according
to their essence
or haecceitous property.

cannot be Descartes*

.

For that reason, Arnauldic Essentialism

We have seen that for the latter not every-

thing shares the same essence, but still many things do.

Created

substances divide up into two categories, thinking tilings and

corporeal things, each group with its own associated essential
property.

This suggests that Descartes is interested in those pro-

perties in virtue of which a thing is the kind of thing it is

Everything , of course, fits into many different kind categories, so

- 1 ?-

it is not alone sufficient to
explicate Descartes' notion
of
essence by saying that it is
related to kind properties,
but it
step in the right direction.
For Descartes' intellectual
predecessors, the scholastics, to ask
for a thing's essence was
to
What kind of thing it is, what
properties it must have in order
exist as that kind of thing. This
too was Descartes* concern.

is a

ask
to

For

him, as well as for the scholastics,
a thing could not become
a
thing of a kind different from what
it is in fact. For that reason,
we are not talking about a version
of Spurious Essentialism according

which pairs of properties are necessarily
co-instantiated, but
which allows the possibility- of a thing's
ceasing to have both
members of a given pair. Rather, Cartesian
essentialism begins to
oo

look like what we can label '/Aristotelian
Essentialism'

~

.

:-P ts 1 i 3 n Essentialism
For every individual
x , there is a proper subset:, F, of its nonuniversal properties which is such that x
necessarily has F.
:

.

Descartes

Essentialism.

r

essentialism seems to be

a

variant of Aristotelian

For Descartes every individual substance has a

subset, one that is in fact a unit set, of its non-universal

properties, which it has essentially.

But what subset?

How do we

specify which of a thing r s non-universal properties is its essential

property?

Descartes does not say.

We know only that created

substances divide into those that are essentially thinking and those
that are essentially extended.

But why divide them that way?

To answer our question it may be instructive to look at

passage from C.D. Broad

f

s

The Mind and its Place in Nature.

a

In his

,
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introductory chapter Broad set? out

view of substance and essence

a

that is very cj.ose to Descartes' own
view.

notion of a "differentiating attribute

"

Broad introduces the

that comes quite close to

Descartes* notion of an essential property.

He says:

There are certain attributes which anything
must have if it is to be a substance at all
I should say that anything that is a
substance; must have some duration and must
be
capable of standing in causal relations
Or
since some people deny the reality of time
and or causation, let us say that anything
that is a substance must have those characteristics whatever they may be, which appear
to human minds as duration and causation.
I
will call these "Substantial Attributes."
There are other attributes which a thing need
not have in order to be a substance. It
need not be extended and it need not even
appear to be so. Again, it need not have the
power of feeling or cognising, and it need
not even seem to have tnis
.Now it must be
admitted that every actual substance must
have some special attribute or other beside
the substantial attributes which are essential to all substances. This special attribute will make it a substance of such and
such a kind, e.g., a material or a mental
substance. Let us call suen attributes
"Differentiating Attributes." It will be
necessary to describe the nature of a differentiating attribute a little more fully.
(1) It must not be essential to substance
as such, even if in fact it be possessed by
all substances. E.g., if materialism be
true, extension is an attribute which is in
fact possessed by all substances
But it
is a differentiating attribute for all that,
since it is not essential for a substance
as such to be extended.
(2) It is a determinable which is not itself a determinate under
any higher determinable. This condition is
needed for the following reason. Suppose that
the properties of being gold being silver
and so on, are ultimate and irreducible. We
do not want to count these as differentiating
attributes: but, if we did not add the present
.

,

.

.

.

.

,
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condition, it is difficult to see why we
should not have to do so. But these
properties would be determinates under
the higher determinable "matter," and
so
they will not have to be counted as
differentiating attributes if we add the
condition that such attributes must be
de terminable s of the highest order. 22
There are several important features of Broad's
analysis
thot should be noticed.

First, he is concerned to distinguish,

as Descartes t view apparently does, between
those attributes that

are had universally by all substances (following
common usage of
the notion, Broad regards these "substantial
attributes" as

essential to substances) and the kind attributes that are not
necessarily had by all substances.

In the former category he

places duration, as uescartes does, and in the latter category he
puts extension and thought.

Broad's first condition on differen-

tiating attributes, that they are not essential to substances as
such, supports my claim that while Descartes thinks that the

essential attribute of a particular substance is not shared by all
substances, this is a result of the way God has made the world.
He might have made it differently.

Broad* s point here is that it

is in virtue of being the kind of substance it is that

a.

substance has the differentiating attributes that it has.

particular
Differen-

tiating attributes are not essential to substances qua substances,

but

qu_a

the kind of substance that they are.

The second condition, I think, is at the heart of Descartes 1

notion of an essential property.

For him essential properties are

the defining properties of natural kinds of the highest level of
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belong to each of its parts.

The other is that differentiating

attributes must be simple in that
they cannot be analyzed into
a
conjunction or disjunction of other
properties
Descartes certainly held the first of the above
conditions to apply to corporeal
suds trances
His view with respect to mental
substances was that
they are not divisible into simpler
or smaller parts. With regard
to the condition that differential
attributes be simple it is not
clear that Descartes was in agreement,
at least as pertains to
.

.

,

thought.

We shall discuss the question in the
following section.

After explicating the notion of a
differentiating attribute,
Brcao goes on to discuss how the notion
can be used.

He says;

A ’'Differentiating -Attribute Monist"
holds
thac there is in ract only one differentiating

attribute. Materialists, like Hobbes, and
Mentalis ts 3.ike Leibniz, are monists of this
kind. A "Differentiating-Attribute Pluralist"
holds that there are two or more differentiating attributes. Pluralists of this kind
can be further subdivided according to two
different principles. (1) We may take the
trivial principle of dividing them according
to the number of differentiating attributes
they accept. E.g., Descartes was a dualist
and accepted two only:
... (2) A Much more
important principle of division is the following.
Some people who accept a plurality
of differentiating attributes hold that one
and Che same substance can have several or
all of these attributes.
Thus Spinoza held
that God has all the infinite number of differentiating attributes
Others consider the
various differentiating attributes to be
incompatible with each other. This view was
held by Descartes of the two differentiating
attributes which he accepted.. The first
kind of dif feren elating -attribute pluralist
can (though he ‘ieed not) believe that there
is only one substance, as Spinoza did.
The
second kind of differentiating-attribute
,

.

2
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generality into which individual
substances

be divided
Bread
uses the determinable-determinate
distinction to capture this
notion, and he expresses it by saying
that there is no higher
determinable over a differentiating
attribute. Broad should have
pointed out that there is one higher
determinable over particular
differentiating attributes and that is the
determinable "differentiating attribute;" however, there are no
others.
car.

.

Unfortunately Broad’s account does not mesh
entirely with
Descartes’, since the latter does recognize
viz., "created substance."

matter

higher determinable,

Had Descartes given thought to the

he might have regarded the property having
been created by

,

God as essential to created substances.

view

a

i.im

But we can alternatively

as giving an account of the essence of created
substance

only.

If so, we can dismiss the property of having been
created

by God

ctnd

say chat there are

and extension.
tne f ii

st

.no

determinables higher than thought

The property having been created

by.

God would fail

conaitiori of dif ferentiating attributes, since relative

to created substances it would be a universal property.

Adoption

of this strategy also enables us to dismiss our previous worry about

how many of God’s properties are essential.

If Descartes’ account

is intended to apply to created substances only, then there is no

inconsistency between his claim that every substance has one

essential property only and the view that God has many.
Parenthetically, I should point out that Broad offers two

additional conditions to characterize differentiating attributes.
One is thac a differentiating attribute of a complex substance must

.

<
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piuralis.t must admit at le ast as
many dif1(3 X'fcj
substance s as there are differentiating
attributes , and lie mav cf course admit
more,
Descartes could not"~cons.is tently have
accepted
less than two substances; and
in fact he accep ted a great many more, since he
thought
that each individual mind is a
distinct subx,

stance

I have introduced this passage from
Broad so that we may keep in

mind his interpretation of Descartes

following chapter to Descartes

1

1

view as we proceed in the

arguments for the distinctness of

himself and his body and for the claim that
his essence is thought.
We shouldn't at this juncture uncritically
accept Broad's inter-

pretafion , but it is a strong candidate to consider.

One of the

consequences of Broad’s view is that if Descartes can
prove either
his claim that his essence is thought or his claim
that he and his

body are distinct, then the other claim follows with the
use of the

doctrine that differentiating attributes are incompatible with
each
other.

A difficulty for Descartes 1 adopting such a strategy to

establish his claims is that he seems not to have given argued
support to the view, if he in fact held it, that thought and extension are incompatible attributes.

But more of this in later chapters.

Thin king

Descartes gave

*

cegitatio

f

and

’

pens ee*

a

sense that ex tended

far beyond the sense that one ordinarily associates with the English

word

T

thought

(he calls them

When he gives lists of particular kinds cf thought
’

modi cogitandi *) Descartes lists many that we

would not normally include under the notion of thought.

Medita tion II he says:

In

;

,
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What is a thing which thinks?
it is
a thing which doubts,
understands, affirms
5
refUSGS Which filso

anrieels!^

’

In a retter to Mersenne

’

,

who had objected that man has no
will if

nature consists only of thought,
Descartes reminded him that
willing, understanding, imagining and
feeling are simply different
modes of thinking, which all belong
to the soul.” 25
hi.,

,T

When he defines thought, Descartes appears
to add a new dimension to the notion.

He seems to claim that we are always
conscious

of all of our thoughts

.

In Arguments Drawn up in Geometrical

Fashio n he says:
T hought is a word that covers everything that
exis cs in us in sucn a way that we are inimedi —
atsly conscious of it. Thus all the operations
cf the will, intellect, imagination, and of
the
senses are thoughts. 26

It may appear here that Descartes is referring to the
objects of

thought as that of which we are conscious, and not to our thoughts
themselves.

However

,

the same definition appears in Principle IX.

which also clarifies the sense in which sensation is an activity
of the mind
By the word thought I understand all that of
which we are conscious as operating in us
And that is why not alone understanding, buu
also feeling, are here the same thing as
thought. For if I say I see, or I walk, I
therefore am, and if by seeing and walking I
mean the action of my eyes or my legs, which
is the work of my body, my conclusion is not
absolutely certain; because it may be that,
as often happens in sleep, I think I see or
1 walk , although I never open my eyes or move
from my place, and the same thing perhaps
might occur if I had not a body at all. But if

:

- 24 -

I moan only to talk of my
sensation or
my consciously seeming to see
or toVaik
i.t oecomes quite true
because my assertion
now refers only to my mind, which
alone
is concerned with my feeling
or thinking
that I see and I walk. 2;

When Descartes sa y 5 that thought
is that of which we are
conscious as operating in us, he seems
to be referring not to what
we would call the object of a thought,
but rather to what we would
regard as the activity of thinking. It
is the activity, not the
object, of which Descartes seems to hold
that we are conscious.

Kenny seems to share this interpretation of
Descartes when he says:
.Doubting is one kind of thought; and
thought is defined precisely as~ "whatever
takes place within ourselves so that we
are conscious of it, in so far as it is
an object of our consciousness ” Therefore "if X doubr 1 know that I doubt"
follows, for Descartes, from the definition
he has giyen of thought, of which doubting
is a species or mode
We might say that
according to Descartes* definition, if we
wish to find whether a given verb 0, which
is applied to human beings
signifies a
kind of thought or not, we must ask "is
it true that when I 0 I know that I 0?"
Descartes therefore makes it true by
definition that if I think, I know that I
think 28
.

.

.

,

.

,

.

Arnauld objected to Descartes* definition by drawing attention
to the fact that there may be much in the mind of which we are not

conscious.

For example, the fetus possesses the faculty of thought

but is not conscious of it.

Descartes replied by pointing out that

when he says there is nothing in the mind of which he is not conscious
he is referring not to the faculties but to active thoughts.

says

He

:

.

,
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e
Can exist in us n o thought
of which,
?2
r ver
at thG
y moment that it is present in us
we are not conscious.
Wherefore I have no
hat th mdnd beglns to think
at the
«mo ume it is infused into
.own
the body of an
15
' h9
*
Same time oonscious of
its ^t-h
thoughts, thougn afterwards it
does not
remember that, because specific
forms of ?hese
thougats do not live* in the memory. 29

^

’

V

-

*:

The claim that we are conscious
of all our thoughts has been
a source of difficulty for
Descartes since it was first advanced.

Commentators seem to have regarded Descartes'
primary definition
as having been given ostensively,
or by example, thus opening to
objection his contention that we are always
conscious of our
thoughts.

The problem is that consciousness itself,
being a mental

activity, would surely fall under Descartes'
broad notion of thought.
But if my consciousness of some thought that
I have is itself a
thougn;., then Descartes would seem bound
to hold that I am in

turn conscious of my consciousness of my thought,
and so on, ad

infinitum
The objection was first put by Hobbes

.

In Objections III he

says

Moreover it is not by another thought that I
infer that I think; for though anyone may
think that he has thought (to think so is
precisely the same as remembering), yet we
cannot think that we are thinking, nor similarly know that we know. For this would
entail the repetition of the question an
infinite number of times; whence do you
know, that you know, that you know, that
you know?-50
It is not clear exactly how Hobbes intends his objection to be read
He may intend a sort of epistemic regress that would seem to follow

.

.

.
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lf one answers the question
"How do you know that you are
thinking?"
with one claim "I am conscious
of my thinking."
that answer would

itself be open to query

}

and so on.

An alternative interpretation

of Hobbes* intent is to see
him as offering the objection
I

adumbrated above.

The objection is that Descartes’
thesis gives

rise to an infinite regress:
b)

c)
d)

e)
f)

g)

Ue are aware of all of our thoughts.
An awareness of a thought is itself
a
separate thought.
Assume
we are aware of some thought Tl,
We are aware of T1 through a separate’
thought T2
T1 * T2.
Our awareness of T2 (call it *T3*) is
distinct from T2
And so cn
:

.

.

io avoid being committed to the regress
Descartes would have

to deny (a) or (b).
of thought

,

To deny (a) would be to give up his definition

so Descartes should deny (b).

strategy in his reply to Hobbes.

This seems to ba his

He says:

Again it is irrelevant to sav, as this
philosopher here does that one thought
cannot be the subject of another thought.
Who. except my antagonist himself, ever
imagined that it could ?31
,

But to deny (b) while at the same time retaining (a), though Descartes
does not admit as much, seems to require one to hold that a thinker’s

thought and his awareness of that thought are one and the same act
or event.

There is some evidence that Descartes thought this to be

the case.

For example, he says that we are imme diately conscious

of the thoughts that' we have

,

^

If he means that we are simul-

taneously aware of our thoughts when we have them, then

it;

seems
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thaC 0Ur #WareneSS ° f

given thought might

be part of that thought

itself.

One ordinarily thinks of the
judgement that one has a
particular thought as being consequent
upon and occurring after the
thought one judges oneself to have.
But if such judgement occurs
simultaneously with the thought one has,
then there would seem to
be a case for claiming them to
consist in one and the same act.
Further, in a letter to Reneri,
Descartes seems to either
confuse or intentionally identify the
sensation of breathing with
the judgement that one is breathing.

He says to Reneri:

When someone says ’I am breathing, therefore
I am
if he wants to prove he exists from
the
fact that there cannot be breathing without
existence, he proves nothing, because he would
have to prove first that it is true that he
is breathing, which is impossible unless
he
has also proved that ne exists
But if he
wants to prove his existence from the feeling
or opinion that he has that he is breathing/
so that he judges that even if the opinion
was untrue he could not have it if he did not
exist, then ids proof is sound. For in such
a case the thought of breathing is present
to our mind before the thought of our existing and we cannot doubt that we have it
while we have it. 33
1

*

.

,

It is the judgement that occurs

,

consequent upon his having the

sensation of breathing, that would provide the premise for Descartes’
proof of his existence.

But Descartes seems to suggest that the

feeling, or the strict sensation, could provide such

a

premise.

It

is possible to interpret the passage as showing that Descartes thus

identified the feeling and the concommitant judgement.

So it may be

that Descartes does consider a thought and the awareness of it to be
one and the same act or event.
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Anthony Kenny sees this as being
a grave difficulty for
Descartes* view of mental activity.
He says:

h

s

/Descartes/ had missed the point
f
°
objection, ie must have meant that
a thought such as seeming
to see was ident e aW3r eness of seeming
to see.
But if this ^
is so, then the consciousness
or a thought is no different
from the
*'

thought itselr and cannot be used by
Descartes as the mark that distinguishes
cogitative activities of human beings
from
their corporeal activities. 34

Kenny here appears to think that
Descartes regarded consciousness
as a mark or criterion of the mental.

We saw above that he thought

such a view to follow from Descartes*
definition of thought.

That

is, if I am immediately conscious of
/, then 0 is a thought or

mental event.

Now it might appear, at first glance, that
such a

putative criterion would be unreliable, given that
I can be
conscious of my corporeal activities as well as my
thoughts.

But

that xs co overlook the importance of the distinction
Descartes

provides between corporeal activities and the sensations of
them.
Of the latter we are immediately conscious.
foj.n>ex

,

With respect to the

if wq ace conscious of them at all, it is only derivatively

by inference

i

com our thoughts.

sciousness could be such

a

So Kenny may be correct that con-

criterion.

However, if Descartes identifies a thought with his awareness
of that thought, then, Kenny thinks, he loses the criterial feature

of consciousness

.

For his objection to carry weight, Kenny must

also hold that criteria are independent features of the things
for ’which they are criteria, features that are common to all and

5

,
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only those things

.

So if our thoughts and our
awarenesses of them

are identical, then awareness
is not an independent feature
that
accompanies all mental events and no
physical events. So, Kenny

would say, Descartes cannot use
consciousness as

a

criterion of

the mental.

At first glance it strikes one that
Descartes did not introduce Ids consciousness doctrine to
provide

a

criterion for distin-

guishing between mental and non-mental acts or
events, and so
Kenny’s objection is not a worthy one.

Bur there is some evidence

that Descartes might have had such an intent.

Or at least it

seems that he might have regarded as one value
of his consciousness

doctrine its ability to provide such

a

criterion.

After indicating

that thought covers everything in us of which we are
immediately

conscious, Descartes says:

But I have added immediately for the purpose of excluding that" Which is a consequence
of our thought, for example voluntary movement, which, though indeed depending on
thought as on a causal principle, is yet itself not thought J
.

,

.

And even if it is not Descartes’ intent to provide

a

criterion for

distinguishing between the mental and the non-mental , it is not
unreasonable to request such a criterion from him.

His conscious-

ness doctrine, if it is successful, would possibly provide such a

criterion.

We should, then, look for some way of salvaging Descartes

thesis that we are always aware of all of our thoughts

It might be thought: that asserting the identity of a thought
(e..g.

,

A) with cur awareness or it (here, B) is too radical a step

.
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t0 take ln avoidin^ Hobbes* regress.

Rather we can perhaps hold

that there is a necessary conjunction
between A and the awareness
of it, E, so that the latter still
serves as a mark of the presence
of the former, but is not identical
with it. Also, in addition to
whatever else it is, A is also an awareness
of B.
That is, there is

reciprocal relationship of awareness that
holds between A and B;
each is an awareness of the other. Thus,
a

all of our thoughts

would have a concommitant thought that would
be an act of awareness
Ox

that thought, but no thought would require,
in virtue of Descartes*

consciousness doctrine, the existence of more than
one other
thought.

By this strategy we could retain our criterion
of the

mental and avoid Hobbes* regress.
Unfortunately, employment of this strategy is precluded by
Descartes* insistence, in reply to Ilobbes, that one thought cannot
be the subject of another

.

What is worse

,

even if Descartes were

to retract his claim, the suggested strategy would still fail.

To see why consider, for example, a sensation of pain, and suppose,

following Descartes, that I am aware of that sensation.
of my awareness is a certain painful sensation.

The object

But the object of

my sensation, if it can be said to have an object at all, is cer-

tainly not an awareness of a sensation of pain.
a

pain.

It is, if anything,

So, having different objects, my sensation of pain and my

awareness of my awareness of my sensation of pain are distinct
entities.

The strategy offered to save Descartes* criterion has

failed

It does not seem to me that Descartes can hold the view,

.
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however important it might be to
his ontological enterprise,
that
consciousness is a criterion of the
mental and at the same time
retain the view that we are aware
of all our thoughts.
But, what
is worse for him, neither does
it seem that he can keep the
latter
view and avoid Hobbes regress by
claiming the identity of our
1

thoughts with our awareness of them,
even if he is willing to give
up the criterion of the mental.
As I pointed out above, Descartes'
reply to Hobbes requires that every
thought have as its object

either a thought that is an awareness or
a thought that is an
awareness of an awareness
But while some thoughts may have such
.

objects, surely not all do.
It seems, moreover, that the kind of awareness
that Descartes

speaks of is a relational property.
my thoughts

.

It is a relation between me and

But surely not all of my thoughts are relations

between me and others of my thoughts.

Surely some of them enable

me to make contact with the real world (hopefully),
or at worst,

they connect me with a realm of Meinongian entities.

But it does

not seem, contr a the consequences of Descartes’ view, that I am
trapped in the circle of my own thoughts
Nov;

it may be that Descartes’ view is not really damaged by

the objections that I, Hobbes, and others have raised against it.

Two considerations can be offered in defense of Descartes
first place, it might be objected that

against Descartes misleadingly.

I

.

In the

have stated the case

It may seem that at least some of

our thoughts can have dual objects and that, for that very reason.
Descartes’ view does not at all trap us in the circle of our thoughts.

3
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It may be argued that if X am
thinking of Christmas for
example
then my thought has as one
of its objects, Christmas
(or the idea
of Christmas, if you prefer),
and it has as the other of
its objects
my awareness of my thought of
Christmas.
,

,

I am

inclined to believe, however, that
the dual-objects view
is an implausible one.
On the view suggested for Descartes,
every
thought would be at least an awareness
of a thought.
But it seems
that some thoughts have properties
not had by awarenesses of
thoughts.

Zeno Vendler has objected to the
identification of

thinking with the judgement that one is
thinking by claiming that
whereas the sensation of breathing can be
painful, the judgement
that one is breathing cannot 3
This points up, I think, one
.

difference between some thoughts, in Descartes’
sense, and awarenesses of thoughts.

For example, the thought of a personal mis-

fortune can be painful, but it is not clear that
awarenesses of
thoughts can be painful,

it is the thought of misfortune, not the

awareness or consciousness of that thought, that causes
pain.

Still

less would we be inclined to say that the awareness of the
awareness
of the thought of misfortune is painful.

Similarly, as Descartes recognized, thoughts are sometimes

clear and distinct, and other times confused.

But I can think of

no reason why he should have regarded the awareness of a thought as
confused.

Certainly our memory of past thoughts is often confused,

but not present awarenesses.

It seems, then, that at least some

thoughts have properties not had by awarenesses of thoughts.

I can

be vividly aware of a very confused thought, but there is no reason

j

.
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to suppose that my awareness of my
vivid awareness is also
confused
So it seems that my awareness
of my awareness of a thought
of
Christmas for example, is not identical
with my thought of Christmas,
j.ne latter brings rne
pleasure the former, when it exists,
leaves
me unmoved.
So, I am led to believe that the
dual-objects strategy
for d voiding Hobbes’ regress is
unsuccessful. But even if all such
strategies fail, Descartes can fall back
on a second line of defense.
,

That defense lies in claiming that if
his view does lead to a
Hobbesian regress, it is none the worse for
doing so. A distinction
is sometimes made in philosophical
discussions between vicious

and non -vicious regresses, the former being
pernicious and the

latter benign.
category.

Descartes

*

regress would fall into the non-vicious

No damaging consequence would accrue to Descartes’

theories as a result of allowing such a regress

I take it that

.

Descartes’ commitment to the Hobbesian regress is objectionable
only
in that we are not aware of there being an infinite chain
of aware-

nesses that is associated with each thought we have.

taken as evidence of there being no such regress

.

And that is

But nothing

Descartes has said requires than we be aware of such regresses if
they in fact occur.

It does not follow from our being aware of

each thought we have that we are also aware of having the sum total
of thoughts that we have

In addition, if Descartes’ defense against the Hobbesian

regress lies in his claim that one thought cannot be the object of
another, then even if the need for a criterion of the mental didn't
exist, Descartes would do well to retract his reply to Hobbes.

He
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clearly elsewhere held its denial.

For example, under some in-

terpretations, the Cojito passages
require that Descartes be able
to think about others of his
thoughts, tod under all interpretations known to me, the causal
argument for the existence of God
requires that Descartes be able to
entertain thoughts about his
thought of God.. 37
fncre are two other problems that arise
for Descartes'

remarks about thinking.

Neither is insurmountable.

One stems

from passages in which Descartes seems
to claim that the mind is
identical witn its thoughts.

The other stems from passages in

which Descartes apparently affirms a claim that
is counter to our
experience, at least when taken in conjunction with
Descartes* claim
tnoi.

we are always aware of our thoughts.

Descartes seems to hold

that the mind is always thinking something.
says that he

.is

essentially

him to have meant tnat
the time.

I shall deal

r.e

a

Thus, when Descartes

thing that thinks, some have taken

is essentially a thing that thinks all

with the former claim first.

Earlier in this chapter we characterized

a

Cartesian substance

as something that is over and above, or exists in addition to, the

properties that it instantiates.

Thus, minds are something in

addition to their thoughts and bodies something in addition to their

physical properties.

Unfortunately , some of Descartes' remarks seem

not to square with such a view of the mind.

He says:

We may consider thought and extension as
constituting the natures of intelligent
and corporeal substance; and then they
must not be considered otherwise than as

.
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substances that think and
are
extended, i.e., as mmd and
body.-38
It certainly seems that
Descartes is here advocating
a view of
substance that is at variance
with the one X have previously
attributed to him. Kenny attempts
to save my view (and his)
by
pointing out that the nature of a
substance, which Descartes says
is constituted by thought
or extension, is different
from substance
itself. 39 That is certainly the
view we have been advocating,
but it just does not mesh with
the remainder of Descartes’
above
remark. Nor is it compatible with
a remark from the Interview
with

Burmsn where Descartes says, "All
the attributes taken together
are
truth the same thing as substance;
but not the attributes taken
singly apart from the others. 40

m

Descartes here seams to be offering something
like
bundle theory of the mind.

a

Humean

But there are insuperable difficulties

witn his offering such a view.

For example, Descartes held that

the identity of the body changed as it gained
or lost parts.

It

would seem, then, that if the mind is nothing in
addition to its
t noughts

,

then as one 1 s thoughts come and go, the identity
of the

person changes.

But there is nothing in his writings to suggest

that Descartes held such a view cr that he would accept
such

a view.

Indeed, in Princ iple LXIV, which immediately follows the troublesome
one, Descartes explicitly denies that the identity of a mental sub-

stance changes with its thoughts.

He says:

We may likewise consider thought and extension as the modes which are found in substance j that is, in as far as we consider
that one and the same mind may have many
different thoughts
.

.
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A .so,

Dc

2n£

^.artes

ID

definition of substance (given in
reply to
as something in which
properties reside would seem

to require that mental substances
be something in addition to

Hume’s "congeries of perceptions."

There is little doubt that

Descartes thought of himself as something
that has thoughts rather
than as something that is identical,
entirely or in part, with a
collection of thoughts
In his S^qops.is Q f the Meditations Descartes
gives additional

support to tns view that the mind is
thoughts and is not composed of them.

a

substance underlying its
He says:

tne human body, inasmuch as it differs
from other bodies, is composed only of a
certain configuration of members and of
other similar accidents, while the human
mind is not similarly composed of any
accidents, but is a pure substance. 4 ^
.

Further

,

.

,

in reply to Hobbes Descartes says:

Where I have said this is the mind the
s piri t, the intellect
or the re ason ~T~
understood by these names not merely
faculties, but rather what is endowed
with the faculty of thinking... 43
,

,

,

Again I do not assert that that which
understands and the activity of understanding are the same thing... 44
Somewhat later he says,

,T

I

do not deny that I, the thinker, am

distinct from my own thought, in the way in which
tinct from its mode." 4

-’

a

thing is dis-

For those who regard Descartes as having

believed himself to be identical with his mind, this reply serves
to provide yet more evidence that Descartes thought the mind

distinct from its thoughts.

In general, I think we arc safe in
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conceding that the passage from
Principe LXIII, however unable

to

account for it we may be, does
not represent Descartes'
considered
view on the nature of mental
substance.
other difficulty I want to
discuss concerns the question
of how we are to interpret
Descartes' claim that he is
essentially
4
thir'9- Thae is, “hat does
Descartes mean when he says
that something is a thing that
thinks? The more natural way to
view
Descartes' pronouncement about
himself would be to regard him
as
holding that he nas the capacity
or power to think.
However,
apparently most commentators have
interpreted him as asserting
that he is always in the process
of thinking
Anthony Kenny for
example, purports to be speaking for
Descartes when he says,

—

.

,

"Tnought is the essence of mind in the
sense that each mind must
always be thinking some thought or other,
but particular thoughts
come and go and none of them is essential ."45

“
me;

; nd
,

again> „ fls long

i exist, Descartes believed, the proposition
'c oqito

'

is true of

the particular cogita tiones that make it
true vary from

moment to moment, from dim prenatal pleasures to
metaphysical
meditations

47

Tnat Descartes held the view attributed, to him is supported
by
a letter to Gibieuf

.

He says;

I believe that the soul is always thinking
for the same reason I believe that light
is always shining, even though there are

not always eyes looking at it, and that
heat is always warm though no one is being
'armed by it, and that body or extended
substance always has extension, and in
general that whatever constitutes the nature
v,
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of a thing always belongs
to it as Iona
it exists
So it would be easier
for me to believe that the
soul ceased to
times when it is supposed
to
cease lo think than to conceive
that it
could exist without thought 48
c=s

.

.

Ana in reply to Gassendi he says;
You have a difficulty, however,
you sav
as to whether I think that the
soul always
thinks
But why should it not always
think when it is a thinking
substance ? 48
.

,

A good hypothesis to account for
Descartes
a

1

having held such

counter-intuitive view, if he did, would be
that he either

confused, or failed to recognize, the
distinction between occurrent
and dispositional properties 50 Since
he held the view that
.

substances must have their essential property
if they are to exist

at dll, then if he failed to distinguish between
the property of

actively thinking particular thoughts and the
property of having
the capacity to think, we can see why Descartes
might have believed

that minds are constantly in the process of entertaining
thoughts.
It seems that if Descartes had recognized the dispositional

property of having the capacity to think, he would not have had

reason to claim that he is always thinking.

Apparently, though,

when Descartes says "I am essentially a thinking thing” he means
not that he is a being who has the capacity to think, but that he
is a being who is always thinking

.

He even moves, in a letter to

Gibieuf , to defend his view against the obvious objection that it

doesn’t seem to us that we are always thinking.

He says:

And I do not see any difficulty here, except
that people think it superfluous to believe

-

.
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that 1C the sou ~7 thinks at
times when no
memory or4 the thought remains
with us after
wares. But consider that every
night we
have a thousand thoughts, and
even while
awo^e we had a thousand thoughts
within the
hour of which no trace remains
in our memory
’
and wmch seem no more use than
thoughts
v;e may have had before
we were born.” Then
you will find it easier to be
convinced of
my theory than to judge that a
substance
whose nature is tc think can exist
while
not thinking at all. bl
-

Descartes is here guilty of the fallacy
of false alternatives.
He seems to think that if something
is essentially a thinking thing,
then it either thinks all the time or
ceases to exist while not
thinking.

But that is to overlook the alternative
according to

which the existence of essentially thinking

tilings is sustained by

their property of having the capacity to think.

In addition to

committing the fallacy of false alternatives, Descartes
has failed
to answer adequately the objection he set himself
to answer.

It

just seems plainly false to claim that the person who has been

unconscious

,

or the person who has been awakened from deep sleep,

instantaneously forgets what he was thinking, but that he was
nonetheless thinking and that he was at the time conscious of his
thoughts.

Admittedly , there is nothing inconsistent in Descartes'

view, but it is painfully counter-intuitive, at variance with what
we take to be the case

,

and to be avoided if at all possible

There is, of course, a respectable alternative view.

That is

to regard man as having the capacity to chink or as having the

faculty of thought.

Now it may have been that Descartes was led

to his view by epistemological or -metaphysical considerations that

he thought persuasive

For example, if persons fail
to have the
property of corporeality, or
fail to have it essentially,
then they
can be known only by their
thoughts. They are possibly
without any
other properties, except existence
and duration. But knowing
only
that a thing has existence and
duration seems not sufficient to
guarantee our epistemological access
to that thing. We know a
substance by its properties, Descartes
tells us, and it might have
seemed to him that if a substance
didn't manifest some non-universal
properties, then there is nothing we
could know about it. For
better or worse, that is the epistemological
consideration that
might have motivated Descartes. He
might also have been moved
.

by the metaphysical consideration that
universal properties alone

are not sufficient to sustain the
existence of a thing.

know from our previous discussion, he believed.

That, we

And it might have

seemed to him that the active exemplification
of "differentiating

attributes” was required for the existence of

a thing.

It seems to me, however, that these considerations

did in fact motivate Descartes, should not have.

compelling

.

,

if they

They are not

Regarding the metaphysical consideration first, even

if we accept tne view that a substance must have some non
-universal

properties in order to exist, there is no reason that we should
require them to be non -dispositional properties.

The property of

having the capacity to think, or the faculty of thought, should serve

equally well to sustain individual mental substances.

There is

no reason to fear the possibility of such a substance passing out
of existence when it c eases to have occurrent properties.

If it

.

.

.

-4lma kos sense to think of a
non-material substance at all,
then
there is no reason why one
non-material, non-uni versal property
rather than another shouldn’t
characterize it.

With regard to the epistemological
consideration that might
have motivated Descartes’ view,
there again seems to be nothing
that compels Descartes to require
that constant occurrent properties characterize mental substance.
To the extent that we have
any access to the mental properties
of a substance distinct from

ourselves, there is no reason to suppose
that we have better access
in the case of occurrent properties over
dispositional properties
In our own case it may be thought that
Descartes required an

unbroken chain of consciousness to guarantee
our beliefs about
self-identity.

He may have thought that if there were moments
when

we ceased to think, and so ceased to be conscious
of ourselves

thinking , then we could not be sure after we had resumed
thinking

that we were the same mental substance that had existed a few
moments before
However, that is a problem about the reliability of memory
and the truth of clear and distinct perceptions.

It is well known

that Descartes thought himself capable of solving that problem.
Further, the problem is no greater when there are momentary lapses
of consciousness than when there is an unbroken chain of consciousness

In both cases we must rely upon the accuracy of our memory of there

being prior acts of consciousness
1 think,

then, that there is no reason for Descartes to have

required that mental substances be constantly in the process of

.

~*J2-

thiriking some thought or other.

that he

m

And it is not entirely clear

fact imposed that requirement.

To Hobbes he said:

.Walking is usually held to refer
only to
thdt action itself, while thinking
applies
now to the action, now to the faculty
of
thinking, and again to that in which
the
faculty exists.
.

.

Descartes several places speaks of the
faculty of understanding and
distinguishes between it and the mind. 53
it is tantalizing to
suppose chat when he says ”1 am essentially

Descartes intends "I am essentially
(or capacity) of thought.”

a

thinking thing”

a thing that has

the faculty

There is insufficient evidence to

ascribe that view to Descartes, but

I

hope I have shown that there

is no reason why he shouldn T t have held it.

Having armed ourselves now with a passable understanding
of
Descartes’ technical notions, we are ready to wade into
his arguments for the non -identity of himself and his body and for
his

essence being thought.

.
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CHAPTER II
After establishing the certainty
of his existence, Descartes
proceeds to investigate the nature
of: the thing whose
existence is
^h.„t

ly Descartes;

investigation results in the issuance
of two claims
one, that his essence is
thinking; the other, that

he is nee identical with his
body.

Our concern is to discover

Descartes* arguments for the latter
conclusion, though in doing so
we will need tc investigate his
attempt to establish the formerclaim.

The Argument

f rom

Doubt

We can begin by looking first at an
argument often derided by

Descartes* commentators and generally taken
to be his primary

argument for the distinctness of himself and his
body.

The argu-

ment is suggested in the following passage from
Part IV of the
Discours e
I considered attentively what I was; and I
saw that while I could feign that I had no

body, that there was no world, and no piece
for me to be in, I could not feign that I
was not; on the contrary from the mere fact
that I thought of doubting about other truths
it evidently and certainly followed that I
existed. ...From this I recognized that I was
a substance whose whole essence or nature is
to be conscious and whose being requires nc
place and depends on no material, thing. 1

The argument I have in mind (call it the

gets

a

1

Argument from Doubt-

clearer statement in The Search After Trut h when Folyander

says that he is not a body, for otherwise, doubting of his body
he should at the same time doubt of himself, and this he cannot do

3
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Arnauld

probably wrongly, thought that
the Argument from Doubt
W5S present in th8 5econd Meditation.
He summarizes it as follows:
,

I airs able to doubt whether
I have a body
nay, whether any body exists
at all; yet
I have no right to doubt
whether I am or
exist, so long as I doubt or think.
3)
Hence

who doubt and think am not a
j. ,
v
oody; otherwise in entertaining
doubt concerning body 1 should doubt about
myself.
,

We can reconstruct the argument as
follows:
I can doubt that my body exists
1 cannot doubt that I exist
I am not identical with my body.

1)
2)

In the Discourse Descartes spoke not of
doubting his body to exist,

but rather of his being able to feign that
it does

not:

exist.

That

suggests an alternative version of the argument
that we can

reconstruct as follows:
1*)
2
3*l

)

I can feign that my body does not exist,
1 cann ot feign that I do not exist.
I am not identical with my body.

The two arguments are closely similar in form, so we shall concen-

trate on the former, more popular version.

Reconstructed either

way, the Argument from Doubt has its faults, and the commentators

purport to have exposed them.
Norman Malcolm, for example, proposes to demonstrate the
argument’s invalidity by constructing "arguments of parallel form
that are plainly invalid."

He offers three.

Unfortunately, none

has the same form as the Argument from Doubt and so cannot demon-

strate the latter’s invalidity. 4
is:

Malcolm’s first counter -argument

.
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can

doubt: that I am a Grand
f?
Master of
PJ_ IJ cannot doubt that I exist.

c)

1 am not a

Elk-

Grand Master of Elks.

(A) has roughly the form;
af
bt

1 can doubt that Fa.
I cannot doubt that Ga.
-Fa

)

)

cTy
or possibly;
a")
b")
c")

Fa
K3a
-Ha

whereas the Argument from Doubt has
the form;

'

1")

I can doubt that Fa.

2 ")

1

3 fr)

a

cannot doubt that Fb
:JT“"

or possibly;
l ,ft

)

2**»)

Fa
-Fb

PTTT? b
Clearly, the form of Malcolm* s first putative
counter -argument fails
to parallel that of the Argument from Doubt.

It can be brought

closer into line by changing Malcolm* s argument
to;
A*, a)
bj
c)

I can doubt that the Grand Master of Elks exists
I cannot doubt that I exist.
I ?“the Grand Master of Elks.

This same form is exhibited by Malcolm's second argument;
3.

a)
b)

I cannot doubt that Bertrand Russell exists.
I can doubt that the author of "Why I Am Not a

—

Christian " exists
Bertrand' Russell y- the author of "Why
Christian."

c)

Both (A*) and (3) approximate the form of the
They differ in that they

I

Am Not

7-irgument

unlike the latter, contain

a

a

from Doubt.

definite

v
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description, which, if given
desired parallelism.

3

Russellian treatment, precludes
the

It might bt thought that
there is no real

difference between the Argument
from Doubt and Malcolm's
(A> ) and
(B), since <my body’ in the
former must be understood as
short
for ’the body that is mine'
or some such description.
That being
so it would bo objected + herp it an Q
e J s an exact parallel
between the
arguments. However, the objection
is mistaken.
9

,

-

>

We have at least two versions
of the Argument from Doubt under
consideration. One has as its first
premise *1 can doubt that my
body odists 1 and the other has
»I can feign that my body doesn’t
exist
Also we have two alternative ways of
treating ’my body.*
We can regard it as a proper name,
one whose referent gers specified
,

m

the context in which it appears.

ror a definite description.

Or, we can regard it as short

Whichever treatment of

f

my body* we

elect 00 employ, it should work in both versions
of the Argument
from Doubt.

Only one does.

If we regard the expression as short for a
definite descrip-

tion, then there is no problem, with the sentence *1
can doubt

that my body exists* if we read it as *1 can doubt that
there

exists something , x, such that x is

a

body of mine and anything

t ha t is a body of mine is identical with x*
*1 can feign that my body

,

x

,

However, the sentence

doesn*t exist,* under the definite

description treatment, becomes
something

,

*1 can feign that there exists

such that x is a body of mine and anything that is

body of mine is identical with x and

x.

doesn*t exist.

a

The sentence
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Wh°° e trutn

1

am sa3 a ro

able t0 f eigri is a contradiction,
but

*

it seems doubtful that I could in
fact feign the truth of a

contradiction.

Thus, the locution 'my body' in the
Argument from

Doubt must be regarded as being like an
individual constant, not
like a definite description. Malcolm's
counter -argument then,
fails to exhibit the needed form.

5

To produce an argument that parallels the
Argument from Doubt,

Malcolm should have used an argument like;
d)
-

f)

I can doubt that Mark Twain exists.
1 c annot doubt that Samuel Clemens exists

Mark Twain ^ Samuel Clemens

Thei e are imaginable circumstances under which
someone could

doubt the truth of the proposition that Mark Twain exists,
but not
the proposition that Samuel Clemens exists.

Thus, Descartes'

argument is invalid, and the possible truth of the premises and
falsity of the conclusion in the above argument demonstrates that
fact.

Malcolm also attempts to persuade us of the failure of Descartes'
argument by producing a similar argument with
able to Descartes.
g)
h)

rr

a

conclusion unaccept-

He offers:

I can doubt that there exists a being whose
essential nature is to think.
I cannot doubt that I exist.
I am not a being whose essential nature is to think.

This too lacks the form of the Argument from Doubt.

But even if it

had the correct form, it is not clear that the argument would be

troublesome to Descartes

,

since there is some reason to suppose that

he would reject the first premise.

«
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On more than one occasion Descartes
claims that he clearly and
distinctly perceives that his essence
is to think.

He holds too

that clear and distinct perceptions,
while being attended to, are
not capable of being doubted. In
assessing the truth of
(g)

Descar ces might be drawn to consider
the argument:
am a being whose essential nature is
to think
exist
XT’ There exists a being whose essential
nature is to
tniuK
j)

k)

I
I

.

Further, Descartes would probably have held
that he clearly and

distinctly perceives the conclusion, since he
clearly and distinctly

perceived the premises and the inference from the
premises to the
conclusion.

That being so, Descartes, when attending to
(g),

may refuse to grant that he can doubt the existence of
such
being, since he clearly and distinctly perceives
(1).

sufficient for Malcolm*

s

a

it is not

purpose to show that an argument is

constructible that both has the form of the Argument from Doubt
and would be troublesome to Descartes if he accepted the premises.
He must find one whose premises Descartes would in fact accept.

Even if Malcolm* s strategy of counter-argument can be made
successful, as it appears that it can, we would still like to know

exactly where the Argument from Doubt goes wrong.
has attempted to expose its weakness.

Anthony Kenny

He notes that the move

from (1) and (2) to (3) in our version depends upon the Principle
of the Indiseernibility of Identicals.

If that is correct, the

argument* s formal structure looks like this:

)

)

)
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4)
5)

r-'b

-Fs

M

H
/)

(b=s

(y) ((x=y)s»(Fx=Fy))
)•=*

g)_. ;-(Pb=Fs
9)
~(b=s

(FbsFs
)

Kerry’s objection is that the
principle here used (i. e
., (6), call
1
rt Leibniz Law ) has a restricted
range of application, in
1

particular we are enjoined by the existence
of counter-examples
from applying it in modal and intentional
contexts. What makes its
use not available to Descartes is that
(1) and (2) provide a
context that is both modal and intentional.
argument is to be rejected as needing

a

So, Kenny says,

the

principle not applicable

to itb premises; or, as some would say, a
false principle.

Many philosophers remain unconvinced that modal and
intentional
contexts yield counter-examples to Leibniz

1

Law.

6

For them, Kenny 1

objection to the Argument from Doubt is neither welcome nor
conv_iTk.

ing

.

Rue we should find Kenny 1 s objection unconvincing

irrespective of our feeling about the range of applicability of

Leibniz

1

Law.

It is unconvincing, because in the argument we have

constructed the principle is not applied to contexts bound by socalled opacity inducing operators.

Filled out, the Argument from

Doubt goes as follows:
1)
2)

10)

11)
12)

can doubt that my body exists.
cannot doubt that I exist.
My body has the property of being possibly doubted
by me to exist.
I do not have che property of being possibly
doubted by me to exist.
(x) (y) ( (x=y ) ^> ( Fx=Fy )
I
I

s

- 5 ^-

)

I

y Kay > then "V body has
haing possibly doubted
by ,Z to
na only it I have that
property
f
2°5 Z~’ ha5 tft ® pooperty of' being
w??biv doubted
gosstblv
by me to exist.
I am not identical with my
body]

d:.e

re-r

D?QD'.'r?v

^

—

We can see that Leibniz* Law
is applied not to (1) and
(2), as
Kenny 1 s objection suggests, but
rather to (10) and (11), contexts
that are purely ex tens tonal.
Kenny »s objection does not hold;
he has failed to show us what
is wrong with the Argument from
Doubt
Fortunately, we need not look far to
see where the real fault
lies. To see where the argument
goes wrong, it is helpful to

suppose for a moment that Descartes
offered a truncated version of
the Argument from Doubt, one like
our version except with premises
(1) and (2) omitted.

How should we assess such an argument:

It is valid, but we must question the truth
of its first two
premises ((10) and (11) in our version).

justification for offering them?

What is Descartes*

If he is entertaining the

possibility at this juncture that he is identical

v/ith his body

then he is not warranted in merely asserting, without
proof, that

something is true of the one but not the other.

That claim requires

argued support, and what Descartes has available is the fact,

represented by (1) and (2), that he is able to conceive the truth
of the proposition that

Ms

body does not exist but unable to con-

ceive the truth of the proposition that he does not exist.

however, is not sufficient.

That,

The fact that Descartes doubts that

nis body exists and the fact that he does not doubt that he exists

do not yield the de re truth that his body has a property not had
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by him, that of being doubted
to exist.
If

„r„

hav^ correctly represented his
seasoning, Descartes 1

error lies in the move fro5a

C

1 ) and (2), his only
stated premises,

to (10) and (11), premises required
to get the desired conclusion

by application of Leibniz* Law.

The inference from (1) and
(2) to

(10) and (11), from de die to propositions
to their de re counter-

parts (call this inference Exportation*),
is not warranted. 7
thav.

To see
it is not, suppose that I am attempting
to discover whether

John is Tom*s father.

I reason as follows.

X can

doubt that John

has ever been fertile, so John has the
property of being possibly

doubted by me to have ever been fertile.

I cannot doubt that

TornE father has ever been fertile, so Tora*s father
does not have
the property of being possibly doubted by me to have
ever been,

fertile.

Since John has a property not had by Tom’s father, the

two are distinct.

Obviously, the argument is invalid.

Leibniz*

Law is not suspect, so the fault must lie in the move from a de

proposition to a de
similar to the above.

proposition.

Descartes* procedure is

He infers from its being possible for

Mm

to doubt that his body exists and its not being possible for

Mm

to doubt that he exists that

Ms

body has a property he does not

have, that of being possibly doubted to exist.
seen, that is not a warranted inference.
do«ss

Eut, as we have

The Argument from Doubt

not work.

Now it may be thought that there are circumstances under which
exportation is allowable.

It can be argued that all I have shown

,
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With

v

counte ^ -example is that exportation
as a principle of
inference is not universally
applicable but that there are
cases
Descartes' possibly being one,
in which exportation is
permissible.
For example, my believing true the
proposition the tallest sov is
,

£££ d&;

'

E

not by itself warrant

the-

claim that I believe of

Jones, who happens to be the tallest
spy, that he is a spy. But,
one might argue, I am sufficiently
well acquainted with my body and
16)

with myself to be warranted in claiming
that

I have de re beliefs

with respect to them that I have inferred
from my de dicto beliefs
iri which they play a role.
For example, X can infer from;
I believe that 1 am writing.

the

d(5

re proposition:

17)

I believe of myself that I am writing.

In general, one may argue, where the de re belief
is about the

believer (let us call such a belief a

,

first person belief f

),

it is

one that can be inferred with warrant from a de dicto
proposition.
In reply to the objection, I must admit that I am sympathetic
to the claim that first person beliefs are such as to be inferable

from

propositions, though, 1 should add, only where the de

4®.

dicto proposition has a certain indexical feature

,

that is

,

only

where the believer *s statement of the believed proposition contains
an indexical expression, that refers to himself.

For example, where-

as it is permissible for me to infer (17) from (16), it is not

permissible for mo to infer:
18)

1 believe of the youngest resident of Oak Street
that lie is writing.
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(where I happen to he that person)
from*
I heiNeve that the youngest
resident of Oak
street as writing.

In the latter case we must at least
add che requirement that I
know that I art the youngest resident
of Oak Street.

Descartes 1 case, of course, is an
inference of the former
sort, and it would appear to be
sanctionable. But 1 think it is
not.

At least, not entirely.

Someone might object to the

inference in Descartes » case with the claim
that his is a special
case. It is special in that the very
issue he is trying to settle,
i.e., the nature of his relation to his
body, is one about which
he ought to be clear before he can be said
to have an adequate

acquaintance with the objects of which he is said in
(10) and (11)
to hove beliefs.

That is, if he is trying to determine, and

doesn f t yet know, whether he is identical with his body, then
he
cannot be sure that in doubting that his body exists he does
not
also doubt, in an oblique fashion (or under a different description
of himself) that he exists.

So, the argument goes, Descartes is

not warranted in exporting from (1) and (2) to (10) and (11); he
does not have the requisite acquaintance with himself and his body
to make the inference in this case.

The argument is appealing, but I think it is only half right.
I want to claim that Descartes would be warranted in inferring

(10) from (1), but not (11) from (2).

Indeed, it seems dubious that

it is ever the case than an inference of:
20)

It is not the case that I believe of x that it is F.

..
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from:

It is not the ease that I believe that
x is F.

21)

is permissible.
fr0iTl

That is, I deny the allowability of
exportation

che denial of a de dicto belief
statement to the denial of a

de re belief.

Certainly such inferences, conjoined with
inferences

from such statements as:
22)

I believe that x is F.

23)

I

to:

believe of x that it is F.

lead to trouble.

For example, suppose that I am witness to a bank

robbery by the Masked Bandit.

I'm in the bank, I watch him empty

the cash drawers, hear him order the customers and tellers
about,

etc.

In such a case, I would be warranted in inferring:
24)

I believe of the Masked Bandit that he is a
bank robber

25)

I believe that the Masked Bandit is a bank robber. 8

from:

And suppose further that my neighbor, unbeknownst to me, is in fact
the Masked Bandit, though I regard him as a paragon of virtue and

the last person I would suspect of wrongdoing.

In this case it

would be acceptable to infer:
26)

I believe of my neighbor that he is not a

bank robber
from;

27)

1 believe that my neighbor is not a bank robber.

Given the truth of:

.
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28)

My neighbor = the Masked Bandit

and the fact that (24) provides
a context in which »the
Masked
Bandit' occurs extensionally, we
can infer- from (24) and
(28):
29)

I Believe of

icy

neighbor chat he is a bank robber,

tod we could conjoin (27) and
(29) to get:
30 )

I believe of my neighbor that he is
a bank
robber and that he is not a bank robber

31)
(30) is not inconsistent.

from
other

ray

.

It is, in fact, true, though it arises

believing propositions that are inconsistent
with each
Kotice that (30) is to be distinguished from:

32)

I believe that my neighbor is a bank
robber
and not a bank robber.

(ol) is an inconsistent belief.

Presumably rational agents do not

hold beliefs like (31), though they do, unfortunately,
often hold
beliefs that are mutually inconsistent (in this case,
(25) and (27)).

But notice that both (30) and (31) are to be distinguished
from;

33)

It is the case that I believe of my neighbor
that he is a bank robber and it is not the
case that I believe of my neighbor that he
is a bank robber.

(32) is a straightforward contradiction; unlike (30), there are no

circumstances under which it is true.

But we will be saddled with

statements like (32) if we allow exportation both from belief
statements and from the denials of belief statements (i.e., from
statements like (2) in the Argument from Doubt).

For example

in the above situation I infer:
It is not the case that I believe of my
neighbor that he is a bank robber.

,

if

.

-6o~
from the true statement;
34)

It is not the case that I
believe that
my neighbor is a bank robber.

then (33) will be inconsistent
with (23). which is also a true
statement. In short, allowing
exportation in the case of both
affirmations and denials of de ditto
belief statements opens the
way to a plethora of contradictions

It seems apparent, then, that if we
are going to allow exportation in belief contexts, we ought
not to allow it with respect
to both the affirmation and the denial
of belief statements,

it

seems, moreover, that we do hold de re
beliefs and that there are

occasions on which it may be useful or desirable
to export from

—d

j-ffrq

to

£i beliefs

.

So it seems that since we cannot allow

exportation in both cases, we should allow its use
in the appropriate affirmative cases and proscribe its use in
all cases of the

denial of a de dieto belief.
At any rate, it is certain that if exportation is ever
allowable in the case of the denial of a belief, it is at least
not so

allowable in Descartes ? case, i.e., in the move from
(2) to (11).
In the context in which the Argument from Doubt appears, Descartes

must grant that it may turn out that he does indeed doubt of himself that he exists when he doubts of

Ms

body that it exists.

It

would turn out that way if, unbeknownst to him but conceded by him
to be possible, he was identical with his body,

I conclude, then,

that the Argument from Doubt is invalid; it relies upon a rule of

inference whose application is not warranted in the context in which

-61it is applied.

If Descartes offered the
Argument from Doubt, he

shouldn’t have.
There are reasons, however, to
question the imputation to
Descartes of the Argument from
Doubt. There are two reasons,
a good
one and a bad one. The bad one,
which is based on a principle of
charity, goes as follows. While
exportation is sometimes permissible
in affirmative belief contexts
there are some such contexts that
,
never allow it. Two of them are
'believe that x does not exist'
and 'doubt that x exists.' That
is, one can never export from

statements like;
35)

and

S doubts that x exists.

38)
36)

8 believes that x doesn’t exist,

to statements like:

37)

S doubts of x that it exists.

and
S believes of x that it doesn’t exist.

(35) and (36) do not allow exportation, since if S’s doubt is

justified, then he has no reason to believe that there exists anything of which he can doubt that it exists or believe that it

doesn’t, ard if his belief is true, then there is in fact nothing of

which he doubts and believes.

Further, if he has reason to believe

that there is something of which he can doubt and believe, then his

doubt and belief are unjustified.

It seems that there is at best a

sort of pragmatic inconsistency in the de re versions of (35) and (36).

.
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If there is something for S to believe
and doubt about, and

he

if-

is sufficiently well acquainted with
it to allow exportation, then

he shouldn't hold the beliefs and doubts
that ha does.

But if

there is nothing to believe and doubt about,
then exportation
fails.

So it seems that contexts provided by the
locutions

'believe that x doesn't exist* and 'doubt that x
exists* arc contexts

that never allow exportation.

The Argument from Doubt, the

reasoning goes, since it involves the latter construction,
obviously
fails to get off the ground.

So, on charity alone, it should not

be imputed to Descartes
I think it true that there is something odd about the construc-

tions in question, and X am inclined to agree that exportation should

not be allowed in contexts created by them.

However , that is not a

difficulty for the Argument from Doubt, since it employs neither
construction.

In one of our two versions Descartes says that he is

to doubt that his body exists, not that he does in fact so

doubt (though for other purposes he doss so doubt).

In the other

version he says that he feigns that his body does not exist.

There

seems little doubt that the locution 'feign that x does not exist*

provides a context that is not closed to exportation on threat of

something like pragmatic inconsistency.

It is a common occurrence

for us to feign, in a counter-f actual frame of mind, that something

with which we are familiar decs not exist.

We imagine v?hat the

world would be like without it.

Admittedly, it is more open to question whether the context
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provided by the locution ’able to doubt that x
exists* is one from
whicn we can export. The locution in question
seems to have two

interpretations.

On one, ’able to doubt that x exists’ can ba

explicated as saying that there is a possible world, or
imaginable
counter -factual situation, in which it would not be
pragmatically

inconsistent to doubt that x exists.

exportation is permissible.

On this interpretation

It would not, of course, be permiss-

ible in the imagined counter -factual situation, but we are not in
that situation

.

We are in one in which

x_

does in fact exist.

On

the other interpretation the locution says that the present

situation or actual world is such that it is not pragmatically in-

consistent to doubt that x exists.
accommodate exportation.

This interpretation would not

I have no strong opinion regarding the

correct interpretation, but it is open to a proponent of the
Argument from Doubt to opt for the former.

On it, it is true that

I can doubt that my body exists but not that I exist.

V?e

can see,

then, that neither version of ths Argument from Doubt is open to
the present objection.

It is a bad one.

The other reason for withholding ascription of the argument to

Descartes is a good one.

It stems from the context in which

Descartes is purported to have offered the argument.

As we saw above,

if we are to export from (1), then ’my body’ must be referential;

it must refer to something that exists.

'

But when Descartes is in-

vestigating the nature of himself, he does not yet know whether he
has a body, or even that there are any material objects at all.

.
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h

fotjliori, he does not know that 'my body'
refers to anything.

The

Argument fro* itoubt, expressed as it is, has
as a consequence:
39)

But at

t’ne

(3x)(x = Descartes’ body)

juncture at which he is thought to have offered the

argument, Descartes would not recognize (39) as true.

And so, we

suppose, he would not have offered an argument with
(39) as a consequence.

This

,

I think, is a good reason for withholding ascrip-

tion of the Argument from Doubt to Descartes.

But then we must

seek an alternative interpretation for the passages from which
the argument is derived.

We should look for an interpretation

that has no consequences that go beyond what Descartes knew at the

juncture at which the passages occur.
One minor revision of the argument comes to mind.

We could

attempt to express the first premise hypothetically so as not to

commit ourselves to the existence of Descartes 1 body.
40)

We could uses

If I have a body, it is such that I can
doubt that it exists.

However, (40) won’t give us:
41)

My body is such that if I have it, I can
doubt that it exists

and something like (41) is what we would need to employ Leibniz 1 Law,

which is necessary to get the conclusion that we desire.

To derive

(41) we would need an existential quantifier in front of (40), but

that would reintroduce the difficulty that led us to abandon the

Argument from Doubt.

I am in general inclined to doubt that any

non -question -begging version of Descartes 1 argument can be constructed
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unless it

.is

one that does not make use of Leibniz

5

Law.

Conceivobility
It would seem best to give up the attempt to
construct an

argument that relies on Leibniz 5 Law.

if we go back to the texts,

we can find evidence that Descartes had a
different argument in
“ tla

ra

fourth set of objections

‘

,

when Arnauld summarizes

Descartes 5 argument from Medit ation II, he expresses the
first

premise by saying that he is able to doubt whether he
has a body.
There is an important difference between the statement
that my body exists

5

and

5

1 can doubt

1 can doubt whether I have a body.

former* tends to suggest that I have a bodyj

on the question.

5

5

The

the latter is neutral

Descartes most often expresses himself in the

fashion of the latter.

Moreover, he often grants that while he is

sure that he exists,

finds no difficulty in supposing the world

lie-

to be devoid of objects
is not a body.

.

From that he is led to conclude that he

The evidence suggests that Descartes has in mind an

argument like:
42)

I can conceive of myself existing and no

bodies existing.
a body.

4TTXa^not
P.s

it stands, the argument is shamefully enthymemafcic ; we should

attempt to make it respectable by adding soma premises.

Descartes

gives no hint as to how it is to be filled out, but if it is his

argument, we should be careful to supply only premises that would
]& acceptable to him.

As an initial step toward lending respectability, we can appeal
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t0 the Huaean aoctrine that what is not possible
is not conceivable,
that is i
44)

t>

is conceivable,

is possible)

9

Applied to our first premise, the principle sllov/s us
to conclude;
45)

It is possible that I exist and no bodies
exist.

Mow the problem is to get from its being possible that
Descartes
is not a body to the conclusion that he is in fact
not one.

Obviously the move would be an easy one if we had available a
principle to the effect that if something is a body then it is not

possibly not one.
42)
44)
45)
46)
47)
49)
49)

We could then construct the following argument:

can conceive of myself existing and no
bodies existing.
(£>( if g> is conceivable, then p is possible)
It is possible that I exist and no bodies
exist.
It is possible that I am not a body.
(x)(if x is a body, then necessarily x is a body)
If 1 am a body, then necessarily I am a body.
I am not a body.
I

Douglas Long has recently suggested for Descartes a principle
like (47).

He offers:

Long*s Principle:

(x)(if x is corporeal, then
necessarily x is corporeal

For Long T s Principle to be acceptable to Descartes, *x is corporeal 1

must be understood as *x is a body.*

Otherwise, if we allow as

corporeal things that have bodies but are not identical with bodies,
then Descartes would be troubled by the consequence that God, whom
he supposed to have incarnated himself, could not have done otherwise.

Also Descartes would want to hold that he, being in fact in possession

)

.

.

.

,

.
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of a body ,

cor, id

as well have been only a disembodied
mind.

But
even if we understand Long’s Principle as
asserting that what is a
body is such that it is necessarily true
that it
is a body, the

principle as worded is still unacceptable.

It leads to a reductlo .

Supposing our quantifiers to range over only actual
entities
we can adopt the principle:
P)

(x ) (Necessarily

,

if x is corporeal, x exists)

Ihe principle, of course, is false if we consider merely
possible

entities.

However, there is justification in so restricting our

range of quantification, since the principle, so restricted,
is one
to which Descartes gave his tacit assent in the Coglto argument.

He

seems there, and elsewhere, to have held that if something has

properties, it exists.

^

And our principle is just an instantia-

tion of that principle, which would be false if understood to range

over possible but non-actual entities
We can now see the difficulty to which Long’s Principle leads.
It, in conjunction with the principle that what is corporeal exists,

enables us to generate the following undesirable argument:
50)
51)
52)
5?

)

54)
55)

Descartes’ desk is corporeal
(x)n(if x is corporeal, x exists)
<x)(if x is corporeal, then necessarily x is corporeal)
If *3 ( poQ) and 6 p , then a Q
o (Descartes’ desk is corporeal)
ES (if Descartes’ diesk is corporeal, Descartes’ desk
exis ts
a (Descartes f desk exists)
.

56)

Descartes, of course, held that only God necessarily exists, so we
can suppose that he would reject the argument by rejecting Long’s

Principle
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W] l at
’

'

is needed, then, is a principle
that, while it allows

Descartes to get from his conceiving
that he is not a body to his
in fact not being one, does not sanction
the conclusion that there
are things other than God that exist
necessarily. Mvin Plantinga
has proposed such a principle. 12
60)

He suggests that we user

(x)(if x is a body, x is essentially a body)

Since *x is essentially F f does not entail
’Necessarily, x is p
our

ej/Tployin.g

the notion of an essential property

,

«

a notion

comfortable to Descartes if not to others, enables us
to block
the use of the medal principle (53), and so block
the troublesome

conclusion that Descartes* desk exists necessarily. 1 ^
clear-

it is not

whether Plantinga thinks that Descartes held (GO), but it is

clear that he thinks that it, in conjunction with (45), yields the

conclusion that Descartes is not identical with his body.

Ob-

viously, though (45) and (60) are net alone sufficient for the
conclusion; the argument is still enthymematic

.

Plantinga fails

to tell us how it is to be filled cut, but I think we can see how
to do it.

If we understand essential properties to be those without

which a thing cannot exist, as Descartes seems to do, then if Descartes were essentially a body, it would not be possible for him to

exist in a world devoid of bodies

.

But we already have established

that it is possible that Descartes exists and no bodies exist
(given the truth of the thesis that what is conceivable is possible).

Hence, Descartes is not essentially a body, and, by (60), he is not
a body at all.
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us examine the fruit of our labor,

We have constructed

the following argument:
I can conceive of myself existing and no
rodies existing.
(£}(if d is conceivable,
^ is possible)
It is possible that I exist and no bodies exist.
(x)(if x is a body, x is essentially a body)
It I am a body, I am essentially a body.
If* I am essentially a body, it is not
possible
that I exist and no bodies exist.
I am not essentially a body.
1 am not a body.

57)

50)
59)
64)
60;
61)
62)

63)

We now have a valid argument (call it the ’Argument from
Conceiv-

ability’) with the conclusion that Descartes desires.

We ought,

then, to consider whether Descartes might have offered the argument.
If we can agree that the premises are ones that Descartes would

accept, we ought to ask whether they compel our assent.

The argu-

ment has four independent premises, (57), (53), (SO), and (62).
I have suggested that (57) is a plausible interpretation of part

of the quoted passage from Meditation II.

that Descartes accepted it.

The evidence is strong

To justify introducing (58) I have

appealed to Hume; however, I think that while Descartes never
advanced it explicitly, it is an assumption that underlies many of
his arguments.

14

(60) is never explicitly stated by Descartes,

but there is evidence that he ’would accept it.
for example

,

He seems to hold,

that if some tiling has properties that are modes of

thinking or extension, then that thing is essentially thinking or

extended.

lj

Since bodies have corporeal properties, Descartes

would seem bound to conclude that they have them essentially, and
16
so are essentially bodies.

Finally, (62) is a straightforward

.

,

,
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ccnsequence of Descartes' notion of an
essential property as he
explains it. So I think we are justified
in attributing the

premises of our argument to Descartes

.

Let us examine them more

closely to see whether Descartes ought to
have embraced them.
My strongest reservations have to do with
the first premise,
so I should like to suspend discussion of
it for the moment.

respect to the second premise

,

With

the claim that what is conceivable

is possible, the view is, I have suggested,
a well -rooted tradition

in modern philosophy.

To quote Hume:

It is an established maxim in metaphysics
that whatever the mind clearly conceives includes t he idea of po ssible existence, or in
othab words, that no t hing we imagine "is absolutc l y impossible
We can form "the idea of
a golden mountain, and from there conclude
that such a mountain may actually exist. We
can form no idea of a mountain without a valley,
and therefore regard it as impossible. 17
.

I am willing to give tentative acceptance to the principle on

the basis of its historical patronage, but not without first discuss-

ing the possible existence of coun ter -examples to the principle and
the problems raised by those examples

One of the uses Hume made of (58) was in the attempted refuta-

tion of the view that

lav/s

of nature are necessary truths

argues:

We can at least conceive a change in the
course of nature; which sufficiently proves,
that such a change is not absolutely impossible
To form a clear idea of anything
is an undeniable argument for its possibility,
and is alone a refutation of any pretended
i,Cj
demonstration against it.
.

.

He

,
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Kneale, noting the dependence of Hume’s putative
refutation on (S3)
argues against the latter. 19 He says;
In any sense of the word ’conceive* which
is relevant
the argument, an ability to
conceive the contradictory of a supposed law
of nature does not disprove the suggestion
that the supposed law is a principle of necessxtation. This can be seen from consideration
of a mathematical analogy. In 1742 Goldbach
sn otherwise unknown correspondent of the
Sv/Ass mathematician Euler, suggested that
every even number greater than two is the sum
of two primes . This conjecture has been confirmed for ail the even numbers for which it
has been tested, but during the past two centuries no one has succeeded in demonstrating
its truth. The attitude of mathematicians
towards it can, therefore, be expressed by the
statement "Goldbach’ s conjecture looks like a
theorem, but it may conceivably be false* 5

Xneale’s argument seems to be that unproved and unrefuted mathematical propositions are conceivably true (and, we suppose , conceivably
false).

But, of course, being mathematical propositions they are

necessarily true, if true at all, and hence, not possibly false.
Similarly, if they are false, they are necessarily so, and thus not

possibly false.

So we cannot argue from the conceivability of their

truth or falsity to the possibility of their truth

or-

falsity.

I am inclined to think that Kneale has not made his case strong

enough, though I think it can be so made.

As he states it,

inis

view seems to allow us to assert the conceivability of any propo-

sition not known to have been shown false

,

But I think that is to

confuse conceivability with epistemic possibility.*®

Surely there

are some constraints on the conceivability of a proposition beyond

not knowing it to have been show, false,

h person, on being told

.

.
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°nly that a mathematician named
'Goldbach' once issued a conjecture
that haS not bsen sho
fal se, would not be sufficiently
informed

m

'

to conceive its being true.

He could perhaps conceive that the

conjecture he had been told about was true,
but that is different
from conceiving Goldbach T s conjecture to be
true.

At least some

more acquaintance with the content of the
conjecture seems required
for the latter state of affairs.

However, I think that a sufficiently informed person
is in a

position

'-O

conceive the truth or falsity of the conjecture

I

think that I, for example, can conceive of, or imagine,
Goldbach's

conjecture being false.

Certainly

7.

can imagine the discovery by

computer of a counter-example to the conjecture, the attendant

discussion of it, the subsequent revision of philosophical examples,
etc.

Similarly, I think that there was a time when I could quite

clearly conceive of trisecting an angle with compass and straightedge.

During my youth I spent the better part of a school year

trying it before discovering its impossibility

.

Certainly at that

time I could conceive of succeeding at what I was trying to do
But, as Kneale has pointed out, it does not follow from

ceiving those states of affairs

that*

they are possible.

rr.y

con-

We do have

what seems to be at least two counter -examples to the second pramise
of the Argument from Conceivsbility

Now it might be objected that I have not really succeeded in

conceiving what I claim to have conceived. 21

For example, with

respect to the case of GoXdbach f s conjecture, it might be eonceeded

.
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that 1 C5n ifaagine sgneth ing that results
in discussion among

mathematicians, revision of philosophical examples,
etc., but still
it can be objected that what I have
imagined is not clearly the

discovery of a counter-example to the conjecture.

What I have

imagined, it may be argued, differs in no particular
respects from

uhst would happen if

a.

computer discovered something that was

universally, but f alsely

,

believed by mathematicians and philosophers

to be a counter-example to the conjecture.

While I can imagine a

mathematician reading something on a computer printout as a result
c* which he comes to believe that the conjecture is false,
that

would not differ from my imagining a mathematician reading a counterexamp le on a printout, as a result of which he comes to believe

truly that the conjecture is false.

Since the two cases do not

differ in respect to the content of the image, the argument goes,
I have no evidence to support my claim that I have in fact succeeded

in imagining what I claim to have imagined.

With regard to my

second example, the trisection of an angle, it can be objected
that I have

riot

really imagined trisecting an angle, since if I

were able to describe the appropriate steps in the imagined situation, they could be applied to an actual trisection.

I have not

succeeded in imagining the trisection, because my image is not
complete
I think that the foregoing objection fails

useful purpose in so doing.

,

but it serves a

In particular, it reminds us that we

should be careful not to conflate the notions of conceivability
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end zmaginability. 2 *

There is no doubt that in many, perhaps
most,

oases of one's conceiving a cartain
preposition, there is an

element of imagination involved.

But being able to produce imagery

is not necessary to conceiving the truth
of a proposition.

For

example, we can conceive, but not produce
associated images, of
their being forms of life on Mars unlike anything
that we can

imagine

Similarly

.

,

we can conceive of their being sounds beyond

the humanly audible range

sound like

.

,

but we cannot imagine what such sounds

1 think that the conflation of conceiving and imagin-

ing was begun and fostered by Hume as a result of his
psychological
and epistemoJ.ogicai views.
view.

But we should not ba limited by Hume's

We can conceive propositions

affairs of which we cannot imagine

Descartes
ahility.

,

,

the associated states of

c

too, refused to identify conceivability and imsgin-

He held that;
I c3.early recognize that I have need of a
particular effort of raind in order to effect
the act of imagination , such as I do not
require in order to understand, and this
particular effort of mind clearly manifests
the difference which exists between imagination
and pure intellection.

Descartes* view was that the imagination somehow depended on his

being accidentally joined with a body and that the understanding
nr

could just as wall function without it.
So, it is no objection to my claim to be able to conceive
the falsity of Coldhach's conjecture that the images I associate

with the discovery of a counter-example are compatible with its

.

- 75 -

nct bsing the genuine discovery of a counter
-example

Neither is

.

it an objection to my claim to be able to
conceive of trisecting

m

angle with compass and straightedge that I
cannot imagine all

of the requisite steps involved.

I am inclined to believe, then,

that my putative counter-examples to (58) are
genuine.
I want to allow, though, the possibility that an
acceptable

analysis of

f

o is conceivable 7 can be found under which the fore-

t

going objection fails.

Also, I do not deny that I still may be

persuaded that I have not really met the conditions

,

whatever they

are, for actually conceiving what I claim to have conceived.

The

importance of the principle we are examining as a philosophical

bedrock cannot be over-estimated.

So, we should allow the possi-

bility cf its salvage and proceed now with an examination of the
other premises in the Argument from Conceivability

With respect to (62), it should be accepted for the purposes
of our discussion.

We may be inclined to reject the notion of

essential properties altogether, but since we have provisionally
accepted the notion, we must allow (62) to stand.

With regard to (60) I am in much the same position I am in
with respect to (58).

Plantinga seems to think its truth obvious,

but I know of nothing that can be said about it sufficient to

compel acceptance or rejection.

A proponent might argue in its

favor by asking us to try to imagine some material body 7 s losing its

corporeal attributes.

I can imagine my desk, for example, without

its actual color, but not without some color or ether.

Or possibly
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I can imagine it becoming colorless, but
certainly T cannot imagine

its losing the property of extension
without ceasing to exist

altogether.

The argument has a persuasive ring, and
I think it a

decent argument for one claim, albeit not the one
it purports to
support.

04

I think it is rather en argument to the effect
that a

material body cannot lose all its corporeal properties
and continue
co exust.

But that is consistent with an object 1 s never having had

corporeal properties to begin with.
attention to persons

,

Especially when we turn our

the important objects for our purposes

argument loses some of its appeal.

,

the

It is difficult for me to

imagine myself losing all of my corporeal properties and continuing
to exist, but I can imagine myself to nave been instantiated in a

world devoid of material objects.

It may well ba that, being in

fact a material object, I cannot lose my corporeal properties and

continue to exi.st.

But I might have existed without ever having

had corporeal properties to begin with.

While I don f t mean to

suggest that my intuitions are persuasive in the matter, they at

least lead me to suspend judgment with respect to (60).

It is,

however, an important principle and more needs to be said before
the question of its truth is settled, but for the purposes of

assessing the argument under examination, we can pass on to the
first premise and a more glaring difficulty.
Some would think it odd to challenge the truth of the first

premise.

As we have constructed it, (57) seems to report a psycho-

logical fact about Descartes,

presumably he knows whether he can

conceive of himself existing and no bodies
existing.

However, I

ttunk it can be shown that another premise,
like the first in form

can be used in the Argument from Conceivability
to yield a con-

clusion unacceptable to Descartes and incompatible
with the claim
Descartes is not a body.
of which Descartes must grant.

Further, it is a premise the truth
If that is so, then the use of the

Argument from Conceivability is not available to Descartes.
Recall that at the juncture at which Descartes offers the
Argument from Conceivebility , be has established that he exists and
that he thinks, but he does not yet know what he is.

remains to be decided.
bat

b.o

stil-i.

That question

He is able to doubt that he is a body,

allows that it is possible that he is a body.

He says:

I am not that set of limbs called the human
body; I am not some rarefied gas infused into
those limbs
.all these things I am supposing
to be nonentities. But I still have the' assertion * nevertheless I am something. 1 But perhaps
it is the case that these very things which I
suppose to be nonentities , and which are not
.

.

properly known to me, are in reality not different from the n l* of which I am aware? 25
?

How it may seem that this passage is incompatible with Descartes
remark in Meditation II to the effect that

n? I am’

precisely taken

refers only to a conscious being; that is a mind, a soul, an intellect, a reason...”

It may be objected that for Descartes

it:

is

analytic that a mind is a thing that thinks and that what thinks is
a mind.

But compatibility between Descartes* claims that he is

a

mind and that he does not know whether ha is a body can be obtained
if we allow tliat mind and body may not be distinct substances.

There
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is evidence that Descartes was allowing
this possibility in the

second Haol t:~, tio n

He says to Hobbes:

.

...it is very reasonable, and prescribed by
usage , to use different names for substances
that we recognize as the subjects of quite
different acts or accidents; we may then
examine later on whether these different
Barnes stand for different tilings
or for one
,
and the same thing. 2 ®

Descartes here seems willing to grant that, while he knows
himself
to be a mind, he may also be identical v/ith his body.

This attitude

is expressed again in a passage from M editation IV (HR
-I, 176):
.1 not only knew that I exist, inasmuch as
I am a thinking thing, but a certain representation of corporeal nature is also presented,
to my mind; and it conies to pass that 1 doubt
whether this thinking nature which is in me,
or rather by which I am what I am, differs
.

.

from this corporeal nature, or whether both
are not simply the same thing; and I here suppose that I do net yet know any reason to
persuade me to adopt the one belief rather
than the other.
Here

,

however

,

lies the problem for Descartes

.

If he is

entertaining the possibility that he is a mind that is identical

with a body and since he does not know at this point in his inquiry
that there are any disembodied minds

,

then he is bound to grant the

truth of:
65)

I can conceive of myself existing and no
minds not identical with a body existing.

(65) is consistent with Descartes* being a mind that is identical

with

a

body, and it is not ruled out by any proposition known to

Descartes.

If Descartes could not conceive of himself being a

corporeal substance with mental attributes, then he would not have
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grown to doubt, as he tells us he did,
whether he was non -corporeal
Surely if one can doubt that
j>, than the truth of nonE is at least
conceivable to one.

So, Descartes should accept
(65).

However, (65) has consequences unacceptable
to Descartes,

In

conjunction with (58) it yields?
66)

Possibly I exist and no minds not identical
with a body exist.

In turn, from (66) and Descartes 1 notion of an essential
property
we get:
67)

So far there

I am not essentially not a body.
5_s

no

cd.f f Iculty

.

But if we are going to attri.bute

(60) to Descartes, then we should also attribute:
63)

(x)(if x is not a body, x is essentially not
a body)

There is compelling reason to suppose that Descartes would have

regarded (63) as true.

Given the semantics on which we have tacitly been relying, (60)
says that if something is a body in this world, then in no possible

world relative to this one does it have the property of not being a
body.

Now there is no reason to suppose this world special among

possible worlds in regard to the property of being a body.

In

general there is no reason to suppose that what is necessarily true
of things in this world is not necessarily true of things in other

worlds possible relative to this one

.

be to advocate a metaphysical principle

Holding the contrary would
,

no defense for which I can

see and certainly none for which Descartes provided.
So, if we think (60) true, we ought to allow that what is a body

.
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in

arty

world is a body essentially. 27

so is (68).

But if that is true, then

To see why, let us suppose
(60) false.

false, then there is something,
label it

property of not being a

btxiy in this

T

If (68) is

Bruce/ that has the

world but does have the

property of being a body in some world
possible relative to that
one does it have the property of net
being a body. But that
conflicts with our assumption that Bruce has
such a property in
this world.

By reductio

n

we see that (68) is true.

Kow we csn see the difficulty to which Descartes
is led by
(65).

It leads, via (66), to (67), which, conjoined with
(68),

entaixs that Descartes is a body.

That is a consequence that

Descartes would not accept and one that is the denial
of the

conclusion of the Argument from Conceivability
Something has gone wrong.

Let us recapitulate to see where.

We have given provisional acceptance to all the premises of the

Argument from Conceivability.
suspect of all.

The first premise seemed least

But if we allow it, then given Descartes* own

remarks , we ought to allow as a possible alternative first premise
(65).

The argument we get using (65), though, when we add a pre-

mise we seem bound to accept if we accept (60), yields the denial
of the conclusion of the Argument from Conceivability.

We seem to be at an impasse, Given that the argument is unacceptable to Descartes, he must reject one of its premises

.

It is open

to Mia, of course, to reject the claim that what is a body is

essentially a body.

Indeed, he may never have held it; the evidence

that he did is conjectural.

But to reject it is to reject the

.
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present line of argumentation
altogether.

X

am led to suspect the

second premise, the principle that
allows us to infer possibility
from conce inability especially in
,
the present context where we
are
playing freely with the notion of essential
properties
it is
clear, however, that Descartes would
not reject the principle.
.

That leaves only the generating premise,
the claim that Descartes
can conceive himself to exist bodiless.
from Eoi stemic Possi bility
Thei'e is a

way of re-reading the first premise that
holds

some promise of avoiding

the.

difficulties of the Argument from

Cone e i vabi li tv and, I think, has the virtue of better
representing

Descartes 1 intent in the second Meditation

.

It is tempting to

say that Descartes there never intended an argument with the
claim

Conceivably X exist and no bodies exist 0 as one of its

presviises

Instead, we might argue, his claim is rather what we would express
by saying that it is epistemieally possible for Descartes that ho

exists and no bodies exist.

^

points in that direction.

For example, in reply to the objection

The texc contains evidence that

that in the Disco urse he assumes without warrant that nothing

corporeal pertains to him, Descartes said that he did not there

claim that he had no corporeal properties

,

but rather

that he did not, so far as he was aware, possess any

Ms

claim was
Jn reply to

critics of Meditat ion II, Descartes often drew attention to the

passage quoted above to deny that ho was asserting that he was not
corporeal.

Rather, he said, ha was not known to be corporeal.

•

.

,

~
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**"

he says in

Station

II, "...it might possibly be the
ease if

I ceased entirely to think, that
I should likewise cease altogether

to exist" we can see him as saying
that it is possible, for all he
knows , that if he did not have the
property of thinking, he would

not exist.

So, instead of (57) as a first premise,
Descartes might

have used
69/

It is epistemically possible thst I exist
and no bodies exist.

Kow the problem is to get from (69) to "Possibly
1 exist and
no bodies exist” where the possibility in
question is logical.

It

has been suggested that the epistemically possible
is a subset of the

logically possible.'' 1

if that is so

.

then it appears that Descartes

can emit the troublesome first and second premises of
the Argument
fiom Coneeivability and still have the conclusion he desires
Unfortunately, the epistemic possibility interpretation has
two flaws, both ratal.

In the first place, it is not true that the

set of propositions that are epistemically possible for someone is
a

subset of the propositions that are logically possible.

For me,

it is epistemically possible that Goldbach T s Conjecture is false.
We agreed earlier, though, that if it is true, it is necessarily so,
and hence, not possibly false.
thing

f

s

So, we cannot conclude from some

being epistemically possible for someone that it is also

logically possible
The other fatal difficulty for the epistemic possibility

interpretation is that Descartes is here in the same position that
he was in with respect to the Argument from Coneeivability.

Given

ths evidence available to him, it
should be epistemically possible

for him both that he exists without
a body and that he exists and
no mind not identical with a body exists.
Descartes simply does

not know what he is
as the

.

The proposition that he is bodiless as well

proposition that he is identical with a body are
both

epistemically possible for him.

That being the case, Descartes is

not warranted in asserting (69) to the exclusion of:
70)

It is epistemically possible that I exist and
no mind not identical with a body exists.

But ir we allow (70), then all of the difficulties of the
Argument

from ConceivabiXity return.
I conclude, then, that the Argument from Epistemic Possibility,

while perhaps closer to Descartes* intent, is akin to the Argument

from Conceivability in being unavailable to Descartes
still in being clearly unsound.

first premise.

,

and worse

The problem, again, is with the

For Descartes to be able to use it, at the juncture

at which he does, he must also grant the truth of (65) and (70),

statements that generate arguments whose conclusions are the denial
of the claim that Descartes seeks to establish.

It would be nice

if Descartes could find some other method of establishing (59), the

claim that it is possible that

Thft

lie

exists and no bodies exist.

Revised Argument from D oubt
70

Such a method has been proposed by George Roberts.

He argues

that the interpretation that Malcolm and Kenny (and I) have given to
the Argument from Doubt is mistaken.

interpretation the following:

Roberts offers as a better

.
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71 )

For me to
logically
For me to
-logically
It Is not
a body.

72 )

doubt that I have a body is
possible.
doubt that I exist is not
possible.
logically necessary that I am

It is not clear to me what Roberts
thinks the Malcolm-Kenny

interpretation to be, nor how he thinks
their premises to differ
from Ms. But it is clear that Roberts’
argument has a different
conclusion. It is not that Descartes is
distinct from his body in
fact, but that he is possibly distinct from

Ms

body.

Roberts’

conclusion, then, is the one that we have been
trying to establish

without using the first two steps in our Argument
from Conceivability.

We ought to look at it closely to see whether
the Revised

Argument from Doubt suits our purpose
On the face of it, the argument looks invalid.

Broadly

construed, it has the form;
a)

OP

frjJLa
c)

0

r

And so interpreted, the argument is obviously not valid.

surely Roberts means something deeper.

But

He probably has in mind

an argument with the form:
d ) 0 Fa
e

)

-{Tb

FT$W
Interpreted in this fashion, Roberts would be saying that there is
a possible world in which Descartes* body has the property of being

doubted by him to exist, but that there is no world in
has that property.

wMch

he

So, there is a world in which Descartes’ body

.
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h*n « property not had by him, hence
a world in which they are
distinct. Given our semantics, that is
what is meant by saying

tnat it is possible that Descartes is
not identical with his body.
If I have correctly conveyed his intent,
then it is surprising

that Roberts did not go on to say that
Descartes 1 body has a

property not had by Descartes, that of being
possibly doubted by
him to exist, and hence that they are not just
possibly distinct,
but are so in fact.
01

That the move from Roberts* argument to the

iginal Argument from Doubt is so easy leads one to suspect
the

former.
lies in

I do.
th.r

The difficulty with the Revised Argument from Doubt

claim that there is no possible world in which Descartes

has the property of being doubted by himself to exist.

would simply not be warranted in holding that claim.

Descartes
It might be

true that there is no possible world in which Descartes regards:
74)

I doubt that I exirst.

as being true of himself: however, as we saw in arguing against

exportation in the case of denials of belief, there might well be
a situation in which?

75)

I doubt of myself that I exist.

would be true of Descartes.

Presumably, in that situation

lie

would

net he in a position to affirm (75), but it might be true nonetheless

.

It would ba true

,

for example

,

if Descartes were in fact

identical with his body, albeit unknown to him, and:
7?)

I doubt of my body that it exists,

were true of him
Roberts is not warranted in asserting one of the premises of

.

,

hm

argument, so the Revised Argument from
Doubt: cannot be used by
us to repair the Argument from
Conceivability
We must look
elsewhere
.

The Argument from Incorrigibility

George Nakhnikian apparently thinks that the
notion of incorrigibility

can,

be used to establish the claim that
possibly

Descartes exists bodiless. 7 ^

He says:

a time when I am still withholding assent
from the proposition that I am or have a body
the proposition that I am thinking is incorrigible for me. Even if it turned out that
I had no body
it would still be incorrigible
for me that X am thinking. Hence, the following tliree things are possible at the same
time:
I exist, 1 am not a body, X do not have
a body.
In other words, it is possible that
I am nothing but a mind existing without a
body. I find this conclusion to be wholly
justified .3*+
Jit

,

At first glance , Nakhnikian seems to have confused logical possibility with epistemic possibility.

He seems to be saying, for

Descartes

is not a body, but that he

,

that as far as he knows

lie

knows hi ruse If to exist and to be thinking; therefore, it is possible that he exists and is not a body.

But for that argument to

be good, the possibility in question would have to be epistemic.

Clearly, Nakhnikian intends logical possibility, so, one might
suppose, his confusing the two has led him to a bad argument.

But I think that that confusion is not Nakhnikian* s

.

He seems to

be saying something different, and his confusion goes deeper

After interpreting Descartes* argument from Meditati on VI in such a

'

.
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way that it argues for the conclusion:
I can exist without my body.

78)

Nakhnikian says:
I think that (78) has already been proved
by the fact that "I think" is incorrigible
for la,,1 , Si d tout that fact would not change
even if it turned out that there ware no
material objects. Hence, it is possible

that I am nothing but a mind existing
without a body.

It is not clear to me how the fact that "I think" is
incorrigible
is supposed to be relevant to Nakhnikian’s defense of
(78),

Earlier he has defined the notion of incorrigibility as follows:
is incorrigible for S =df (i) It is
possible that S believes that p } and (ii)
f
S believes attentively that p'r "entails
’S knows that £.*56

79)

£

The notion of attentive belief is designed to capture Descartes’

notion of clear and distinct perception.

For our purposes we can

ignore the notion and read the definition as referring to belief
sirapliciter

.

I think, however, that one feature of the definition

is important for interpreting Nakhnikian’s remarks about (78).

Notice that if someone believes an incorrigible proposition, then
he knows chat proposition, and hence, it is true.
I suggest that we can find here a clue to Nakhnikian’s con-

fusion.

not

f

He regards

X have a boay

5

T

1 think’ and

M

exist’ as incorrigible, but

So, he is led to say, evert if I had no body,

my believing that I exist and that I think would guarantee the truth
of those statements.

Thus, he would say, it is possible that I

exist and think, but have no body.

It is not difficult to see that

,
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trha

reasoning is specious.

It is true that if I had no body,

'I exist* and. *1 think* would still
be incorrigible for me.

But

that is an epistemic fact about those
statements, one that is quite
independent of the question whether I am identical
with my body.
It might even be that I am necessarily identical
with my body,

and hence, cannot exist without it, but still
that *1 think* is

incorrigible for me and

*

I have a body* is not.

If so,

*1 exist*

and *1 think,* despite being incorrigible for me,
would not be
true ix I had no body

.

In particular

,

their truth would not be

guaranteed by the second condition of Nskhnikisn*s analysis, since
the left hand side of that condition would not be true.

That is,

having no body, I would not exist, and so could entertain no
beliefs.

I believe that Makhnikian is guilty of the confusion I

have outlined, so I think that he has given us no successful argu-

ment for the conclusion we seek, i.e., that Descartes is possibly

distinct from his body.
Nakhnikian*s argument, however, suggests another that might
hold promise.

had in mind.

Indeed, it may even be the argument that Nakhnikian

Incorrigible statements are sometimes said to be those

whose truth follows from their being believed.

In like manner,

epistemologically indubitable statements are sometimes said to be
those whose truth follows from their being doubted
boths

80)

I believe

81)

1 doubt that I exist.

chat I exist,

and

,

For example
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entail:
82)

I exist.

Likevd.se, both:

83)

I believe that I think,

84)

I doubt that I think.

85)

I think.

and

entail:

Thus ’I exist 1 and *1 think

gically indubitable.

*

are both incorrigible and epistemolo-

They are so, because my believing and my

doubting anything at all entail that I exist and that I think.
b.

y believing or doubting that I exist or think entails

*2*

,a

that I exist and that I think.
We saw that

1

1 have a body*

(and, *1 am a body*) is not incor-

rigible under Nakhnikian's definition.

Similarly, it may be

argued , it is neither incorrigible nor indubitable under the above

definitions

.

That is

,

it does not follow from my believing that

I have a body or my doubting that I have a body that I do in fact

have a body.

Or, what amounts to the same thing, neither:

86)

I believe that I have a body.

87)

I doubt that I have a body.

88)

I have a body.

nor

entails:

However, (86) and (87) do entail (82).

We agreed that it follows

,
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frow

ray

since
entca

believing or doubting anything that
I exist.

Further,

and (87) entail (82) but not
(83), neither does (82)
(88), for if it did, than so would (36) and
(87). That is,

(8..<)

t

at Goes not follow from the fact that
I exist that I have a body.
Or, put differently, it is possible
that I exist and do not have
a body.

Wc

SQ-cia

searching.

then, to have the argument for which we
have been

,

In fact, at least one philosopher thinks that
the

argument is Descartes ».

Robert Jaeger has argued that when

Descartes says that he can doubt that his body exists
but not
that he exists, he intends the following argument;
89)
90)
91)
92)

Jaeger does

I doubt that I exist 1 dty »i exist*
*1 doubt that I exist* dp *Kv body exists*
*1 exis t*
*My body exists*
PossiEly I exist and my body doesn't.
S

riot

think the argument successful, and neither do I.

The problem with it, in my opinion, is that any defense of (90)

either begs the question or relies on the previously maligned
principle that allows us to derive possibility from conceivability
the principle that the argument is designed to circumvent.

It is

true that *My body exists* is not incorrigible under Nakhnikian*s

definition, but whether it is so under the revised definition,
i.e., whether *1 believe that my body exists* entails *my body

exists,* is unsettled.

Any argument to the effect that the entail-

menu relationship does not ho3d amounts to claiming that
exist and entertain doubt without being embodied.

I can

But, to assert

that is just to assert the conclusion of the argument, and in so
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doing , to beg the Question.
A_Re i;.i,sed Argument from Cone e x vab 1 11
tv
Thfire 1S cne

lasr Possibility for avoiding the
objection I

have raised against the Argument from
Conceivability

.

Roderick

Chisholm has suggested that Descartes can
construct a respectable
vei^ion of the argument and avoid my objection
by providing an
emended account of essential properties,"^®

Recall that I have attributed to Descartes the
following
principle regarding essential properties:
93)

(x)(F)(if x has F essentially, then x
cannot exist without having F)

It is Chisholm y s suggestion that Descartes should replace
(93)
with:
94)

(x)(F)(x has F essentially if, and only
if x cannot be conceived except as havina
y
F)
,

It is easy to see how Chisholms suggested principle blocks

my objection to the Argument from Conceivability.

I have pointed

out that some of Descartes ’ remarks commit him to:
65)

I can conceive of myself existing and no
minds not identical with a body existing.

And 1 remind Descartes that (65) along with:
58)

(n)(if

66)

Possibly I exist and no minds not identical
with a body exist.

£

is conceivable,

j)

is possible)

yields:

Then from (66) and (93), a principle given by Descartes’ notion of
an essential property, wc get:

I am not essentially not a body.

6?)

I then point out the disastrous consequences
that ensue from the

assumption that in some possible world Descartes
is a body.

with Chisholm’s help Descartes could now reply:
essential properties is given in (94) above.

Eut

"My account of

Although I accept

(58), your derivation of (87) from (66) is invalid, since it re-

quires (95), which I do not accept."'^
At first glance it may seem that Chishclm T s strategy is
not

successful unless Descartes also denies Hume ’ s thesis (i.e.,
(58)), since (94), in conjunction with Hume’s thesis is equivalent
to (93).

The objection, however, is shortsighted.

Although Hume

doubtless held that the conceivability of a proposition is both

necessary

sufficient: for its possibility, 1 have not attributed

arid

the biconditional to Descartes,

He held that some states of affair

that are actual, e.g., God’s infinite perfection and the theologi-

cal "mysteries

are in fact beyond human comprehension, and so,

presumably, they would not be conceivable.

I don’t think, then,

that Descartes accepted:
95)

(|>)(if

id

is possible,

g.

is conceivable)

But (95), in addition to (58), is needed to get (94) from (93).
One further putative objection to Chisholm’s principle seems

possible.

An essentialist would probably hold that the property

bein g such that when ad ded to 84 it yields 121 is essential to the

number 37.

Eut, it might be objected, the student who does

poorly in arithmetic may conceive that 37 does not have that

t
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propsr'cy

Thus, by Chisholm's principle and
contrary to the
pronouncement of the essentialist, it dees
not have that property
essentially. I think Chisholm could parry
the objection and thereby
save his principle by pointing out that
it is worded so as to require
de re conceivability and by claiming
that the student's limited
.

intellectual resources have confined him to de
die to conceivability
with respect to numbers
if he had an adequate level of acquaint.

ance with the objects of his inquiry to achieve
de re conceivability

with respect to 37, than the student would not be
able to conceive
that 37 leeks the property in question.

Having successfully blocked my objection to the Argument

from Conceivability by providing an alternative treatment
of

essential properties , Chisholm suggests that we replace the argu-

ment with one formulated this way:
S’6)

97)
98 >

My body cannot be conceived to be incorporeal.
I can be conceived to be incorporeal.
my “body
I

It should be obvious, though, chat this argument is open to the
same objections that led to the fall of the Argument from Doubt.
If asked to defend (95) Descartes would have to appeal to its de

die o counterpart:
99)

I cannot conceive that my body is incorporeal.

But we have seen that while statements like (97) can be got from
statements like:
100)

I can conceive that I am incorporeal,

by exportation, it is not the case that exportation is allowable

:

.

-

Wlth re spect t0 clenlals of belief
statements like (99).
to allow that Descartes T body can in
fact

94 -

‘

We want

be conceived to be

incorporeal, and would be so if, unbeknownst
to Descartes, he was
identical with his body and if he conceived
himself to be incorporeal. Since Chisholm 1 s suggested argument
relies upon unwarranted

exportation in defense of one of its premises,
it must be rejected.
However, there is another argument, one not
requiring exportation, that Cldsholm might try in place of the
rejected argument.

Appealing to (94) and the principle that what is a body
is essentially a body, Chisholm has suggested the principle:
101)

Usiih

No purely corporeal thing can be conceived
as being incorporeal.

that principle we can get the following Revised Argument from

Cortce i vabi li ty

102)
103)
104)
1 05)

106)

(x)(if x
x is not
(x)(if x
I can be
I am no t
I am net

can be conceived as being incorporeal,
a purely corporeal thing)
is a body, x is a purely corporeal thing)
conceived as being incorporeal.
a purely corporeal thing*.
a body.

The first premise of the argument is the contrapositive of (101)

when the latter is put into quantificational form.

If Descartes

accepted Chisholm's suggested principle, (101), then he would no

doubt accept the argument, since its only other independent premise,
(104), is cei'tairily one which Descartes embraced, especially in the

passages that deal with the nature of minds

,

bodies

,

and himself

Further, this argument is not open to the objection directed

against Cfiisholm's first argument, so it looks as though it might
bo a better one.

But I think it is not.
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a.t

will turn cut that the Revised Argument from
Conceivabiltty

is at best open to the same type of objection
that destroyed the

original Argument from Coneeivability .

But it may even be that

the present argument fails to get off the ground in
virtue of the

fact that the principle on which it is founded, Chisholm 1 s
analysis
of essential pioperties, is false.

example.

It seems to allow a counter-

Surely Chisholm, and Descartes if he goes along with the

argument, will grant that, with respect to people whom we see on
the street, we can conceive them to be incorporeal.

But if that

is so, it seems that I could mistake a cleverly designed and con-

structed robot for a person.

We can suppose it to possess whatever

degree of perfection that is required to mislead me into thinking
it to be a fellow traveler.

There seems no doubt that I could have

de re beliefs with respect to it while thinking it to be a person.

In addition, it is such that, thinking it to be a person, I could

conceive of it being incorporeal.

It is, of course, a purely cor-

poreal thing, and we have what seems to be a counter-example to
Chisholm* s principle.

We can suppose, though, that Chisholm would have a rejoinder
to the claimed counter-example, so we should show that the revised

argument is open to a much more telJ.ing objection.

discussing the Argument from Conce.inability

,

As we saw in

in the passages we

have considered where Descartes examines the nature of himself,

and prior to attempting to demonstrate the distinctness of himself
and his body, he allows that he may ba identical with his body.

He

.

knovfs

himself to be s mind , but he allows chat he may
be a mind

that is identical with a body
107)
should grant the truth of:

.

Given that allowance

,

Descartes

I can be conceived to be corporeal.

Further, if he accepts Chisholm’s principle,
(101), then the same

considerations that led to the establishment of it will lead also
to;

108)

No purely incorporeal thing can be conceived to
be corporeal.

which Descartes would be obliged to accept.

But (107), conjoined

with (103), entails:
109)

I am not a purely incorporeal thing.

Now those commentators who regard Descartes as having thought

himself to be identical with his mind and as only concomitantly
being in possession of a body will find (109) a disquieting

result, certainly sufficient to justify abandonment of the Revised.

Argument from Conceiv&bility .

However, those who regard Descartes

as having thought himself to be identical with a mind -body union

will not be disturbed by (109).

It takes another result to

disturb them

Given Descartes* allowance that he may be a mind that is
identical with a body, he should grant the truth not only of (107)
but also:
110)

I can be conceived to have the property of

being identical with my body.
The mind-body unionists will regard the conceived state of affairs
in (110) as having been ultimately shown to be false, but they will

.
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«t least grant its conceivability

.

However, from (110) and (94)

we can infer:

Ul)

The property of not being identical with
my body is net essential to me.

I think that (111) is a conclusion that Descartes
would deny

outright

But if not, he would at least accept:

.

68)

(x)(if x is not identical with a body, x
is essentially not identical with a body)

He would be bound to accept (68) in the present
circumstance since
lie

has given tacit approval to:
60)

(x)(if x is a body, x is essentially a body)

from which, in conjunction with (94), (101) was derived, and we
have seen earlier that a commitment to (50) obliges one to accept
(69).

Further, (68), conjoined with (111) entails that Descartes

is identical with a body.

That, both the unionists and their

adversaries will agree, is & result that Descartes would not
accept.

I conclude, then, that

m

must reject the Revised Argument

from Coneeivability as being no better off than its predecessor and
of no use to Descartes

.

.

- 99 -

12.

"Vvorld and Essence,”

13.

Intake it to be a desideratum of an analysis of *x has F
eosentially* that it does not entail necessarily™ x
has" F.

Phil. Rev., Oct., 1970, p. 405.

*

seems presupposed, for example, in Principle
LIII (Haldane and Ross, Vol. 1 p. 240).
,
‘

15.

Compare Principle LIXI. Descartes is often accused of
holding
that his essence is tMnking solely on the basis of Ms
possessing mental attributes

16.

The view I have attributed to Descartes is a strong one, and
in fact, in conjunction with two other views often attributed
to him, it would give the conclusion that he is not a body.
The other views are (a) that substances have only one essential property and (b) that any two things with different
essential properties are distinct substances
Since he knows
that he has the property of thinking, Descartes could conclude
from the principle I have attributed to him that he is not
identical with his body
This argument is not one that
Descartes ever offered, and it is net one that we should offer
for him. In the first place, the principle X attributed to
him needs more argued support, but more importantly, (b) above
is a claim that Descartes seems to repudiate (Haldane and Ross,
Vol. II, pp 52-53). In addition, the argument would be inconsistent with Descartes* claim in reply to the second and third
sets of objections that he does not conclude from Ms having
the property of thanking that he is not identical with his body.
.

.

.

.

Treatise

,

Bk. I, Pt

18.

Treatise

,

3k

19.

Pr obabili ty and Induction

20.

Epistemic possibility, so called , was first discussed by
Moore ("Certainty” in Philosophical Papers) and more recently
it has been discussed by Wilfrid Sellars ("Phenomenalism" in
Science , P erception , and Rea lity) and Paul Teller ("Epistemic
Fnilosophia , Oct., 1972). Without so calling it,
Possibility
Kintikka discusses" epistemic possibility at length in Kno w ledge
and Belie f

21

It has been so objected in private correspondence by Jay

17

.

„

.

II, sect. 2.

I, Ft, III, sect. 6.
,

pp. 79-00.

.

.

.
.
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NOTES

CHAPTER II
1.

&C, 32.
I have

2

.

At least two arguments are suggested
in this passage,
quoted only what pertains to the one I am
examining

P

f

gt

HR-T

440

alSO SU3gests th ® ar 9UffianC in Notes
A g ainst

3.

HR -II , 80.

4.

Doney, pp. 328-329.

5.

Malcolm’s third argument is like his second.

6

I count myself among them.
All putative counter-examples
that I have seen rest on scope ambiguities in the
use of
us finite descriptions
The issue is discussed by

.

.

Swartz in "Leibniz’s Law and Belief" j.p
" “
pp. 122-137.

*

Vol

'
*

Robert
No
’

7.

Exportation with respect to belief statements is discussed
by Ernest Sosa in "Propositional Attitudes De Dicto and De
Rg / J.P. , Vol. 67, No. 21, pp. 883-896.

8

I don’t mean here to imply that all of our de re beliefs are

.

arrived at by exportation from de dicto beliefs
I simply
mean to claim that the inference is warranted in this case
Replace
in (24) and (25) with ’Hooker, 1 and (24) becomes
a proposition that: you would tie warranted in inferring from
(25), if you knew the latter and the additional facts about
me given above
.’

I speak loosely here of our being warranted in inferring one
proposition from another in seme cases and not in others
Strictly speaking, I suppose, 1 should rather say that we are
warranted in exporting from some proposition, p, to a proposition, q, when, and only when, we know the truth of some ether
proposition, r, such that it, in conjunction with
entails q
It is the proposition, r, that embodies the collateral information necessary to justify exportation.
9

,

10

.

11

.

Trea tise

,

Bk. I, Pt. II, sect. 2 (Selby -Bigge

"Descartes f Argument for Mind -Body Dualism,”
Forum, Spring ’69, p. 265.

Compare Principle X (HR -I,

.222),

,

p. 32).

P hilosophical

Principle XI (HR -I, 223),

t.

.

-

100 -

22 .

rmAosopnv or

Tncugftt and Action.

25.

Medit ation II (Anscombe and Geach, p. 69).

26.

Anscorabe and Geach, p. 131.

27.

Planting i holds the stronger principle and apparently thinks
its truth obvious ( "World and Essence/’
p. 48 5 ).
I do not
think it' truth obvious but I do believe that a c ornmi tme n
to (60) obligates one to hold the stronger principle.
*

,

28.

See No te No. 20.

29.

HR -I, 137.

30.

HR -II, 133 , 211, and 30.

31.

By Lennart Aqvist in a paper on subjunctive conditionals read
at tha University of Massachusetts in the spring of 1970.

32.

’’Some

~

Questions in Epistemology," Proceedings
of the 'Arista‘
“
"
telian Society . 1969-70, pp 37-60.
.

33.

An Intr oduc tion to Ph ilosophy

34.

p. 146.

35.

p. 147.

36.

pp. 70-75.

37.

Jaeger offers this interpretation in "Doubt, My Body, and I"
and "The World, Perception, and the Self," both yet to be
published
J have benefitted from correspondence with him on
this and related issues

,

pp. 146-147.

.

38

.

.

Chisholm’s argument was conveyed in private correspondence
I am grateful to him for helping me come to grips with the
natters discussed in this dissertation.
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39

.

Though Descartes never
evidence that he would
fisct that his follower
essence as "everything
nor be conceived n
.

advanced Chisholm* s principle, some
regard it favorably is given by
the
Regis in his C ours Enticr defined
without which a tiling can neither be

‘

,
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CHAPTER III
Up to this point we hove been considering
arguments for
the distinctness of Descartes and
his booy that can be supported
by textual material contained in
Meditation II and Discou rse iv.

But to bo fair to him, it should be noted
that Descartes denied

having proved distinctness until the sixth
Meditati on,

in reply

to Hobbes* objection that the thing that thinks
may be corporeal,

Descartes tells

)iis

reader;

that thinks , ha says , may ha
cor >oreal; and the opposite
bn
at
has
been assumed ; not proved”
Si
But really I did not assume the'Toposite
neither did I use it as a basis for my
argument; I loft it wholly undetermined
until Meditation VI, in which its proof
is given I

h

£2lli:£

k little later, in speaking of mind and body, he says;

But after v?e have formed two distinct
concepts of those two substances, it is
easy, from what has been said in the
sixth Meditation, to determine whether
they «re one and the same or distinct. 2

When we turn to the sixth Meditation , where distinctness is
supposedly proved

,

we find a lengthy passage treating of the mind

and the body, but not a very clear argument.

Descartes says;

And first of all, because I know that
all tilings which I apprehend clearly
and distinctly can be created by God
as I apprehend them, it suffices chat
I am able to apnrehend one thing apart
from another clearly and distinctly in
order to be certain that the one is
different fxm the other, since they my
be made to exist in separation at least
by tha omnipotence of God; and it does

. .

,

.
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not signify by what power this separation
is made in order to compel me to
judge them

to be different; and, therefore, just
because
I know certainly that 1 exist, and that
meanwhile I do not remark that any other thing
necessarily pertains to my nature or essence

excepting that I am « thinking thing, I rightly
conclude that my essence consists solely in
the fact that I am a thinking thing
And although possibly (or rather certainly, as I
shall say in 3 moment) 1 possess a body with
which I am very intimately conjoined, yet
because , on the one side, 1 have a clear and
distinct .idea of myself inasmuch as I am only
a thinking and unextended thing and as on
,
the other, I possess a distinct idea of body,
inasmuch as it is only an extended and un~
thinking thing, it is certain that this I is
entirely and absolutely distinct from my body,
ana can exist without it. J
.

,

This passage can be variously interpreted to get out a number of

different arguments
When we try to tease cut the most premising argument, we come
up with two candidates.

The first is fairly brief and comes not so

much from what Descartes says in the passage as from what he claims
elsewhere to have said in the passage

,

Stripped of its trappings

the argument goes as follows:
3*)

I clearly and distinctly conceive that I

2)

am separate from my body
Whatever 1 clearly and distinctly conceive
is true

J)

1

am separate from my body.

Since the worth of this argument clearly turns on Descartes* defense
of (2), end since discussing his defense of (2) requires coming to

grips with the Cartesian Circle, I should like to suspend discussion

of it for the moment.

Let us look first at the other argument.

Before doing so, however, I should point out at this juncture

.
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a problem for interpreting Descartes*
arguments.

It is often not

clear in a particular passage whether
Descartes is arguing for the

distinctness of himself and his body or for the
distinctness of mind
and body. He often, as in the above passage,
seems to switch
back and forth between the two.

Many philosophers

?

0 f course, will

regard Descartes as having thought himself to be a
mind, so it is

not important to them whether Descartes refers to himself
or to
mind in proving distinctness.

While I don’t want to commit myself

regarding the question of what Descartes thought himself to be,

I

do think that much the same considerations apply to proofs of the

distinctness of Descartes and his body as apply to proofs of the

distinctness of mind and body.

I shall

often take the liberty of

viewing Descartes as attempting to prove the non -identity'- of himself and his body when he more properly appears to be concerned to

prove the non -identity of mind and body.

I am not aware of any

problems created as a result cf my taking that liberty, though

X

shall often caution the reader as to my intent.
The Argument fro m D istinct Conception
It is not easy to see exactly what argument Descartes intends

when he speaks of apprehending (conceiving, we will say) one thing
apart from another,

h fairly simple argument first suggests

itself:
A.

4)
S’)

I can conceive of myself without conceiving
of my body
"l am "'distinct from my body.

This argument seems ambiguous between:

).

.

.

).
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B.

6)

TT

I can conceive that I exist and
have
no body
X Irakis tinct from my body.

and
C.

8)
95

Argument

(P>),

I can be conceived by me without my
body

being conceived by me
3Tam distinct from my body.

to the extent that it can be made
deductively

respectable, is simply

a

restatement of the Argument from Con-

ceivaoility .

We would conclude from (6) that Descartes
is possibly

distinct from

h;rs

body, and then employ a premise to the effect

that If something is identical with a body, then
it is necessarily

identical with a booy.

But the faults of that argument are well

known
Argument (C), on the other hand, has not before been introduced, but its vaults have

.

Filled out, it would look something

like the following:
.

10)

I have the property of being possibly conceived
by me without my body at the same time being

conceived by me
11) My body does not have the property of being
possibly conceived by me without my body at
the same time being conceived by me.
( FxsFy
32L.
13) I r ray body
The trouble with (C*

should be clear from our discussion of the

Argument from Doubt.

To get (10) Descartes would presumably have

to Infer it from something like:

14)

I can conceive of myself at t-1 without
conceiving of my body at t-1.

From (14) he exports to:
15)

I have the property of being conceived by
ma at t-1.

-
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artd

16)

My body doss not have the property
of
being conceived by me at t-1.

Then from (15) snd (IP) Descartes
constructs (10).
we can suppose to be s truth of
reason.

Premise

(

11 )

Ths argument would seem to be
successful if the moves from
(14) to (15) and from (14) to (16) are
acceptable.

But while we

may want to allow exportation from
(14) to (15), it should be clear
from our earlier discussion that we do not
want to allow it from
(14) to (16),

We want to allow for the possibility that
Descartes,

in conceiving himself, also, albeit unknown to him,
conceives his
body.

If he does conceive of his body in that situation,
then,

of course, he conceives of it under a description
that does not

permit him to recognize that
by him

,

iris

body is in fact being conceived

For example, if Descartes is in fact, though unbeknownst

to him, identical with his body, then in conceiving of himself he
is also conceiving of his body.

In the same way, if I am ignorant of the fact that Richard

Nixon is President of the United States, but I know something about
his political past, then I might conceive of Richard Nixon as

being an unscrupulous person.

But I may further hold that 1 could

not conceive of the president of the United States as being anything but a person of highest scruples.

We may want to claim in

such a case that Richard Nixon has the property of being conceived
by me to be unscrupulous

.

but we would not be warranted in inferring

also that the President of the United States does not have that

.
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property

.

In fact he would have the property
in question, giver.

that Nixon is President.

The problem, of course, is with
exportation in the case of
denials of the holding of some
propositional attitude. It is a

matter of fact about human cognition
that we claim to have de re
beliefs and that we claim to be sometimes
warranted in inferring
then from de dicto propositions.

But if that is so, then it is

unsafe ever to infer the denial of a de re
attitude from the denial
of the corresponding de dicto attitude. 4

Since that is a move that

is required for Descartes to get the first
premise in

conclude that (C

l

)

(CM,

J

is not an acceptable argument.

If a respectable argument can be constructed from the
passage

in ^fetation VI, it is not one that is as simple as (B) and
(C),

It must, ns the text suggests, at least have something to do with

what is within God 1 s power.

George Nakhnikian has reconstructed

what he believes to ha the argument that Descartes intended in the
passage we are examining.
D.

17)

18)

iwr

1''

He offers:

If I know that all things that I conceive
clearly and distinctly can be produced by
God exactly as I conceive them, and I can
clearly and distinctly conceive x apart
from y and y apart from x, then I am certain
that x and y are distinct (different) from
each other and can exist apart from each
other*
I know that all things I conceive clearly

and distinctly can be produced by God
exactly as I conceive them,
If 1 clearly and distinctly conceive x
apart from y and y apart from x , then I
am certain that x and y are different
from each other, and can exist apart from
each other.

.
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23)

I find that thinking and thinking only is
of the I of "i think, 1 exist.”
I am only a thinking thing, or a substance
whose entire essence is to think.
I have a distinct idea of body, whose
is t0 *>e extended and unthinking.
I have a clear and distinct idea that I

24)

I am distinct from my body.

20)

^of_tha_ossenoe
lx)

22)

my body are apart from each other

Nakhnikian* s argument certainly has the complexity one would

expect of a reconstruction cf Descartes* argument.

But if Descartes

actually intended the argument Nakhnikian offers, he shouldn 1 u have.
The argument has a number of faults
its dis jointedness

.

,

not the least of which is

As it stands, premises (21) and (22), which

Nakhnikian apparently sees as supporting (23), although they do not

entail it, are alone sufficient for the conclusion.

Restating them

somev’hat, we get the argument:
5.

25)
26)
27 y

My essence is tc think.
It is not the case that the essence
of my b ody is to think.
I '/my”body

where the inference from (25) and (26) to (27) is justified by

what we have called 'Leibniz* Law.

1

A somewhat different argument

suggested by (21) and (22) is:
F.

My essence is to think.
The essence of bodies is extension.
If two substances (things) have different
essences, they are distinct.
3ITT ? my body
28)
29)
30)

So it is not clear why Descartes would have offered all of argument
(D) when only a part would have been sufficient.

He should not be faulted too severely, though, if either (E)

or (F) can be successfully defended.

Unfortunately, neither can.
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Both depend upon Descartes* claim that
his essence is to think,
and in the argument at hand, that
claim is net adequately defended.
As ivakhnikian has it, and as the
passage seems to, Descartes* sole

defense of the claim that his essence is
to think lies in (20),
the assertion that he doss not know of any
other properties that

pertain to his essence.
It seems that Descartes has failed to establish
not only that

thinking is his only essential property, and hence
his entire

essence, but also he seems not to have shown even that
thinking
is essential to ham.

It should be granted perhaps that Descartes

kno^t himself to think, but it does not follow from his
possessing
the property of thinking, that he

lias

that property essentially.

It may be that Descartes is tacitly appealing, or could appeal, to
the principle:
32)

(x)(if x thinks, then x is essentially
u thinking thing)

to establish that thinking is essential to him.

But while we may

be inclined to grant (32), we should balk at an unquestioned

acceptance of:
33)

(x)(if x thinks, then thinking is the
only essential property had bv x)

That is a claim that surely requires substantial support, and the
present argument gives it none,

Admittedly, Cartesian essentialism

recognizes only two properties as being essential to created substances, viz,, thinking and extension, but it is still an open

question how those properties distribute among created substances.
In particular, (33) would require much support. 6
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will ex ami re the extent to which
Descartes was elsewhere
successful in establishing (32) and
(33) somewhat later, but for
the moment we can leave that
investigation and return to Nakhnikian's
argument. It does not need
(20), (21), and (22) since they were
offered only in support of (23). Even
if we give Descartes that
premise , the argument is still clearly
not successful.
Vte

In the first place, the argument, as it is
stated, is invalid.
If it establishes anything, it establishes:
25 )

not (24).

I

cun

certain that I and my body are distinct.

And (25) seems to refer to psychological certainty,
not

to tbs epistemological certainty of s particular
proposition.

At

least the argument, as it stands, is inadequate to
establish (25)

where the certainty there expressed is epistemic.

It does not

follow from my being certain that
£ that the proposition £ is
itself certain, or even that
is true.
Nakhnikian has faithfully

£

rendered the text when he refers in (17), and again in (19), to
the possibility of his certainty.

But ha must not eliminate

reference to his certainty in the conclusion; it should be (25)
not (24).
Of course, (25) is not the conclusion Descartes is locking
for.

Descartes* actual conclusion is even less well established

than (24),
26)

He concludes:

It is certain that I am distinct from
my body.

It would be better to drop all references to certainty, whether

psychological or epistemological, in (D).

The argument is surely

e

.
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n° W0PSe off without it, and is
probably easier to defend.
One other dxuiculty besets the
formal structure of the argument,
(24) should come from (19) and
(23) by application of modus
But (23) is clearly not the antecedent
of (19). The
difference between them is important.
It is the difference between
IS. til

r/,)

de cioto constructions, and we
are aware by now that much

turns on which of those two constructions
we employ.

seems to favor

ade

The text

re reading of its premises, but it is
not

altogether clear that it does.

We should restate the argument by

providing two versions of (D), adhering throughout
the one to de r
locutions and throughout the other to de die to
locutions.
Our restatement can be simplified by reducing the
number of

premises in the argument.

For example,

v/e

can reserve reference

to God’s power for a defense of the truth of our
first premise.

Similarly, we can reserve (20), (21), and (22) for our defense
of
Bared of their non-essentials, then, we get the following

(23).

candidates for Descartes* argument:
G.

34)
35)
36)

TFT
K.

If I can conceive x without conceiving
y, then x is distinct from y.
Jr I can conceive myself without conceiving
my body, then 1 am distinct from my body.
I can conceive myself without conceiving
my body
I am distinct from my body.

If I can conceive that x and y are
distinct from each other, then x is
distinct from y.
39) If I can conceive that I am distinct
from my body, then I am distinct from
my body.
40 ) I c an conceive that I am distinct from my body.
41) "~I f- my "Fody
38)

'

.
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How should we assess <G> and (H)f

Let us begin with (G).

There

is some evidence that Descartes
intended an argument like (G).

In

defending his argument for the
distinctness of the mind and the
body against Regius’ manifesto,
Descartes writes:

wb.ence I deduced and demonstrated that
;
mind was clearly perceived by us as an
existence , or substance, even supposing we
had no concept whatever of the body, and
denied that any material things had ’existence; and accordingly, that the concept
oi mind did not involve any concept
of
body
Our friend, however, admits that
mind can sometimes be cognized apart from
body, to wit, when there are doubts about
the body; whence it assuredly follows that
mind cannot be termed a mode of body. 6
*

•

.

.

The argument Descartes here suggests admittedly can
be read

^

but it also accommodates an interpretation according
to

which Descartes is claiming that the mind can be conceived
without
the tody at the same time being conceived,

A troublesome fact about (G) is that

v;e

have in it an argument

no premise of which needs to be, or can be defended by an appeal to

God *s power.

What is worse, while (34) and (35) seem unobjection-

able, it is not clear how Descartes can defend (36).

The problem

confronting him here is the same as that which confronted him in

defending the first premise of (C f

)„

Given that Descartes does not

know yet whether he is distinct from his body, he is not warranted
in claiming that in conceiving himself he does not also, unknown
to him, conceive his body.

It seems perhaps that part of the purpose of the appeal to

essence is in defense of (35).

Descartes seems to be sayi.ng that

„
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te0auSe

M*

*»**«*• is different from the essence of
body, then ha

csn conceive of hi see If without
conceiving of his body.

But, as we
have seen, Descartes hasn't adequately
established the claim about
hlS es£en ~ e > and if he had established
it, he wouldn't need an

argument like (G) to prove distinctness.
and hope for something better in

(

We should dismiss (G)

H)

I take Descartes to have appealed to God's
power in an attempt

to establish the truth of (38).

He seems at first to have been

relying upon the principles:
42)

(p)(if I can conceive that p, then
makes it possible that p)

4i)

(p)(if God makes it possible that
p,
then p is true)

Grxi

and

Ihat is, he claims that from his conceiving that his mind and body
are distinct, we can conclude that God can make them distinct.
if God can make them distinct, then they are distinct.

And

However,

Descartes surely only appears to hold (42) and (43); we must suppose
that he didn't in fact think them true.

host of contradictions.

Together they lead to a

I have argued earlier that Descartes can

also conceive that his mind and body are non -distinct,.

So from

(42) and (43), he should be able to conclude:

44)

I am identical with my body,

but that is the denial of the claim they are meant to establish.

What is worse, given (42) and (43) we must conclude that
whatever is possible for God is actual.

But since every contingent

state of affairs is such that it is within God f s power to bring
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that state of affairs about, then by

affairs is actual.

<«) every

So then, every contingent state of
affairs, p,

and its contrary, -p, will both be
actual.

diction.

possible state of

But that is a contra-

Since Descar tes held that ever. God could
not bring about

a contradiction, we must refuse to hold
(0?) and (41) together,

fit

least one must be rejected.

Kow it may seem that I have misrepresented Descartes

One

.

might be inclined to object that Descartes was concerned
not about
the conceiva.bility of propositions slmpllciter
but, rather, about

the possibility of conceiving that one thing is
distinct from

another.

In particular, to represent Descartes

1

concern, It might

be cl aimed, we ought to replace (42) with:

44)

(x)(y)(if I can conceive that x and v are
distinct, then Gcd can make it possible
that x and y are distinct)

and we ought to replace (43) with:
45)

(x)(y)(if Gcd can make x and y possibly
distinct, then x and y are distinct)

But if we accept (44), we do so at a price.

To accept it

requires that we countenance quantification into intentional

contexts

.

While it may be possible to construct a theory that will

allow such quantification without the familiar difficulties

,

it is

beyond the scope of this work to do so, and such a theory was

clearly not part of Descartes* technical apparatus.

Without such

& theory, the conjunction of (44) and (45) seems to admit: of counter-

examples.

For instance, I can conceive that Washington, D.C. and

the Capital of the United States are distinct, but they are not so

:

.
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in fact.
!a

itself.

Edition, (44) seems to admit of counter-examples by
Someone may conceive that Mark Twain end Samuel
Clemens

axe distinct, though not even God can make
them so.

ness couxd be conceived, for example, by one

Clemens as an affable boyhood friend

and.

v;ho

Their distinct-

knew Samuel

was familiar with the

writings of Mark Twain, but didn f t know that Clemens wrote
those
works pseudonymous lv.

it is important: to note that, given the

peculiar character of (44), such a person is not conceiving that
Mark Twain is distinct from himself.
presumably, could not be conceived.

That is a proposition that,
Rather, what is being con-

ceived above is precisely that Mark Twain i£ distinct from Samuel
Clemens
We cannot escape the difficulties of (42) and (43) by supplant-

ing them with (44) and (45).

However, there may yet be a way out.

In Principle LX Descartes suggests an argument like the one from
Medi tation VI
.

.

He says

.

.we can conclude that two substances are

really disui.net one from the other from the
sole fact that we can conceive the one clearly
and distinctly without the other. For in
accordance with the knowledge which we have of
God, wa are certain that He can carry into
effect all that of which we have a distinct
idea. .Similarly because each one of us is
conscious that he thinks and that in thinking
he can shut off from himself all other substance, either thinking or extended, we may
conclude that each of us, similarly regarded,
is really distinct from every other thinking
substance and from every corporeal substance.
And even if we suppose "that God had united a
body to a soul so closely that it was impossible
to bring them together more closely, and made a
.

,

j
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s ingle, thing out; of the two
they would yet
,
remain really distinct one from the other
notw i ths U ndirg the union; because however
closely God connected them He could not set
aside the power which He possessed of separating tnorn or conserving them one apart from
the other, and those things which God can
separate, or conceive in' separation, are really
distinct.^
,

An even clearer variation of the argument from
Meditation VI appears
in the reply to the second set of objections, in
Proposition IV
j

gguggnts Drawn u£

ij)

G eometr ical Fa shion

Descartes says:

.

God can effect whatever we clearly perceive
just as we perceive it (preceding Corollary).
But we clearly perceive the mind i ,e
a
thinking substance, apart from the body, i.e.,
apart from any extended substance (Post. IX);
£nd. vice versa we can (as all admit) perceive
body apart from mind. Hence, at least through
the instrumentality of the Divine power, mind
caii exist apart from body, and body apart from
,

.

,

mind.

But now, substances that can exist apart from
each other, are really distinct (Def. X). But
mind and body are substances (Deff. V, VI, and
VII) f that can exist apart from each other
(just proved). Hence there is a real distinction
between mind and body 10

When he says that we clearly perceive the mind apart from the
body, I

tcike

it that Descartes can be interpreted as saying

conceive that the mind and body are distinct,” 11

sition is one whose possibility God guarantees

.

n We

And that propoNov;

what is

different about this argument, and what gives us a clue for repairing (H), is its explicit reference to substances as conceived to be

distinct, and as being possibly distinct.

Further, when Descartes

says ” substances that can exist apart from each other, are really

distinct

n

he again speaks only of substances, not of things in

,

.

-

general

.

argument
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Weiv we using (44) and (45) to
reconstruct the above

we

l'

ave r °

U»lt

the range of our quantifiers
to

substances only.
However, we need not appeal to those
troublesome principles.
I think we can see a way of altering
(42) and (43) to get a res-

pectable version of (H).

Since Descartes has limited his interest

in the above argument to identity relationships
between substances,
and since that is in fact his only concern
in (H), let us replace

(42) and (43) with principles that reflect that fact.

We can use:

4S)

If I can conceive that two substances are
distinct, then they are possibly distinct.

47)

If two substances are possibly distinct,
than they are actually distinct.

and

(46), it will bs noted, is an analogue of Hume’s Thesis

(discussed in Chapter II) for the distinctness of substances.
is guaranteed by God’s power.

It

If I can conceive of two substances

as being distinct, then God brings it about that they are possibly

distinct.

(47), it will also ba noticed, is an analogue of

Plantings/ a principle (and possibly Long’s principle, both discussed
in Chapter II).

It says in effect that if two substances are

identical, they are necessarily identical.
(if),

So the present argument,

has begun to look very much like the Argument from Conceivability

However, our rejection of the latter should not be oaken as

sufficient reason for rejection of the former.
that close.

The similarity is not

For example, our objection to Hume’s Thesis, the claim

)
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that what is conceivable is
possible, in the Argument from Conceivability was an objection to the
effect that we ccn conceive
of the falsity of mathematical
conjectures, which are necessarily
true if true at all, and so are
not possibly false. But that objection will not work against (46). We
must examine our version of
(H)

find

assess it on its own merits.

The reconstructed version of (H), then,
goes as follows;
H f*

48)
49)
50)
51)
52)
53)

54j

At fi

r'st

I am a substance.
My body is a substance.
I can conceive that I and my bodv are
distinct.
If I can conceive that two substances
are distinct, they are possibly distinct.
I and my body are substances that are
possibly distinct.
If two substances are possibly distinct,
then the y; are actually distinct.
my body
1

glance it may seem that (H*

)

is a faithful rendering of

neither the argument from Meditation VI nor the arguments from
P rinciple LX and Proposition IV, since the first premise of (H*
is contained in none of those arguments.

While that is strictly

true, I don 1 think it poses any difficulties.
1

Those who view

Descartes as having thought himself to be identical with his mind
should not object, since Descartes does say in Proposition IV
that minds are substances.

(48) would follow from Descartes*

being a mind and the fact that minds are substances

.

Those who

hold that Descartes saw himself as a mind -body union usually held
that he was a substantial union, so they should allow (48).

If

there are any who hold that Descartes thought himself to be a union
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of two substances that was not
itself a third substance, then it
is
not cleat to roe how they can interpret
Descartes as having proved,
with the use of an argument like the
present one, that he is distinct
from his body.

At any rate

,

the text from Meditation VI supports
the view

that in claiming to be able to conceive
that the mind and body are
separate, Descartes took himself to be involved
in producing a

proof to the effect tnat he and his body are
distinct.
conclusion, and the French version of the Meditations

.

That is his

which was

revised by Descartes, supports the view that he
thought himself to
be identical v/ith his mind.

It reads?

...it is certain that this I, that is to
say, my soul by which I am what I am, is
entirely and absolutely distinct from mv
body

There is no such clue to Descartes’ intent in Proposition IV,
since there his purpose is to prove the distinctness of mind and

body.

But since ha elsewhere proclaimed that he is a mind or

thinking substance (e.g., in Meditation II and above in Principle LX),
the argument in Proposition IV easily lends itself to the adap ra-

tion I have made of it.
I think, then, that (H J

Descartes.

)

is acceptable as an attribution to

We should assess its worth as an argument.

It may

appear that Descartes could not convince a materialist with his
argument, for the latter would refuse to grant the conjunction of
(48) and (49).

Once we allow those premises, he would claim, then

given Descartes' definition of substance as some tiling that can exist

.

i

,
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by itself without the aid
of anything else
ship to dualist,.

simple

„e have given up the

,

But I don't think Descartes is
guilty of such

a

j think ha would grant at the
start of the argu-

ment that tor all we know I and my
body are identical.

We know
only that they are substances,
not that they are separate substances of the same kind, or, what
is more to the point, that they
are separate substances of different
kinds.

Giving different names to my body and me
does not mark them
as different substances.
Descartes affirms as much in reply to
Hobbes when he says:

Moreover , since we do not apprehend the substance itself immediately through itself, but
by means only of the fact that it is the
subject of certain activities it is highly
rational, and a requirement forced on us by
custom, to give diverse names to those substances that we recognize to bs the subjects
of clearly diverse activities or accidents
and afterwards to inquire whether these diverse
names refer to one and the same or to diverse
things. But there are certain activities,
which we call corporeal
ancT the substance
in which they exist is called body
.Further,
there are certain other activities, which we
call thinking activities, .. .The substance in
which they reside we call a thinking thing or
the mind
,

.

.

.

.

But after we have formed two distinct concepts
of those two substances, it is easy, from what
has been said is the sixth Me ditatio n, to
determine whether they are one and same or

distinct. 13

No doubt, it is partly because corporeal and mental attributes are
such diverse properties that Descartes is able to conceive the mind
and body existing separately, bat it would be unfair to accuse him

of having assumed at the outset that corporeal and mental proper tie
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belong to different kinds of substance.

While (H*

)

is not a petitio

able difficulties

.

.

X think it does have insurmount-

They are not unfamiliar ones.

Hobbes* objection,

to which Descartes* reply was quoted
above, was to the effect that

Descartes has assumed, rather than proved,
that the thing that
things is incorporeal.

Descartes protested that he rather left

the matter undetermined tut gave different names
to mind (or, himself)
arvd

body,

arid

only afterwards did he prove them distinct.

Before

his proof he allowed the possibility that they were
identical.

But to follow a now familiar route, if Descartes seriously

countenanced the possibility that he and his body were identical
then presumably he would accept:
55)

X can conceive that I and my body are identical.

If (55) was a proposition whose truth Descartes would refuse to

grant j then he was at best being disingenuous in his reply to
Hobbes when he said that he did not assume himself to be incorporeal

prior to its proof in Meditation VI.

If (55) was not true, that

is, if Descartes could not conceive himself to be identical with

his body, then he shouldn* t have held that as far as he knew, he

and his body were identical

.

Of course

,

given that the only

property Descartes knew kUiself to possess, that of thinking , did

not seem to him to require a corporeal substance for its instantiation, it no doubt seemed tc him more likely that he was distinct

from his body than that he was identical with it.

But though it

did not seem to him that mental attributes required an extended

substance for their instantiation, if did seem so to Hobbes, and to
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accommodafe the latter, Descartes allowed
that, so far as he knew
prior to Me ditation VI, Hobbes was right.
But in accepting (55), Descartes has put
his foot on

slippery slope.

a

familiar

(51) is defended by appeal to the claim that

Gou*s power is sufficient to effect what
I can conceive.
the conceivable possible.

Gcd makes

To protect Descartes against difficul-

ties involved with Hume f s Thesis, we limited
our claim that God

makes the conceivable possible by restricting ourselves
to identity

relationships among substances.

But even given that restriction,

Descartes would seem bound to accept:
56)

If I can conceive that two substances are
identical, then they are possibly identical.

since God makes possible all conceivable states of affairs with

respect to identity relations among substances.

Then, given (48),

(49), (55), and (56), we can get:
57)

I and my body are substances that are
possibly identical.

Moreover, the considerations that led Descartes to accept (53)
should also compel acceptance of:
58)

If two substances are possibly identical,
then they are actually identical,

(53) camo from the claim that if God can make two things distinct,

then they are in fact distinct.

metaphysic

\1

59)

That claim seems to rest on a

principle like:
(x)(y)(i.f x and y are substances and x is
identical with y, then x is necessarily
identical with y)

But if we accept (59), we should also accept:

)

.

.

- 123 -

G0 )

<x)(y)(if x and y are substances and x
distinct from y, then x is necessarily
distinct from y)

By parity of reasoning with respect to
the move from (60) to (68)
in Chapter II, to accept (59) while denying
(60) requires that we
hold the dubious metaphysical principle
that there exists a meta-

physical principle (viz., (59)) that holds for
actual objects but
not for non-actual possible objects, or that
it holds for things

that exist in this possible world but not for
the denizens of other

possible worlds

.

As I said in Chapter II, I know of no reason for

holding the metaphysical principle in question, and
certainly none
can be found in Descartes T writings.
cso

if Descartes accepts (H T

),

then the same considerations that

led him to it should also force him to countenance the following
argument:
I.

a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)

gl

I am a substance.
My body is a substance.
I can conceive that I and my body are identical.
If I can conceive that two substances are
identical, then they are possibly identical.
I and my body are substances that are possibly
identical
If two substances are possibly identical, they
are actu ally identical.
I -- my Body

But Descartes v/ould not accept (I).

accept (H*

only if he refuses to allow that he can conceive himself

to he identical with his body.

Since he seems to be committed to

the latter claim, he must reject (H*
At:

I conclude, then, that he can

)

this juncture I should point out that it is possible to

interpret the passage from Meditation VI in a slightly different

?

)
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fashl'° n froi “ * hat 1 hav » doas

-

The alternative interpretation
is

suggested by Descartes in Proposition
IV, quoted above.

He seems

there to be offering the following
argument:

Hf

*
.

48*)
49 )
50*)
51*)

52*

53*)

—
54

1

I ora a substance.
My body is a substance.
I can conceive of my body and me
existing separately.
If 7. o an conceive of two substances
existing separately, then they are
possibly distinct.
I and my body are substances that are
possibly distinct.
If two substances are possibly distinct
r ve actually distinct.
I -f my body
'

T

)

This argument, as an interpretation of the passage
from

Meditation VI, would have avoided a number of difficulties
that
beset the interpretation we settled on; however, it is
ultimately
no more successful.

The considerations, previously adduced, that

led us to regard Descartes as being committed to (55) are still
in

effect, and so would preclude the use of (H**) as well as (H*).

How it may be thought that the Argument from Distinct Conception, which we have rendered finally with (H T

)

(but which may be

rendered as (H* *)) is unlike the Argument from Conceivabiiity in
that, contrary to my contention, Descartes would deny that he can

conceive himself to be identical with his body (or inseparable from
1

it).

It may be objected that when the Argument from Conceivabiiity

was advanced in Meditation II (if it was in fact there offered),

Descartes was more ignorant of his nature than he is at the point at

which he offers the Argument from Distinct Conception in Meditation
VI.

For example, he claims to know after the investigation of the

:
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second Meditation that his entire essence
is to think
And if he
knows further that the entire essence
of body is extension, then
.

presumably he could, with adequate
justification, deny that he can
conceive himself to be identical with his
body.
That objection is a strong one, to be sure.

However, it is

so strong that if it holds, then the facts
on which it is based
are alone sufficient to prove that Descartes
is distinct from his

body

He could argue as follows

.

a)
b)

cj

It appears

,

I have the property of being essentially
a thinking thing.
My body does not have the property of being
essent ially a thinking thing.
Ijs ray body

then, that an adequate defense of the first premise

of the Argument from Distinct Conception against its contrary can

also obviate whatever other difficulties the argument might have by

affording one whose premises would be entirely unobjectionable.
We should turn, then, to an assessment of the extent to which

Descartes was successful in establishing the claim that
essence is to think.

Ms

entire

But before we do, there is another argument

that is clearly stated in Meditatio n VI, one which may make an

appeal to Descartes 1 essence unnecessary.

We should digress briefly

for a look at that argument.

Th e Argument from Divisibility
In

Ms

Synopsis of the Meditations

,

Descartes informs us that

the sixth Meditation contains an argument for distinctness that is

different from the one we have been examining.

After outlining the

,
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Argumenr from Distinct Conception, Descartes says
of its conclusion:
This is further confirmed in this same
Meditation by the fact that we cannot
conceive of body excepting in so far as
it i< divisible v/hile the mind cannot
be conceived of excepting as indivisible.-^
.

,

The argument he is referring to appears some

Argument from Distinct Conception.

fev;

pages after the

It is given in the following

passage:

In order to begin this examination, then
I here say, in the first place, that there
is a great difference between mind and body,
inasmuch as body is by nature always divisible,
and the mind is entirely indivisible
For as
a matter of fact, when I consider the mind,
that is to say, myself inasmuch as I am only a
thinking thing, I cannot distinguish in myself
any parts but apprehend myself to be clearly
one and entire; and although the whole mind
seems to be united to the whole body, yet if
a foot, or an arm, or some other part, is separated from my body, I am aware that nothing
has been taken away from my mind
And the
faculties of wilding, feeling, conceiving,
etc cannot be properly speaking said to be
its parts, for it is one and the same mind
which employs itself in willing and in feeling
and understanding. But it is quite otherwise
with corporeal or extended objects , for there
is not one of these imaginable by me which my
mind cannot easily divide into parts , and
which consequently I do not recognise as being
divisible; this would be sufficient to teach me
that the mind or soul of man is entirely different from the body, if I had not already learned
it from other sources,
.

,

,

.

.

The passage can be construed as providing an argument for the

non-identity of Descartes
mind and body.
A.

61)
62 )
63)

arid

his body, or for the non -identity of

We can represent the two arguments as follows:

My body is divisible.
I am not divisible
my body
I

f

.
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B.

Body is divisible.

64)

65j_M:uKi is not divisible
Hi ad f body

66)

each case the premises yield the
conclusion by application of
Leibniz 4 Law. If Descartes is construed
as offering (B), and not
Ir.

(A), then to get the conclusion that
he is not identical with his

body, he would have to further demonstrate
that he is a mind.

Then

he could use (6S) to establish the desired
conclusion.

The worth of both (A) and (B) seems to turn
on the truth of

their second premises.

To evaluate his arguments, we can grant

Descaites the first premise in each case and proceed
to an

assessment of the adequacy of his defense of the second
premises.
To support (62) Descartes appeals to (i) his inability to
distinguish

any parts in himself, and (ii) the fact that when he is aware
of
the lo*s of a part of his body, he is also aware that nothing
has

been lost from himself.

Descartes

1

first appeal is obviously unpersuasive.

It does

not follow from his being unable to distinguish any parts in himself
that he in fact has none.

It may even be false that he is unable to

distinguish parts in himself.

It may be, for example

,

that his foot

and arm, which parts of his body he has distinguished, are also

parts of himself, though he remains ignorant of that fact.

Nor can

Descartes here argue as follows:
67)
68)
6S)

My body has the proper cy of having parts
that are distinguished by me.
1 do not have the property of having
parts that are distinguished by me.
I y- my body

since Descartes 1 only defease of (68) would be an appeal to the claim

that ha is not aware of being able
to distirguish any parts of himself.
ttascart.es *

stronger
-lots

titan

second line of defense in support of
(A) is no

Ms

first.

His claim is that when he is aware
of the

of a part of his body, e.g., an arm or
a leg, he is also

aware that he has not lost any parts.

entitled to that claim.

But surely Descartes is not

What he is entitled to, rather, is:

I am not aware of myself losing any parts.

70)

But (70) does not entail:
71)

I

am aware that

I have lost no parts.

It is the latter claim that Descartes needs to support the
claim
that he is not identical with his body.

But all he has available

is the former.

It may be that while (A) is unsuccessful, (B) isn't, and that

Descartes can appeal to the latter in establishing his conclusion.
In defense of (B) Descartes might appeal to the claim that when his

body loses a part its function is impaired, but the function of his

mind isn't

.

Or, he may simply appeal to our intuitions, which

cannot be further supported, that when the body loses a part, the
mind doesn't also lose a part.

I think that something like those

claims is adequate to support: the claim that a person's mind is not

identical with his whole body.

But that leaves open the possibility

that the mind is identical with a part of the body.

There arc parts of the body, parts of the brain to be exact,

such that if they are lost, the function of the mind does seem to
be impaired.

Descartes was not impressed by the fact that a loss
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of a limb, for example, might change
the sensations present in the
mind, since he drew a distinction
between purely cognitive activitaes end activities of the mind that
resulted in part from its being

joined to and affected by the body.

But Descartes should have been

disturbed by something like a prefrontal
lobotomy, which would seem
to affect only the purely cognitive functions
of the mind.
Such a
change in the body would seem to effect a change
in the mind and
would tend to weaken any argument to the effect
that the mind is

not identical'-with any part of the body.
the sort of argument under discussion.

At least it would weaken

Such a fact does not, of

course, prove identity, but it does disarm Descartes* argument.
We should give up on the Argument from Divisibility and turn
to Descartes 7 claim that his essence is thinking, in hopes of

there finding material for a better argument for distinctness.

Unfortunately, it is not an easy task to find arguments in
Descartes* writings for the claim that his essence is thinking

.

In

discussing Nakhnikian’s version of the Argument from Distinct
Conception, we found that Descartes asserts the claim in Meditation
VI, but no argument for it is there given.

Descartes appears to

simply appeal to his ignorance of any other properties being essentrial to him.

But as we saw, it is not clear why he thought thinking

was essential to him, nor does it follow from his not knowing himself to have any other essential properties that he in fact has none

We should look in the earlier writings for some more substantial
argument.

- 131 -

The f.xvst discussion of his essence
that we find in Descartes
wri tings comes from Dart IV of the
Discourse when he says;

1

I next considered attentively what
I was;
and X saw that while I could pretend
that
I had no body, that there was no world,
and
no place existed for me to be in, x could
not pretend that I was not; on the contrary
from the mere fact that I thought of
doubting
the truth of other things it evidently and
certainly followed that X existed. On the
other hand , if j had merely ceased to think
even if everything else that I had ever
imagined had been true I had no reason to
believe that I should have existed. From
this I recognized that I was a substance
whose^ whole essence or nature is to think
and whose being requires no place and depends
on no material thing. 1 '
,

In Chapter II we interpreted this passage as providing the raw

materials of the Argument from Doubt.

It is probably more correct

to interpret the passage as providing considerations in support
of the claim that Descartes* essence is thinking.

those considerations?

There seem to be two;

But what are

(i) Descartes says

that from his doubting (or thinking) it follows that he exists, and
(ii) if he had ceased to think, he would have had no reason to

suppose that

lie

existed.

Somehow these two facts are supposed to

lead to the conclusion that Descartes* whole essence is to think.

The Ar gume nt from Proof -Dependence

Anthony Kenny suggests, and rejects, the hypothesis that
Descartes is here relying upon the unexpressed principle that:
1)

The existence of A depends upon B if, and
only if, the proof of the existence of A
depends upon B. 1 ^

Presumably Kenny sees (i) and (ii) as somehow establishing that

.
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the existence °*

^cartes

depends upon thinking.

Also he must

holo that a thing’s essence consists
in those properties its

existence depends upon.
nov. -specify

With respect to his principle, Kenny
does

what the permissible substitueuds
of

’A’

and

T

F,

f

are,

but he does say that the principle,
however we are to understand
it, is one that Descartes cannot
accept.
Its unacceptability, according to
Kenny, stems from the fact

that Descartes gave a proof for the
existence of God that depends

upon Descartes’ having an idea of God.

But since Descartes’

existence, and hence the existence of his idea,
is contingent,
we wou ^d net want

f;o

say that God’s existence depends upon Des-

cartes* having an idea of God.
thed,

Still less would we want to say

Descartes’ having an idea of

the essence of God,.

God. is

in some fashion a part of

But Kenny apparently thinks that (1) would

commit us to such a view.
i'his

pelling.

objection to (1), though, does not seem entirely comAdmittedly, it is Kenny’s principle and he should know

what is to count against it; however, it should not go unnoticed
that proofs for the existence of God have offered that do not de-

pend upon anyone’s having an idea of God.

The difference I am

pointing to, of course, is between ontological arguments, which
depend upon the idea of God, and cosmological arguments, which
depend upon

s ome

person’ s idea of God.

Descartes offers both.

Had Kenny expressed his principle as:
2)

The existence of A depends upon B if,
and only if, there exists a proof of
A that depends upon B

.

-

then las objection would have succeeded.
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But, as it stands, the

principle is ambiguous between (2) and:
The existence of A depends upon B if
ti.nd only if, all proofs
of the existence
or A depend upon B.

3)

if we ignore a third possible reading
that recognizes only one

proof for the existence of anything.
If we read (1) as (3), which reading would
seem more natural,

then Kenny* s objection surely fails.

Since there is at least one

proof that does not depend upon some contingent being* s having
an
idea of Gcd

,

(1) is not ruled out by Kenny's objection.

It will,

of course, require that the idea or concept of God is essential
to

God, but to the extent that we can understand that result at all,

it seems unobjectionable

.

However, 1 think (1) is open to an

objection, beyond the obvious one that it is too vague to be easily
applicable.

That objection, which takes advantage of the principle's

unperspicuousness

,

is that it makes the laws of logic, upon which

any proof depends, a part cf the essence of everything.

Again, it

is difficult to understand what such a notion comes to, but while

the laws of logic may in some sense be said to be a necessary part
of my nature, they are clearly not a part of my essence in Descartes'

sense

Another objection can possibly be made to the principle
that again plays on its unpercpicuousness
the existence of matter depends

,

.

,

one

Descartes’ proof of

in addition to the goodness of

God, upon his having a clear and distinct understanding of matter
and a strong belief that it exists.

So at least one proof of the

.

.
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existonee of letter depends upon someone's
thinking, and it seems
further that anyone's producing such
a proof will depend in some
sense upon his engaging in thought.
So it may be said that the

proof, or every proof, of the existence
of matter depends upon
there being someone who thinks the
proof through. The same would
hold, or course , for the proof of the
existence of anything. But
there being someone who thinks is not
essential to matter or to

anything that exists
To be fair, it should be noted that (3) can be
distinguished
from:

3*)

The existence of A depends upon B if, and
only if, anyone f s giving a proof of the
existence of A depends upon B.

It may be that the above objection applies to (3 :

),

but not to (3).

Also, if the present objection does succeed as an objection to
(3),

then Kenny* s objection was correct, but not for the reason he thought.

At any rate, Kenny was right in rejecting (1); we should too.
Kenny * s Argument
In rejecting (1) we are confronted again with the need to

explain how the passage from the Discourse supports the claim that
Descartes 5 essence is thinking.

Kenny has provided another inter-

pretation, which presumably he thinks is the correct one.

Kenny

invites us to consider the following propositions that come from
the passage iu question:

4)
5)

6)

I <m thinking
7 have a body
I am in « wori

-1.35-

7)

8)

I am in a place.
I exist.

In regazd to these propositions Kenny
says:

Descartes draws our attention to the following
rects about these propositions and their
relations to each other. First,
(5), (6), and
(// are uncertain, while (8) is certain,
if
(4) is true, and (5), (6), and (7) are doubtful.
(8) is certain. .if (4) is false, and
(5)
(5), (6),
and (7) are true, (8) is not certain...
.

From all this it follws that (4) is a premise
whose truth is both necessary and sufficient
to establish the certainty of (8); whereas
(6), and (7) are premises none of which
>
is necessary, and which together are insufficient, to establish the certainty of (8). 1 -

Kenny tells us that while (5), (6), and (7) all entail
(8),
they do not establish it as certain, because they are themselves

not certain.
sition,

For one proposition, £, to establish another propo-

as certain, Kenny says,

£ must

entail £, and £ must

itself be certain.
Descartes* conclusion is that his whole essence is to think

and that his existence is not dependent upon the existence of any

material thing, so simply pointing out the relationships that hold
among the above propositions is not adequate to explain how

Descartes got his conclusion.

Kenny goes on to suggest a principle

that Descartes might have used to get his conclusion.

He says:

One principle that would enable Descartes to
derive his conclusion from his premises might
run as follows. Those properties constitute
the essence of a thing that are severally
necessary and jointly sufficient to establish
the existence of that thing with certainty.
This principle coupled with the premise that
the single property of thinking is both necessary and sufficient to establish with certainty

1
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»?.),

i

.,..

that

-

r-<y

exa.s t^nce

will yield the conclusion
,
essence is constituted by thought, 2 0

The backbone of Kenny *s interpretation,
then, is the principle:
r

->)

(x)(the essence of x consists of that set
of properties. S, such that the members
of S

are severally necessary and jointly sufficient
to establish the existence of x with certainty)

It would seem that if Kenny* principle is
acceptable, and if he
s
is right that the property of thinking is
alone necessary and

sufficient to establish Descartes* existence with certainty,
then
thinking is in fact Descartes* whole essence.

Unfortunately, it

is difficult to evaluate Kenny *s principle owiiig to its
unperspicuous

wording

,

his /.allure to define the notion of certainty he is using,

and his failure to say what it means for a property or set of

properties to be necessary and sufficient to establish the existence
of something with certainty.

Fortunately, we may not need to evaluate the principle, since

Kenny himself thinks it false.

He undertakes to demonstrate its

falsity as follows:
These considerations notwi ths tending the principle is in fact false, as is easily shown.
For let us suppose that it is true , but not
indubitable, that it is impossible to think
without having a body. Then all Descartes*
premises will remain true. Proposition (4)
alone will be necessary and sufficient to
establish the certainty of (8); for (5),
though it follows from (4) in conjunction with
the hypothesis that it is impossible to think
without having a body, is not certain since
that hypothesis is itself doubtful. 3uc
Descartes* conclusion will be false. For if
it is in fact impossible to think without
having a body, then it cannot be true both
that my essence is thinking and that my

.
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existence does not depend at all on the
existence o.t; any body. The suggested
principle therefore, since it would permit
the c rawing of a false conclusion
from true
premises , must be rejected. 21
,

The false conclusion Kenny has in mind is:
10)

My entire essence is to think,

which comes from (9) and:
11)

Thinking is the only property that is
necessary and sufficient to establish
my existence with certainty.

Kenny *s strategy is to show that there is a possible situation
in

which (11) is true and (10) false.
12)

That situation is one in which:

It is impossible to think, without having
a body

is true but not indubitable, i.e., not certain.

If (12) is true

and t linking is essential to me, then, by the principle:
13)

(x)(F)(G)(if F is essential to x and it
is impossible for something to have F
without having G, then G is essential to x)

having a body is also essential to me.

Kenny does not explicitly

affirm (13), the principle that establishes that corporeality is

essential to Descartes, but he must hold it if his argument is to
succeed.

Also, it is important that (12) be not indubitable, since

if it were, then (11) would be false.

It would be so, because

(12), being certain, in conjunction with (4), would suffice to

establish (5) with certainty.

(5) could then be used to establish

(8) with certainty.

Kenny

*

s

argument, then, goes as follows.

Since (10)

5.s

entailed

by the conjunction of (11) and (9), and since (11) is true in the
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amagined situation in which (12) is also true,
then either (11)
or (9) must be false.
But given that (12) is dubi table
,

remains true.
tion.

(11)

Therefore, (9) is false in our hypothetical situa-

That is, there is a possible state of affairs
in which (9)

is Adxse.

But since if is a metaphysical principle, it is neces-

sarily true, if true at all.

Not being necessarily true, it is false.

How should we assess Kenny *s objection?

We must ask ourselves

whether he has made good on his claim to have shown
(9) false.

I

have suggested that he showed (9) false by showing it to be possibly
false

,

the latter being so when a particular imagined situation

obtains.
cedure.

Nov;

there seems to be something suspect about that pro-

It seems that Kenny is trying to show a principle to be

possibly false

,

so he tells us to imagine a situation in which a

certain proposition is true, a proposition which, if true, renders
the principle ha is examining false.

Admittedly, he is not asking

us to imagine the falsity of the principle under examination, but

what he does ask is no less illicit.

When he asks us to suppose

(12) true, Kenny seems in effect to be claiming it to be possibly

That he must do in order to show his principle, (9), to be

true.

false.

But (12) is a modalized statement of the form

n Nec

r
p_.

If

ry

it is possibly true, then it is true in fact/'

1

-'

We can now see the problem with Kenny’s approach.

In holding

(12), in conjunction with the claim that Descartes is essentially

thinking, Kenny has in effect embraced the position that Descartes
is also essentially corporeal.

His objection to the principle,

then, amounts to claiming it false on the ground that it renders as

.

- 139 -

Descar tes* only essential property that
of thinking, while Descartes
is in fact also essentially corporeal.
But that is to beg the question. Kenny's argument against
(9) is a petitio. so his attempt to
show it false has failed.
It may possibly be objected that I have
misread the passage
in which Kenny tries to show (9) false.
Kenny*

s

It may not have been

intent to affirm that (12) is possibly true.

He may in-

stead have intended to affirm merely that
(12) is epistemically

possible for him.

When he asks us to suppose (12) true, it may

appear that Kenny there merely desires to point out what
follows
ir it is true, as in fact for all we know it is.

sayo

,

Then, my obiectcr

Kenny shows us that if Descartes is essentially corporeal, the

principle fails to reflect that fact, so it is false.
However, Descartes, or someone committed to (9), could reply
to Kenny by pointing out that of course the principle fails to

establish thinking as essential to Descartes, since it isn’t
essential to him.

It is not sufficient to show the principle

false merely by showing that there is an epistemically possible

situation in which it gives a wrong answer to the question "what
is Descartes* essence."

What has to be shown is that there is a

logically possible situation in which the principle gives a wrong
answer.

It does not follow from the principle *s being epistemically

possibly false that it is logically possibly false

.

If the strategy

Kenny really employed was the one we are examining, then he certainly
has not succeeded in showing the principle false

Kenny see&is caught between a question-begging objection and no
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objection at all.

if he offers the objection I have attributed
to

him, then his objection is question -begging.

If he rather intends

to show what follows from a particular
epistemically possible

situation, then he has no objection at all.

Despite the failure of his objection to it, I think Kenny’s

principle is indeed not acceptable.

In the first place, it should

be viewed as unacceptable simply on the basis of its
being not

sufficiently clear to be properly evaluated.

But aside from that

difficulty, tc the extent that we can understand the principle
intuitively, there seems no reason why it should be accepted as

principle for Descartes.

a

Before raising objections to the principle,

Kenny attempts to defend it as follows:
Two considerations make this principle plausible.
First, it seems reasonable to say that
those properties constitute the essence of a
thing that are severally necessary and jointly
sufficient for the thing to exist. Second, if
the holding of a giver, property makes "I exist”
certain, then a f ortiori it seems to establish
~
it as true 22
.

It should be obvious that Kenny’s notion of essence does not match
Descartes’

.

The latter seemed to recognize only two condidates for

the essential properties of a created thing, viz

thought.

.

,

corporeality and

An essence -finder principle for Descartes should be one

that tails us whether a thing has one, or the other, or both of
these two properties.

But other properties, in addition to these,

will be necessary for a thing

Co exist.

Descartes, for example,

recognized duration as being such a property.

Presumably he would

also have countenanced other universal properties

,

such as

.

.

.
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se li -identity , as being necessary to
the existence of a thing.

Kenny’s notion of
/vctraiys

art

So

essential property does not match Descartes’

having regarded necessary properties as essential
leads

us to wonder whether, contrary to his view,
it might not be the case

that universal properties do fit Kenny^s essence -finder
principle,
(9).

Again , it is not clear what Kenny means by a pronosition’s

being certain, but it seems that:
14)

I am self -identical

is certain if anything is, and it seems further that
(14), if true,

entails that I exist.

But the characteristics of being certain and

entailing that I exist are just the characteristics that led Kenny
to say that (4) establishes (8) as certain.

It would seem, then,

that the property cf self-identity is sufficient to establish my
existence with certainty.

But if that is so, then it is not clear

how (4), or any other proposition could be said to be necessary
to establishing my existence with certainty.

Admittedly, if I

prove that I exist, then I have to think in order to do it, but I

don’t need to use (4) as a premise in such a proof.

So it appears

that thinking, contra Kenny, is noc necessary to establish my
exis tenee with certainty

It seems, then, that there may not be any property that fits

Kenny’s principle, since no property seems necessary to establish
my existence with certainty.

can appeal to the former.

Thinking is not necessary, since we

It may be that when Kenny’s principle is

made sufficiently clear it will be seen that my objection does not
apply, but until the principle is made clearer, we should reject it

,
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and look elsewhere.*^

Malcolm’s Principle

Norman Malcolm has offered an essence -finder
principle that he
thinks Descartes might have been relying
upon in the Discourse and
second Meditation .25
15)

from

tills

He SU g gests the general principle:

If there is an existing thing 0 and if
there is something E, such that if one
perceives E, necessarily one perceives 0
and if one perceives 0, necessarily one
perceives E, then E is the essence of 0.^^

general principle Malco3jn derives a principle for Descartes

to apply in his own case:

16)

x is my essence if it is the case that
if I am aware of x then (necessarily)
1 am aware of myself and if I am aware
of ray If then (necessarily) I am aware

Malcolm further suggests that thinking is the only property that
fits (16), thus we should conclude that thinking is Descartes’

essence
Two points should be made here.

First, (15) is defective in

that, as it is stated, if E is the essence of 0, then 0 is likewise
the essence of E.

It may be that thinking is Descartes’ essence,

but it surely is not true that Descartes is thinking’s essence.
This defect of (15) is repaired in (16); however, (15) and (16)

share a different defect.

operator in each.

Malcolm has misplaced the necessity

As he has constructed the principles, the scope

of their necessity operators is limited to the consequent of each

conditional in which they appear; they should carry the whole
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conditional within their scope.
We needn’t spend much time evaluating
(16), since Malcolm
turns elf

rightly rejects it with the claim that there is
no apparent

reason why it should be regarded as providing
Descartes’ essence.

Malcolm claims that the first conditional in
(16) holds trivially
for every property and the second holds for
thinking, not because

it is essential to Descartes

,

but because of the fact that Descartes

held that awareness was a kind of thinking and that we
are aware
of

aj.l

of cur thoughts.

Thus, by the second conditional, if X am

aware of anything at all, then I am aware of thinking.

While I think Malcolm is right in rejecting (16),
has not given all the reasons sufficient for doing so.

I

think he
For

example, it is not clear to me that thinking does in fact fit the

first condition in (16).

Malcolm argues that, for Descartes,

whenever I think, I am aware that I exist, and in being aware that
I exist, I am aware of myself.

^

He cites as evidence for his

claim the familiar passage in Meditatio n II in which Descartes says
that the proposition that he exists is certain only for as long as
he thinks

.

But since it does not follow from that fact that at

every moment at which I think, I am aware that I exist or I am
aware of myself

,

Malcolm has not persuasively established the claim

that thinking fits the first condition of (16).

Even if Malcolm could successfully establish the claim that he
is aware of himself whenever he is aware of thinking, then the

principle would be open to a counter-example.

Given that Malcolm,

^

.
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in order to make the principle work, needs
to subscribe to the view
that Descartes thought of himself as being aware
of all of the

thoughts that he has

,

then it would turn out that being aware of

his vAirikung was essential to Descartes.

That is, whenever Descartes

was o^are of himself, he would be thinking and aware
of his thinking,

And whenever he was aware of his being aware of his thinking

would bo aware of himself (given the success of Malcolm

T

s

,

he

argument

that Descartes is aware of hirnself whenever he is thinking).

Cut

whereas Descartes may have held that he was necessarily aware of
his thinking , he did not hold that being aware of his thinking was
a part of his essence.

Failing the efforts of Kenny and Malcolm to provide a successful essence -finder principle, we should go to the texts and attempt
to tease out the arguments Descartes saw as proving his essence
to be thought

,

The A rgument from Systematic elimination bv Doubt

Finding Descartes

''

1

arguments for Ids essence is a source of

considerable consternation, to be sure; however, there is a claim
in Descartes* writings that has provided far more perplexity to
cosnmen tutors
T

'I

.

I

am referring, of course, to the Cogito , the claim

think , therefore I am.

ft

There is one interpretation of Descartes'

effort to establish the claim that he exists that may shed some
light on his effort to discover his essence
The search that terminated in the Cogito was a search for a

proposition that is certain, or indubitable.

Descartes seems to
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.

equate certainty with induhitability, at least when
he is attempting to discover that most fundamental proposition
that is to ha the

bedrock for his reconstruction of knowledge.
then

j,

An obvious strategy,

for rinding a certain, or indubitable, proposition is to

engage in a systematic attempt to divest oneself of every belief
that can for any reason be doubted,

if one finds a proposition

that cannot be doubted, then the search

lias

ended.

That proposi-

tion is of the sort that Descartes is seeking.
It is reasonable, then, to interpret Descartes as having

proceeded in this fashion in the Cogito passages

,

He systematically

throws out every proposition or class of propositions for which he

can find any reason at all to doubt.

Descartes admits that he may,

in the process, threw away some true propositions, but his search
is not for what is merely true, but for what is certain.

arrives after a while at the proposition "I exist."

He

It is one that

cannot be doubted, since any attempt to doubt it guarantees that
it is true.

For Descartes, any attempt to doubt a proposition is an

activity of thinking, and no such activity exists without a thinker;
hence, any attempt on Descartes

1

part to doubt that he exists

requires that ho be thinking, and his thinking in turn guarantees
that he exists.

Thus Descartes has found a proposition that is

certain for him, one that cannot be doubted, by systematically

doubting all of the propositions that he formerly believed until he
found, one that could not be doubted, i.e., one for which there was

no possible reason to doubt.
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I'he

foregoing is one way in which the Cogito passages can
be

interpreted

,

is available.

I

don’t claim that it is the best interpretation that
Nor even do I believe that it is sufficiently clear,

without being more thoroughly detailed, to be seriously evaluated.
We would first have to say at least something about the notions
of

certainty and indubitability that Descartes was relying upon.

But

it is the general strategy that is important for our purposes

here, and a view of that strategy can be garnered and appreciated

without our attempting to make the interpretation clearer.
Now there is some evidence that Descartes intended such a
strategy to establish that his essence was thinking.

It is

possible to interpret Descartes as having attempted to discover his
essence by systematically doubting himself to possess each of the

properties he formerly took himself to have until he arrived at one

that he could not doubt himself to have

.

In the second Medi ta tion

immediately after establishing that he exists, Descartes says:
Put I do not yet know clearly enough what I
am; and hence 1 must be careful to see that
do not imprudently take some other object
J.
in place of myself, and thus that I do not
go astray in respect of this knowledge that
I hold to be the most certain and most evident
of all that I have formerly learned. That is
why 1 shall now consider anew what I believed
myself to be before I embarked upon these last
reflections; and of my former opinions I shall
withdraw all that might even in a small degree
be invalidated by the reasons which I have just
brought forward, in order that there may be
nothing at all left beyond what is absolutely
certain and indubitable.-^

Descartes then discovers that he can doubt himself to hove
all of the corporeal properties that he formerly took himself to

,

-

liave.

etc.

14 ?-

He can doubt that he has a face, hands, arms, bones,
flesh,

But he cannot doubt that he thinks:
...What of thinking?

I find here that thought

is an attribute that belongs to me; it alone

cannot be separated from me. I am, I exist,
that is certain
But how often? Just when I
think; for it might possibly be the case if I
ceased entirely to think, that I should likewise cease altogether to exist. I do not now
admit anything which is not necessarily true:
to speak accurately I am not more than a thing
which thinks, that is to say a mind or a soul,
or an understanding, or a reason, which are
terms whose significance was formerly unknown
to me.
I am, however, a real thing and really
exist; but what thing? I have answered: a
thing which thinks
.

When he says that thought alone cannot be separated from him,
we unierstand Descartes as saying that thought is the only one of
his properties that resists Cartesian doubt.

He cannot, with

consistency, imagine himself to be without that property.

it is the only property he

lias

Since

found that he cannot doubt himself

to have, Descartes concludes that his essence is to think.

The same strategy appears again in The Search After Truth ,

when Polyander, after claiming that ho can doubt himself to have
any corporeal properties, says:
Of all the attributes which I bestowed upon
myself only one remains for me to examine
and that is thought; and I see that it is
the only one that I cannot separate from myself. For if it is true that 1 doubt just
because I cannot doubt that I do so, it is
also equally true that I think; for what is
doubting but thinking in a certain way? And
in fact if I did not think, I could not know
whether I doubt or exist. Yet I am, and I
know it because I doubt, that is to say because
And better, it might be that if I
I think.
,

.
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ceased for an instant to think I should cease
at the sane time to be. Likewise the sole
thing I cannot separate from me that I know
certainly to be me and that I can now affirm
without fear of deception- -that one thing I
repeat, is that I am a thinking thing. 32
,

,

It seems clear, then, that at least one strategy Descartes

employed to establish thinking as his essence was that of eliminating any property he could doubt himself to have.

Descartes does

not say explicitly here what makes his possession of a given
property indubitable, but it is possible to hazard a guess.

He

cannot doubt that he thinks, because his doubting that he thinks,
since doubting is a species of thinking, entails that he thinks.
So, we might offer the following principles to apply to the present

investigation of Descartes 1 essences
a cannot doubt that he lias F =df a knows
that his doubting that he has F entails
that he has F.
F is essential to a if, and only if, a

21)

22)

cannot doubt that he has F.

Certainly Descartes did not appeal explicitly to these principles

,

but 1 think that something like them may have underlain

his thinking

.

is incomplete.

We should add a caveat, however.

As it stands, (22)

In the first place, we should add a conjunct to the

effect that F is not a universal property.

But even given that

restriction, (22) would still make essential to Descartes other

properties that he did not recognize as essential.

For example,

according to (22), the property of doubting would be essential to

Descartes
However

,

we saw in Chapter I that Descartes wants essential

.
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properties to be of a higher level of generality
than that,

Descartes would hold that while he essentially thinks,
he does not
have as part of his essence any of the specific
activities that

fall under the genus

n

thinking.”

earlier by referring to Broad

1

s

We have expressed this point

differentiating attributes, which

make use of the determinable -determinate distinction.

I

don*t

think we can adequately express that distinction by adding another

conjunct in (22); however, it should be kept in mind that admissible
substituends of *F* are limited to names of those attributes that

Descartes would countenance as being proper candidates for his
essence

Principle (22) is beset by one other difficulty that merits
mention.

That difficulty is that the principle, as worded, works

only for persons, if it works at all.

Now this is also a difficulty

shared by Malcolm* s principle, and possibly by Kenny* s.

At any rate,

bodies do not turn out to be essentially extended on Kenny *s

principle.

It would be nice to find in Descartes* writings the

suggestion of an essence-finder principle that would be purely

general in application to all substances, or even just to all created
substances.
Nov;

Unfortunately, I rind no such suggestion.

that we are reasonably clear about the suggested strategy’

Descartes might have been employing, we should assess its worth.

Recall that X suggested that the strategy of systematic doubt might
under lie Descartes* effort in the Cogito passages

.

There he was

looking for an indubitable proposition , and it seems reasonable to
-set

about finding one by systematically throwing out all of the

,

.

.
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possible candidates that can be doubted.
cannot be doubted, the search is over.

Once one is found that
As Descartes admitted,

there may have been truths that were passed
over in the search, but

that is acceptable as long as one is found about
which he can have

no doubt.

The strategy of systematic elimination by doubt seems

respectable in the C ogito sections
However, it is not clear why we should expect the strategy to
be successful in the search for Descartes* essence.

There is an

important difference retween the enterprise of searching for a

foundation for knowledge and that of searching for a thing’s
essential properties

.

We might characterize the difference as that

that holds between the search for an epistemic fact and the search
for a metaphysical fact.

Indubitability is an epistemic nocion.

It makes sense to look for a proposition that cannot be doubted

when one is searching for an epistemic foundation block.

However

it is not clear why one should seek those properties a person

cannot doubt himself to possess when one is trying to discover that
person’s essential properties.

The latter is a metaphysical search,

not en epistemic one
Two problems present themselves here.

First it is not clear

what reasons there are for thinking that the appropriate non -universal
properties that fit (21) are essential to their possessors.

Second,

it is not clear what reasons there are for thinking that the appro-

priate non -universal properties that fail to fit (21) are not essential to their possessors.

On the face of it, there does not seem to

.
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be any connection between the properties
I can or cannot doubt
rayself to have and those that I have essentially.

Thinking seems to fit (21) simply because in order to employ
the principle I have to doubt and since doubting is
a species of
s

thinking , my employing the principle assures that I will manifest
the property I attempt to doubt myself to have.

But it is not clear

why that fact should lead us to believe that thinking is essential
to me.
rne

,

further

,

it seems that corporeality might be essential to

so that my doubting entails my being corporeal.

don't know myself to be essentially corporeal,
the entailment relationship holds

corporeal.

.

Hence

My being able to doubt that

I

,

I

J

But since I

don't know that

can doubt that I am

am corporeal seems con-

sistent with my being essentially corporeal.

It simply is not

clear why (21) should be taken as showing me not to be essentially

corporeal
there is one possible link that I can see between proper-

Nov/

ties I cannot doubt myself to have and properties that are essential
to me.

It might be said that if I can doubt myself to have a cer-

tain property, then I can conceive of myself existing without it.

Similarly

,

if I cannot doubt that I have a certain property, then

I cannot conceive of myself lacking it.
a

If we now introduce, as

replacement for (22), a variation of the essence -finder principle

that Chisholm has suggested for Descartes (cf. Ch.II):
23)

(x)(F)(x has F essentially if, and only
if, x cannot conceive himself except as
having F)

:

.
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reme>nbering to r as trie t the range of our
property variable to

admissible candidates for Cartesian essencehood, then
we may be
able to make the present strategy respectable
fhe principle (23) can now be conjoined with the
following

principles
(F)(if I cannot doubt that I have F, then I
cannot conceive myself except as having F)
(F)(if I can doubt that I have F, then I can
conceive myself as lacking F)
a can doubt that he has F =df it is not the
case that a cannot doubt that he has F

24)
25)
2G)

to yield the conclusion that thinking is essential to Descartes.

Since thinking is the only admissible property that Descartes

cannot doubt himself to have, it is the only property that he

cannot conceive himself except as having, and hence, the only

property that is essential to him.
Unfortunately, I think the suggested revisions fall short of

making respectable Descartes * strategy of systematic elimination by
doubt.

First of all, it is not clear why we should accept (24).

Again, the tension is between an epistemological fact and a meta-

physical one

.

My inability to doubt that I have some particular

property derives from an epistenrdc fact, whereas my being unable
to conceive myself lacking some property is metaphysical in

character.

Wow it may be that if I can doubt that I have a certain

property, then I can conceive myself .lacking it.

But it does not

seem that my inability to doubt (as defined in (21)) that I have
some property is grounds for holding that 1 am unable to conceive

that 1 lack that property.

It may in fact be that I am both unable
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to doubt that I have the universal properties
I have and cannot

conceive myself except as having them.
to hold with regard to thinking.

But the same does not seem

At least there does not seem

to be the connection between ability to doubt and
conceive that is

requisite to the truth of (24).
I think we can provide an argument to show the unacceptability

of the conjunction of (21), (23), (24), (25), and (26).
v

If that

onjunction is unacceptable, the principles in it cannot be employed

by Descartes to establish his essence.

To begin we must make the

philosophically sound assumption that statements attributing

essential properties to a thing are necessarily true if true at all.
That assumption is surely a reasonable one, since if something, a,
has some property, F, essentially, then it would seem that no

possible world is such that

*a has F

essentially* is false in that

world
But if such statements as *a has F essentially* are necessarily
true if true at all, then if a has F essentially, it would follow
by strict implication from a*s doubting that he has F essentially,

that he does in fact have £ essentially.
27)

For example:

Jones has the property of being essentially
a thinking thing.

follows from:
28)

Jones doubts that he has the property of
being essentially a thinking thing.

where (27) is necessarily true.

However, Jones may be ignorant of

the entailment relationship between (27) and (28), in which case:
29)

«Jones is able to

doubt (27).

.
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would also be true.

So by (23), (25), and (23), Jones does not

have the property of being essentially a thinking
thing essentially.

Nov it might be supposed that an essentia.list would hold
the

following principle s
3C)

(x)(F)(if x has F essentially, then x
essentially has the property of having
F essentially)

If Descartes held (30), then there would be a conflict for him

among (27), (30), and:
33.)

Jones does not have the property of being
essentially a thinking thing essentially.

However, we must remember that Descartes held that persons have one

essential property only, so I think he would be undisturbed by (31),
since he would not accept (30).

Something like the above strategy, however, can be used to
show the unacceptability of the proffered principles that we have

suggested for Descartes.

We have earlier distinguished between

those properties a thing has necessarily and those that are

essential to it in the Cartesian sense.

A thing has a property

necessarily if, and only if, it has that property in every possible

world in which it exists

But not all properties that a thing has

necessarily are properties that are essential to it.

For example,

the property of being self -identical is, for Descartes, we can

suppose

.

had necessarily by every tiling, though nothing has it

essentially.
32)

Descartes would, however, hold the following principle:
(x )(F) (if x has F essentially, then x has
F necessarily)

since a thing has its essential properties in every world in which
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it exists, end that is just what is meant by
saying that something

has a property necessarily.
In addition, whatever considerations give rise to
Chisholm’s

principle , (23), should also lead to an acceptance of:
32)

(x)(F)(x has F necessarily if, and only
x cannot conceive himself except as
,
having F)
if

where the property variable in the latter takes as values all
properties.

The only difference between (32) and (33) lies in the

range of their respective quantifiers and the fact that one treats
of necessary properties where the other treats of essential proper-

ties

We saw above that someone might doubt that he has the

.

property of thinking essentially, and so could conceive himself tc
lack that property.

By the same consideration, a person may be

able to doubt that he has the property of thinking necessarily.

Jones

,

for example
34)

,

may be able to doubt:

property of being necessarily a
thinking thing.

I have the

and so would hold:
35)

I can conceive myself lacking the property
of being necessarily a thinking thing.

By (33), then, Jones could derive:
36)

do not have the property of being necessarily
a thinking thing necessarily.
I

However , given that we have been using S5 semantics

,

we seem bound

to accept:

37)

(x)(if x is necessarily F, then x is
necessarily necessarily F)

So if Jonas is not necessarily necessarily a thinking thing, then

.
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by (37) he is not necessarily a thinking
thing.
is not essentially a thinking thing either.

Hence, by (32) he

But that is a result

Descartes would not accept and it is inconsistent with
the claim
that Jones is essentially a thinking thing, which can
be demonstrated
by use of the principles ((21) and (23)
-(26)) that were adduced to

prove that Descartes* essence is thinking.
The problem, I think, again lies in taking (21) to yield truths

relevant to the search for a thing* s essence.

There is no reason

to accept it in conjunction with (22), nor is there any reason to

accept it in conjunction with (24).

And there is good reason for

not accepting the conjunction of (21), (23), (24), (25), and (26).
They, together with other principles they seem to commit us to,
load to contradictions

.

I

know of no way that we can salvage the

Argument from Systematic Elimination by Doubt to get a successful
proof for the claim that Descartes' essence is to think.
The C artesian Circle Argument f or Essence and Distinctness
I can see or.e last argument for his essence that Descartes might

be interpreted as having offered.
A.

38)
39)

That is the following:

I clearly and distinctly perceive that
my essence is to think.
Whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive
is true
My essence is to think
,

This is an argument similar to one that I earlier suggested as an

interpretation of the passage in Meditation VI that deals with the

distinctness of Descartes and his body

.

We have heretofore bean

supposing that Descartes* conclusion that his essence is to think

.
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could be used by him to prove distinctness.

But if the above

argument for his essence is successful, then Descartes could
also
have used a similar argument to prove that he is distinct from
his

body

He would not need to reason from his essence.

,

I said earlier that tiiere is some evidence that Descartes

.intended such an argument to prove distinctness possibly he also
r

intended it to prove that his essence is thinking.

That evidence

comes not from a careful reading of the sixth Meditation

,

but from

what Descartes claimed to have been the function of his argument
there.

In reply to /crnauld, Descartes claimed that the considera-

tions adduced in Med i t at. ion II were sufficient to adequately prove

that mind and body are distinct.

The purpose of considering the

topic again in Meditat ion VI was rather to allay metaphysical

doubt.

He says:

Consequently, if I had not been in search of a
certitude greater than the vulgar, I should have
been satisfied with showing in the Second Meditation that Mind was apprehended as a thing that
subsists, although nothing belonging to the body
be ascribed to it, and conversely that Body was
understood to be something subs! stent without
anything being attributed to it that pertains to
And I should have added nothing more
the mind
in order to prove that there was a real distinction between mind and body; because commonly we
judge that all things stand to each other in
respect to their actual relations in the same
way as they are related in our consciousness
But, since one of those hyperbolical doubts adduced in the First Meditation went so far as to
prevent me from being sure of this very fact
(viz. that things are in their true nature exactly
os we perceive them to be), so long as I supposed
that I had no knowledge of the author of my being,
all that I have said about God and about truth in
the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Meditations serves
.

to further the conclusion as to the real distinction between mind and bodv, which is finally
completed in Meditation
I take this passage to support an interpretation of the sixth

Meditation according to which Descartes intended the following
argument for distinctness:
B.

41)

I clearly and distinctly perceive that I

42)

am distinct from my body.
Whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive

43T

is true.
1 am distinct from my body.

In his reply Descartes speaks of proving the distinctness of mind

from body, but since he identifies himself as a mind in Meditatio n
II and since ha claimed to have proved the distinctness of himself

and body in VI, we are justified in offering (B) as an interpreta-

tion of his intent.
As I pointed out earlier in this chapter, the worth of argument
(B), to which we can now add (A), clearly turns on the extent to

which Descartes was successful in defending the second premise of
his argument.

Descartes* defense of the principle:
(p)(if I clearly and distinctly perceive p,
then p is true)

44)

occurs in the fourth Meditation

.

However, that defense rests on

the goodness of God, and so it requires the existence of God.

In

Meditation III Descartes presents a number of arguments for the
claim that God exists, but it seems that each has at least one
premise in whose defense Descartes appeals to his clear and distinct
perceptions

Many critics have claimed to find a kind of circularity

.

in Descartes

*

arguments that God exists and that his clear and

.

distinct perceptions are true.

Arnauld was the first such critic . 35

Clearly, then, the success of (A) and (B) depends upon the

extent to which the criticism of Arnauld was justified and the
extent to which Descartes was successful in answering it.

There

exists, of course, a whole tradition of Cartesian scholarship

devoted to assessing the worth of Arnauld*

reply

.

s

criticism and Descartes’

Certainly it is still an unsettled question whether

Descartes is guilty of the charge of circularity 36
.

And since it

is beyond the scope of this work to add significantly to that

controversy, we must leave open the possibility that the Cartesian
Circle Argument for Distinctness is ultimately successful.
For that reason, we must close this essay still unsatisfied

whether Descartes was in fact successful in proving himself to be
distinct from, his body.

We have examined a fair number of arguments

for that conclusion, some of them explicitly offered by Descartes,

others merely suggested by him, and a few with little mors to recom-

mend them than the fact that Descartes could have offered them had
he been so inclined.

But all that we have examined share the common

fault of failure
The argument most often attributed to Descartes, the Argument

from Doubt,

m

saw to ha invalid.

We have seen also that a few

common threads of difficulty run through most of the other arguments.
The strongest of those threads was spun by Descartes* concern to
avoid a petlti o by allowing that, prior to his attempt to prove

distinctness, he was, so far as he was aware, a material substance

~l6o

with the property of thinking

.

That position was one adopted by

some of Descartes 1 critics, notably Hobbes, against whom Descartes
was concerned to protect himself.

But in allowing the reasonable-

ness of the view he was opposing, Descartes seems to have disarmed

many oi

/els

own arguments

.

Those are the arguments that are genera-

ted by the claim that Descartes can conceive that he is distinct

from his body.
To assure the success of those arguments

,

Descartes should have

given considerations to the effect that he cannot conceive of himself being identical with his body.

But, quite the opposite, he

made concessions that can only be construed as committing him to
the claim that he can conceive that he is identical with his body.

But that commitment precludes the use of arguments from conceivability.

One consideration that Descartes might have advanced to

plead the non -concei vabili ty of

Ms

claim that his essence, but

his body

r.ct

identity with his body is his
f

s

essence, is to think.

However, we have seen reason to think that he was not successful in

establishing that claim either.
bfe

leave Descartes, then, with only one unexamined possibility

for proving distinctness, the Cartesian Circle Argument.

So while

we haven* t shown that he successfully proved Mmself to be distinct

from His body 3 neither have we shovm that he failed.

„
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2.

HR -’II , 64.
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6.

Descartes possibly means to defend the claim that thinking is
his only essential property by appeal to the claim that it is
the only property he knows himself to possess , since he can
doubt his possession of any other property. We will discuss
that defense later in the chapter.

7.

An alternative reading of the first premise of (H) is suggested
by Descartes in Rep lies to Objections II according to which
we should replace^(38y”wii:h:
38*)

If I can conceive that x and y exist
separately, then x is distinct from y.

We will consider the argument that so results somewhat later.
8.

HR -I, 440

9.

HR-!, 243-4.

10.

HR-II, 59.

11.

Descartes con also be interpreted as having claimed that what
he clearly perceives is that the mind and body can exist
separately, the possibility of which state of affairs would
That suggests a different argument for
he guaranteed by God.
distinctness, one that will be considered below.
.

12.

HR "I , 190.

13.

HR-II, 64.

14.

MR -I

15.

HR -I , 196.
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16.

Descartes does not actually assert (id) with respect to
himself , but rather with respect to his mind. However,
we must assume that the same considerations apply in both
cases, since Descartes here seems to switch back and forth
between talk of himself and talk of his mind.

17.

HR -I , 101.
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Descartes

19.

Ibid
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pp. 81-82.
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23.

Descartes

24.
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aa come to grips with Kenny 1 s discussion.

25.

"Descartes f s Proof that His Essence is Thinking,’ Doney,
pp. 312-337.

26.

Ibid., p. 315.

27.

Idem
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7m attempt to provide a Cartesian analysis of f x has P essentially’ has recently come to my attention. It might be
possible to construct an essence -finder principle from such
an analysis. Peter J. Loptson (Cartesian Essentiali sm, Ph.D.
Dissertation, Univ. of Pittsburg" 19727 has attempted to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a thing’s having
Loptson also
a property essentially in Descartes sense
attribute as
differentiating
a
of
refers to Broad’s concept
and he
property
essential
an
capturing Descartes* notion of
placed
Broad
conditions
the
to
tries to give formal expression
work
s
Loptson
Unfortunately,
on differentiating attributes.
appears
it
however,
here;
has come to me too late to be treated
that Loptson has not found in Descartes any arguments defending
his views about essence. Further, Loptson’ s analysis seems
defective in that it lias the consequence that a thing can
have the property of thinking without having it es sen tidily.
ecuept
That is a consequence that I believe Descartes would no>.
will
Loptson
of
I am inclined to think that a thorough reading
interpretation
uncover many other points of dispute with my own
of Descartes
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30.
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31.
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32.
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33.

Formal, but not philosophical, problems might be created by
our assumption. In particular, we may need to use modal free
logic to express it formally, since under some semantic
interpretations *Nec Fa* is true only if a exists in all
possible worlds
The problem lies solely in giving formal
expression to our philosoj>hical intuitions

.

,

pp

.

318-319
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34.

HR -II , 101.

35.

HR-JI, 92.

36.

A worthy, and very promising, effort has recently been made
by Fred Feldman to finally settle the question in Descartes*
favor. See his "Episfende JippraisaJ and the Cartesian Circle,"
yet to appear at this writing.

